The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

indeed is what we should expect; for sleep is the cessation of the soul from those functions in respect of which it is called good or bad, except in so far as the motions of the body may sometimes make their way in, and give occasion to dreams which are better in the good man than in ordinary people.

However, we need not pursue this further, and may 14 dismiss the nutritive principle, since it has no place in the excellence of man.

But there seems to be another vital principle that 15 is irrational, and yet in some way partakes of reason. In the case of the continent and of the incontinent man alike, we praise the reason or the rational part, for it exhorts them rightly and urges them to do what is best ; but there is plainly present in them another principle besides the rational one, which fights and struggles against the reason. For just as a paralyzed 16 limb, when you will to move it to the right, moves on the contrary to the left, so it is with the soul ; the incontinent man's impulses run counter to his reason. Only whereas we see the refractory member in the case of the body, we do not see it in the case of the soul. But we must nevertheless, I think, hold that in the soul, too, there is something beside the reason, which opposes and runs counter to it (though in what sense it is distinct from the reason does not matter here).

It seems, however, to partake of reason also, as we 17 said : at least, in the continent man it submits to the reason; while in the temperate and courageous man we may say it is still more obedient ; for in him it is altogether in harmony with the reason.

The irrational part, then, it appears, is twofold. 18

p. 33

There is the vegetative faculty, which has no share of reason ; and the faculty of appetite or of desire in general, ■which partakes of reason in a manner — that >, in so far as it listens to reason and submits to its -way. But when we say "partakes of reason" or listens to reason," we mean this in the sense in which we talk of " listening to reason " from parents or friends, not in the sense in which we talk of listening to reason from mathematicians.

Further, all advice and all rebuke and exhortation testifies that the irrational part is in some way amenable to reason.

If then we like to say that this part, too, has a share of reason, the rational part also will have two divisions : one rational in the strict sense as possessing reason in itself, the other rational as listening to reason as a man listens to his father.

Now, on this division of the faculties is based the division of excellence; for we speak of intellectual excellences and of moral excellences; wisdom and understanding and prudence we call intellectual, liberaHty and temperance we call moral vii-tues or excellences, When we are speaking of a man's moral chai-acter we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that he is gentle or temperate. But we praise the wise man, too, for his habit of mind or trained faculty ; and a habit or trained faculty that is praiseworthy is what we call an excellence or virtue.

D

BOOK II.

MORAL VIRTUE.

Moral virtue 1. EXCELLENCE, then, being of these two kinds, in- i hyVh^repe- tellcctual and moral, intellectual excellence owes its correspond- Dirth and growth mainly to instruction, and so requires time and experience, while moral excellence is the result of habit or custom (eOog), and has accordingly in our language received a name formed by a slight change from Wog*

From this it is plain that none of the moral excel- 2 lences or virtues is implanted in us by nature; for that which is by nature cannot be altered by training. For instance, a stone naturally tends to fall downwards, and you could not train it to rise upwards, though you tried to do so by throwing it up ten thousand times, nor could you train fire to move downwards, nor accustom anything which naturally behaves in one way to behave in any other way.

The virtues,! then, come neither by nature nor 3