The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

Life itself, then, is good and pleasant (as appears also from the fact that all desire it, and especially the good and the blessed ; for life is most desirable to them, and their life is the most blessed). * Cf. the last words of the book.

9. 7-10.] FRIENDSHIP OR LOVE. 311

But he who sees feels that he sees, and he who hears feels that he hears, and he who walks feels that he walks; and similarly, whatever else we do, there is something that perceiv^es that we are putting forth power, so that we must feel that we feel, and know that we know.

But to feel that we feel, or to know that we know, is to feel or to know that we exist ; for our existence, we found, is feeling or knowing [thinking].

But to feel that we exist is a thing that is pleasant in itself; for life is naturally good, and to feel that one has a good is pleasant.

Life, then, is desirable, and most of all desirable to the good man, because his existence is good to him, and pleasant ; for he is pleased by the consciousness of that which is good in itself.

But the good man stands in the same relation to his friend as to himself, for his friend is another self : just as his own existence, then, is desirable to each, 80, or nearly so, is his friend's existence desirable.

But existence, we found, is desirable because of the feeling that one's self is good, such a feeling being pleasant in itself.

The good man, then, should be conscious of the existence of his friend also, and this consciousness \s'ill be given by living with him and by rational converse with him (for this would seem to be the proper meaning of living together, when applied to man, and not merely feeding in the same place, which it means when applied to beasts).

Putting all this together, then, if his own existence is desirable in itself to the good man, being naturally

312 NICOMACHEAK ETHICS OF AKISTOTLE. [Bk. IX.

good and pleasant, and if his friend's existence is also desirable to him in nearly the same way, it follows that a friend is a desirable thing for him. But that which is desirable for him he ought to have, or in that respect he will be incomplete. Our conclusion, therefore, is that he who is to be happy must have good friends. oftheproper 10. Are WO to make as many friends as possible ?

number of . r.'ii>* friends. or, as lu the case of guest-friendship * we approve of the saying, "neither a host of guest-friends nor yet none," shall we say that in the case of friendship also it is best neither to be friendless nor yet to have too many friends ?

With regard to friends who are chosen with a view to being useful, the saying would seem to be perfectly appropriate ; for it would be troublesome to repay the services of a large number, and indeed life is not long enough to enable us to do it. Of such friends, therefore, a larger number than is sufficient for one's own life would be superfluous and a hindrance to noble living ; so we do not want more than that number.

Again, of friends chosen with a view to pleasure a small number is enough, as a small proportion of sweets is enough in our diet.

But are we to have as many good men for friends as we can, or is there any limit of numbers in friendship, as there is in a state ? for you could not make a state out of ten men, and if you had a hundred thousand your state would cease to be a state. But perhaps the right number of citizens is not one fixed

* Cf. note on viii. 3, 4.

p. 313

iber, but any number witbin certain limits. And with friends there is a limit to their number, and it is, we may say, the largest number that one can with : for livingf together is, as we saw, one of the mL»st essential characteristics of friendship, and it is quite evident that it is impossible to live with and spread one's self abroad among a large number.

Moreover, a man's friends must be friends with another, if all are to spend their time together ; but this is difficult with a large number.