The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

11 naturally follow, as it is a sort of virtue, or sX mfferoKu least implies vii-tue, and is, moreover, most necessary "otMuTuT our life. For no one would care to live without iends, though he had all other good things. Indeed, is when a man is rich, and has got power and ittithority, that he seems most of all to stand in need of iends ; for what is the use of all this prosperity if he lave no opportunity for benevolence, which is most requently and most commendably displayed towards iends ? or how could his position be maintained and reserved without friends ? for the greater it is, the lore is it exposed to danger. In poverty and all bher misfortunes, aorain, we reo^ard our friends as oiuly refuge. We need friends when we are young keep us from error, when we get old to tend upon and to carry out those plans which we have not rength to execute ourselves, and in the prime of fe to help us in noble deeds — " two together " [as

[omer says] ; for thus we are more efficient both in lought and in action.

Love seems to be implanted by nature in the irent towards the offspring, and in the offspiingp. 252 towards the parent, not only among men, but also among birds and most animals ; and in those of the same race towards one another, among men especially — for which reason we commend those who love their fellow-men. And when one travels one may see how man is always akin to and dear to man.

Again, it seems that friendship is the bond that i holds states together, and that lawgivers are even more eager to secure it than justice. For concord bears a certain resemblance to friendship, and it is concord that they especially wish to retain, and dissension that they especially wish to banish as an enemy. If citizens be friends, they have no need of justice, but though they be just, they need friendship or love also; indeed, the completest realization of justice * seems to be the realization of friendship or love also.

Moreover, friendship is not only an indispensable, but also a beautiful or noble thing : for we commend those who love their friends, and to have many friends is thought to be a noble thing; and some even think that a good man is the same as a friend.f

But there are not a few differences of opinion about the matter. Some hold that it is a kind of likeness, and that those who are like one another are friends ; and this is the origin of " Like to like," and "Birds of a feather flock together," $ and other similar sayings. Others, on the contrary, say that " two of a trade never agree." §

* TcDc SiKalwv 7h [xa\iaT(x, sc. rh eTrieiKes : cf. V. 10, and VI. 11, 2. t Cf. Plato, Eep., 334. % Literally, " Crow to crow."

§ Literally, " say that all who thus resemble one another are to one another like potters," alluding to the line of Hesiod, kuI

4-2, 1.]

FRIENDSHIP OR LOVE.

Others go deeper into these questions, and into le causes of the phenomena ; Euripides, for instance,

" The parched earth loves the rain,
And the high heaven, with moisture laden, loves
Earthwards to fall."

jraclitus also says, "Opposites fit together," and >ut of discordant elements comes the fairest harlony, and " It is by battle that all things come into ^e world." Others, and notably Empedocles, take ke opposite view, and say that like desires like. Of these difficulties, all that refer to the constitution of the tmi verse maybe dismissed (for they do not properly concern our present inquiry) ; but those that refer to human nature, and are intimately connected with man's character and affections, we will discuss -as, for instance, whether friendship can exist in all len, or whether it is impossible for men to be friends they are bad, and whether there be one form of iendship or rather many. For those who suppose lat there is only one kind of friendship, because admits of degrees, go upon insufficient grounda igs that differ in kind may differ also in degree. Jut we have already spoken about this point.*) 2. Perhaps these difficulties will be cleared up if Jfireewutiva

'^ ^ of friendre first ascertain what is the nature of the lovable. ^h>-

, . , f'riet%dthip

' it seems that we do not love anythtng, but*/"**- V the lovable, and that the lovable is either or pleasant or useful. But useful would appear

611$ Kfpafiii Korffi Kou Ttgrovi reicrwy — "Potter qoarrels with
Jtter, and carpenter with carpenter."
• See Bamsaner.

254 NICOMAOHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE. [Bk. VIII.