Dialogues of the Buddha, Part II — trans. T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids (1910)

1 ' Who are they,' asks the Cy., ' who refrain ? All ariya-puggala — noble-minded persons, learned persons : — those who know the Three Pi/akas (by heart), or two, or one, or even only one of the Nikayas, and can discourse thereon, and are of alert insight. These take die kasi«as for what they are, and, for them, the constituents of mind (the four khandhas) are such and no more.'

p. 63

26. ' And in each case, Ananda, he who refrains from making; the declaration, does not make it with regard either to the present life, or to the next life, nor is it his idea : — " My soul not being like that, I will refashion it into that likeness." [66] That being so, Ananda, we have said enough about the case of those who are not given to theories respecting the form and dimensions of the soul.

' In so many ways, Ananda, is there a refraining from declarations concerning the soul.'

A

27. ' And under how many aspects, Ananda, is the soul regarded ? The soul is regarded x either as feeling, in the words : — " My soul is feeling " — or the opposite, in the words : — " Nay, my soul is not feeling, my soul is not sentient " ; or again : — " Nay, my soul is not feeling, nor is it non-sentient ; my soul has feelings, it has the property of sentience." Under such aspects as these is the soul regarded.

28. ' Herein, Ananda, to him who affirms : — " My soul is feeling" — answer should thus be made : — " My friend, feeling is of three kinds. There is happy feeling, painful feeling, neutral feeling. Of these three feelings, look you, which do you consider your soul is ? "

A

* When you feel a happy feeling, Ananda, you do not feel a painful feeling, or a neutral feeling ; you feel just a happy feeling. And when you feel a painful feeling, you do not feel a happy feeling, or a neutral feeling, but just a painful feeling. And when you feel a neutral feeling, you do not then feel a happy feeling or a painful feeling ; you feel just a neutral feeling.

1 These three forms of the ' individuality-heresy ' amount to an interesting and metaphysically more discriminating statement of the oft-quoted theories identifying the soul or mannikin with one or other of the five Khandhas. (See Vin. I, 13 (' Vin. Texts,' 1, 100) ; M. 1, 138, 300; S. Ill, 66; IV, 34, &c.) According to the Cy., the second assertion is the identification with the body (rupakkhandhavatthuka), which is usually placed first; the third assertion includes identification of the soul with the other three Khandhas — with, let us say, thinking and volition.

64 XV. MAIIA-NIDANA-SUTTANTA. P. ii. 66.

29. 'Moreover, Ananda, happy feeling is impermanent, a product *, the result of a cause or causes, liable to perish [67], to pass away, to become extinct, to cease. So too is painful feeling. So too is neutral feeling. If when experiencing a happy feeling one thinks : — " This is my soul," — when that same happy feeling ceases, one will also think : — " My soul has departed." So too when the feeling is painful, or neutral. Thus he who says : — " My soul is feeling," — regards, as his soul, something which, in this present life, is impermanent, is blended of happiness and pain, and is liable to begin and to end. Wherefore, Ananda, it follows that this aspect : — " My soul is feeling " — does not commend itself.

A

30. ' Herein again, Ananda, to him who affirms : — " Nay, my soul is not feeling, my soul is not sentient," — answer should thus be made : — " My friend, where there is no feeling of anything, can you there say: — ' I am r

' You cannot, lord V

' Wherefore, Ananda, it follows that this aspect : —
" Nay, my soul is not feeling, my soul is not sentient,"
— does not commend itself.

A

31. ' Herein again, Ananda, to him who affirms : — " Nay, my soul is not feeling, nor is it non sentient ; my soul has feelings, it has the property of sentience," — answer should thus be made : — " My friend, were feeling of every sort or kind to cease absolutely, then there being, owing to the cessation thereof, no feeling whatever, could one then say : — ' I myself am ' ? "

' No, lord, one could not.'