The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

These also are different from one another ; for that of parent for child is not the same as that of ruler for subject, nor even that of father for son the same as that of son for father, nor that of man for woman the same as that of woman for man. For each of these classes has a different excellence and a different function, and the grounds of their affection are different ; therefore their love and their friendship also are different. What each does for the other, then, is not the same, nor should they expect it to be the same ; but when children give to their parents what they owe to those who begat them, and parents give to their sons what they owe to their children, then such friendship wiU be lasting, and what it ought to be. But in all friendships based on inequality, the love on either side should be proportional — I mean that the better of the two (and the more useful.

266 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OP ARISTOTLE. [Bk. VIII and so on in each case) should receive more love thai he gives; for when love is proportioned to desert then there is established a sort of equality, whicl seems to be a necessary condition of friendship.

But there seems to be a difference between the equality that prevails in the sphere of justice and that which prevails in friendship : for in the sphere of justice the primary sense of " equal " [or " fair,' 'i(Tov] is " proportionate to merit," and " equal in quantity " is only the secondary sense ; but in friendship " equal in quantity " is the primary, and " proportionate to merit" the secondary sense.*

This is plainly seen in cases where there comes to be a great distance between the persons in virtue, or vice, or wealth, or in any other respect ; for they no longer are, nor expect to be, friends. It is most plainly seen in the case of the gods ; for they have the greatest superiority in all good things. But it is seen also in the case of princes ; for here also those who are greatly inferior do not claim their friendship ; nor do people of no consideration expect to be friends with the best and wisest in the state. It is impossible accurately to determine the limits within which friendship may subsist in such cases : many things may be taken away, and it may remain ; but

7. 3-8, 2.] FRIENDSHIP OR LOVE. 25^

again, given a being very far removed, as God, and it can no longer be.

* The general rule of justice is that what different people receive is different, being proportionate to their respective merits (rh Kar' a^iav taov, or la6T7\s \6ywv : cf. V. 3, 6, 5, 6 and 17) ; in exceptional cases, when the merits of the persons are the same, what they receive is equal [rh Kar' a^iav becomes t^ Kara Trocrhv Xaov) . But friendship in the primary sense is friendship between equals, so that the general rule here is that both give and take equal amounts of love, etc. ; in the exceptional case of inequality between the persons, the amounts must be proportionate.

This has suggested the objection that, after all, a friend does not \rish his friend the greatest of all goods, that he should become a god ; for then he would lose a friend — that is, a good ; for a friend is a good thing. If then we were right in saying that a friend wishes good to his friend for his (the friend's) sake, we must add, " the friend remaining what he is : " so far as is compatible with his being a man, he will wish him the greatest good — but perhaps not everything that is good ; for every man wishes good most of all to himself.

8. Most people seem, from a desire for honour, to of Joeing

'■ ^ _ and being