The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)
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The translator’s English as printed (F. H. Peters). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
But the characteristics we have mentioned appear to be found in the generality of men, though they are not good.* Perhaps we may sa}^ that so far as they are agreeable to themselves, and believe they are good, so far do they share these characteristics. People who are utterly worthless and impious never have them, nor do they even seem to have them. But we might almost ( say roundly that they are wanting in all who are not good ; for such men are not at one with themselves : they desire one thing while they wish another, as the incontinent do, for instance (for, instead of what they hold to be good, they choose what is pleasant, though injurious). Others, again, through cowardice or laziness, shrink from doing that which they believe is the best for them ; while those who have done many terrible things out of wickedness, hate life, and wish to get rid of it, and sometimes actually destroy themselves.
Bad men try to find people with whom to spend ti their time, and eschew their own company ; for there is much that is painful in the past on which they
* <pav\os here as elsewhere includes all who are not good, the incontinent as well as the vicious.
^Ak back and in the future to which they look
Pwward when they are, by themselves, but the company of others diverts them from these thoughts.
As there is nothing lovable in them, they have no friendly feelings towards themselves.
He who is not good, then, cannot sympathize with himself in joy or sorrow ; for his soul is divided against itself : one part of him, by reason of its viciousness, is pained at being (thrived of something, while another part of him is pleased ; one part pulls this way, another that, tearing him to pieces, as it were, between them. Or if it be impossible to be pained and pleased at the same time, yet, at any rate, after a short interval he is pained that he was pleased, and wishes that he had never partaken of this pleasure ; for those who are not good are full of remoree.
Thus we may say roundly that he who is not good has no friendly feelings even for himself, as there is nothing lovable in him. If, then, to be in this state is utterly miserable, we ought to strain every nerve to avoid vice, and try to be good ; for thus we may be friendly disposed towards ourselves, and make friends with others.
5. Well-wishing resembles, but is not the same as, fViendsMp friendship : for we may wish well to those who are tnii. unknown to us, and who are not aware that we wish them well; but there can be no friendship in such cases. But this we have already said.
Neither is well-wishing the same as love; for it has none of the intense emotion and the desire which accompany love.
Love, moreover, implies intimate acquaintance.
p. 298
%i -^ v\ ' "^^^^^ well-wishing may spring up in a moment ; iJ does so, for instance, when athletes are competing fol lA^jNiifrtO-O a prize : we may wish well to a competitor, and be eager for his success, though we would not do anything to help him ; for, as we said, we suddenly become well-wishers and conceive a sort of superficial affection in such cases.