The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

282 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF AKISTOTLE. [Bk. VIIL all men, though they wish for what is noble, choose what is profitable ; and while it is noble to do a good service without expecting a return, it is profitable to receive a benefit.

In such cases, then, we should, if we have the power, make an equivalent return for benefits received, even if there be no necessity to do so ; for we must not treat a man as a friend if he does not wish it. We should consider that we made a mistake at the beginning, and received a benefit from a person from whom we ought not to have accepted it — for he was not a friend and did not act disinterestedly — and so we ought to terminate the relation in the same way as if we had received a service for a stipulated consideration. But the stipulation would only be to repay if we have the power ; if we have it not, even the donor would not claim repayment : so we may fairly say that we should repay if we have the power.

But we ought at the outset carefully to consider who it is that is doing us a service, and on what understanding, so that we may accept it on that understanding or else reject it.

It is a debatable question whether the requital is to be measured by, and to be made proportionate to, the value of the service to the recipient or to the benefactor. For the recipients are apt to say that they received what was but a small matter to their benefactors, and what they might just as well have got from others, depreciating the service done them ; but the others, on the contrary, are apt to say that what they gave was the best they had, and whatp. 283 not be got from any one else, and that it was in a time of danger or on some other pressing 3ion.

Perhaps we may say that, if the friendship have

)fit for its motive, the benefit received should be ten as the measure ; for it is the recipient who. asks dee, which the other render in expectation of an service in return : the amount of the assistance idered, then, is determined by the extent to which le former is benefited, and he should repay as much as he received, or even more ; for that would be the nobler course.

In fi-iendships based on virtue, on the other hand, such accusations do not occur, but it would seem that the measure of the service is the purpose of him who does it ; for virtue and moral chai'acter are determined by purpose.

14. Quarrels occur also in unequal fi-iendships; for cftketamt sometimes each claims the larger share, but when this /riatdikipt. happens the fidendship is dissolved. For instance, the better of the two thinks he ought to have the larger share ; " the good man's share is lai'ger," he saj's : the more useful of the two makes the same claim ; " it is allowed," he says, " that a useless person should not share equally; for friendship degenerates into gratuitous stivice unless that which each receives from the friendship be proportionate to the value of what he does." For such people fancy that the same rule should hold in friendship as in a commercial partnership, where those who put in more take a larger share.

The needy man and the inferior man argue in thep. 284 contrary way ; " it is the office of a good friend," they say, " to help you when you are in need ; for what is the use of being friends with a good man or a powerful man, if you are to get nothing by it ? "

It seems that the claims of both are right, and that each ought to receive a larger share than the other, but not of the same things — the superior more honour, the needy man more profit ; for honour is the tribute due to virtue and benevolence, while want receives its due succour in the pecuniary gain.