The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

18 We must bear in mind, however, what was said above, and not demand the same degree of accuracy in all branches of study, but in each case so much as the -ubject-matter admits of and as is proper to that kind

'^ uf inquiry. The carpenter and the geometer both look for the straight line, but in different ways : the former ly wants a line sufficiently straight for his work, but the latter wants to know what constitutes a straight line, or what is its special quality ; his aim is to find out the truth. And so in other cases we must

I

* This " best and most complete excellence or virtue " is the trained faculty for philosophic speculation, and the contemplative life ia man's highest happiness. C/. X. 7, 1.

t C/. 9, 11.

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This view

harmnnizes various current views.

2C follow the same course, lest we spend more time on what is immaterial than on the real business in hand.

Nor must we in all cases alike demand the reason why ; sometimes it is enough if the undemonstrated fact be fairly pointed out, as in the case of the starting-points or principles of a science. Undemonstrated facts always form the first step or starting-point of a science ; and these starting-points or principles are 21 arrived at some in one way, some in another — some by induction, others by perception, others again by some kind of training. But in each case we must try to apprehend them in the proper way, and do our best to define them clearly ; for they have great influence upon the subsequent course of an inquiry, A good start is more than half the race, I think, and our starting-point or principle, once found, clears up a number of our difficulties.

8. We must not be satisfied, then, with examining l this starting-point or principle of ours as a conclusion from our data, but must also view it in its relation to current opinions on the subject ; for all experience harmonizes with a true principle, but a false one is soon found to be incompatible with the facts.

Now, good things have been divided into three classes, external goods on the one hand, and on the other goods of the soul and goods of the body ; and the goods of the soul are commonly said to be goods in the fullest sense, and more good than any other.

But " actions and exercises of the vital faculties or soul " may be said to be " of the soul." So our account is confirmed by this opinion, which is both of long

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tanding and approved by all who busy themselves with philosophy.

But, indeed, we secure the support of this opinion by the mere statement that certain actions and exercises are the end; for this implies that it is to be ranked among the goods of the soul, and not among external goods.

Oiu' account, again, is in harmony with the common saj-ing that the happy man lives well and does well ; for we may say that happiness, according to us, is a livinor Tvell and doincj well.

And, indeed, all the characteristics that men expect to find in happiness seem to belong to happiness as we define it.

Some hold it to be virtue or excellence, some prudence, others a kind of wisdom ; others, again, hold it to be all or some of these, with the addition of pleasure, either as an ingredient or as a necessarjaccompaniment; and some even include external prosperity in their account of it.

Now, some of these views have the support of many voices and of old authority; others have few voices, but those of weight ; but it is probable that ;ieither the one side nor the other is entirely wrong, but that in some one point at least, if not in most, they are both right.

First, then, the view that happiness is excellence or a kind of excellence harmonizes with our account ; for "exercise of faculties in accordance with excellence " belongs to excellence.

But I think we may say that it makes no small difierence whether the good be conceived as the mere

20 NICOMAOHEAN ETHICS OF AKISTOTLE. [Bk. I.