The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)
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The translator’s English as printed (F. H. Peters). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
We blame, it is said, those who love themselves most, and apply the term self-loving to them as a term of reproach : and, again, lie who is not good is thought to have regard to himself in everjrthing that he does, and the more so the worse he is ; and so we accuse him of doing nothing disinterestedly. The good man, on the other hand, it is thought, takes what is noble as his motive, and the better he is the more is he guided by this motive, and by regard for his friend, neglecting his own interest.
But this theoiy disagrees with facts, nor is it surprising that it should. For it is allowed that we ought to love him most who is most truly a friend, and that he is most truly a friend who, in wishing weU to another, wishes well to him for his (the other's) sake, and even though no one should ever know. But all these characteristics, and all the others which go to make up the definition of a friend.
304 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF AKISTOTLE. [Bk. IX.
are found in the highest degree in a man's relations to himself; for we have already seen how it is from our relations to ourselves that all our friendly relations to others are derived. Moreover, all the proverbs point to the same conclusion — such as " Friends have one soul," " Friends have all things in common," " Equality makes friendship," " The knee is nearer than the shin." All these characteristics are found in the highest degree in a man's relations to himself ; for he is his own best friend : and so he must love himself better than any one else.
People not unnaturally are puzzled to know which of these two statements to adopt, since both appeal to them.
Perhaps the best method of dealing with conflicting statements of this kind is to analyze them, and then clearly distinguish how far and in what sense each is right. So here, if we first ascertain what self-loving means in each statement, the difficulty will perhaps be cleared up.
Those who use self-loving as a term of reproach apply the name to those who take more than their due of money, and honour, and bodily pleasures ; for the generality of men desire these things, and set their hearts upon them as the best things in the world, so that they are keenly competed for. Those, then, who grasp at more than their share of these things indulge their animal appetites and their passions generally — in a word, the irrational part of their nature. But this is the character of the generality of men; and hence the term self-loving has come to be used in this bad sense from the fact that8. 3-6.] FRIENDSHIP OR LOVE. 305 the greater part of mankind are not good. It is with justice, then, that we reproach those who are self-loving in this sense.
That it really is to those who take more than lueir due of these things that the term is usually applied by the genei-ality of men, may easily be shown; for if what a man always set his heart upon were that he, rather than another, should do what is just or temperate, or in any other way virtuous — if, in a word, he were always claiming the noble course of conduct, no one would call him self-loving and no one would reproach him.
And yet such a man would seem to be more truly self-loving. At least, he takes for himself that which is noblest and most truly good, and gratifies the ruling power in himself, and in all things obeys it But just as the ruling part in a state or in any other system seems, more than any other part, to be the state or the system, so also the ruling part of a man seems to be most truly the man's self. He therefore who loves and gratifies this part of himself is most truly self-loving.
Again, we call a man continent or incontinent,* according as his reason has or has not the mastery, implying that his reason is his self; and when a man has acted under the guidance of his reason he is thought, in the fullest sense, to have done the deed himself, and of his own will.
It is plain, then, that this part of us is our self, or is most truly our self, and that the good man more
* iyKpa.T-i)s, continent, in whom the true masters the false self; htftn-fis, incontinent, in whom the true self is mastered.
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p. 306