Dialogues of the Buddha, Part II — trans. T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids (1910)

1 The Cy. interprets as active: — na kafici sattarh tapentiti — they torment no one.

2 Paraphrased as ' lovely to look at, beautiful, charming.'

3 Paraphrased as ' because they see vividly the beautiful vision of the former.'

INTRODUCTION

TO THE

mahA-nidAna-suttanta.

The doctrine of Pa/icca-samuppada — that all dhamma (phenomena physical and mental) are pa^iccasamuppanna (happen by way of cause) finds in the following Suttanta the fullest exposition accorded to it throughout the Pi/akas. It is true that for some reason (cf. p. 26, n. 1) the Dighabha^akas (recorders of the Digha-Nikaya) excluded the first two of the Twelve Nidanas — avijja, sankhara. — and that, in the Paccayakara-vibhanga of the Abhidhamma, the formula is reiterated and analysed with greater variety of presentation. But in the present instance the doctrinal contents are more fully worked out. There is another feature in this Digha exposition which seems to us of no little significance.

But before discussing this feature, we would point to yet another factor in the statement of the chain of the Nidanas which does not find a place in the Nidana-Suttanta. This is the schematized, or abstract formula of the whole sequence, showing the logic of it without the contents — ' That being thus, this comes to be, from the coming to be of that, this arises. That being absent this does not happen, from the cessation of that, this ceases.' (M. II, 32.) In the other Nikayas the scheme usually precedes the full formula, and in one case where the principle of the latter is called 'the Dhamma,'' supersedes the formula. It is on all fours with the modern formulation of the law of causation — ' That every event is the result or sequel of some previous event, or events, without which it could not have happened, and which, being present, it must take place.'

The significant feature is this : — although the formula, as expounded in this Suttanta, ends in the usual way — ' Such is the uprising of this whole body of 111' — the burden of the Dialogue is in no way directly concerned with 111, pain or sorrow. In certain other passages, on the other hand, where the Nidana-chain occurs, dukkha occupies the foreground. Thus in A. I, 177, the formula of the Paricca-samuppada is rehearsed to explain the Aryan Truth of the uprising of 111.

In M. I, 190 the context of the formula is an exhortation by Sariputta on the primary importance of a right attitude towards, and understanding of, the nature and causes of 111, so that the brethren may meet persecutions — ills not due to their own ill deeds — with fortitude and serenity. In the Nidana- Sawyutta of the Sawyutta-Nikaya, all the contexts of the formula known to the compilers are grouped together. Of the ninety-three brief Suttas of which this division consists, only one-sixth of those in which the formula occurs, have Dukkha (or its opposite) for their subject. A slightly larger proportion of the Suttas (16) are so many statements upholding the truth of the evolution of phenomena by way of natural causation. That any being exists absolutely and eternally is at the same time denied. And that any being ever perishes absolutely is equally denied. Of the remaining Suttas, four, in which Loka, the world of sense-perception, is substituted in the Pa/icca-samuppada for Dukkha, belong virtually to the foregoing sixteen. Seven are concerned with rebirth, eight are ethical exhortations to destroy Craving, and thirty-six emphasize the importance of mastering the principle of the Pa/icca-samuppada. That holds the key to insight ; to understand it is therefore the test of true knowledge and sound doctrine. This too is the point in Sawyutta V, 387-9, where the formula again occurs. Once more, in the very strongly emphasized rehearsal of the formula in the ' Great Ta?zha-sankhaya-Sutta ' of M. I, 256, the doctrine there inculcated is not in any way hedonistic, sentimental or, directly, moral. It has nothing to say about Dukkha. It is a repudiation of the belief in any permanent, transmigrating intelligent principle (vi fin aw a) in man, and the affirmation of the contrary view — that vifina;za is a contingent phenomenon, a happening by way of cause and effect, something that ' becomes ' and dies away.