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1ngs besides^' These diflFerent concepts, then, were only so many standpoints* from which we could consider duration. Neither separated nor 24 An Introduction to reunited have they made us penetrate inl it. We do penetrate into it, however, and that can only be by an effort of intuition. In this sense, an inner, absolute knowledge of the duration of the self by the self is possible. But if metaphysics here demands and can obtain an intuition, science has none the less need of an analysis. Now it is a confusion between the function of analysis and that of intuition which gives birth to the discussions between the schools and the conflicts between systems. Psychology, in fact, proceeds like all the other sciences by analysis. It resolves the self, which has been given to it at first in a simple intuition, into sensations, feelings, ideas, etc., which it studies separately. It substitutes, then, for the self a series of elements which form the facts of psy- chology. But are these elements really parts? That is the whole question, is because it has l)een evaded tl int^H Metaphysics 25 problem of human personality has so often been stated in insoluble terms. It is incontestable that every psychical \ state, simply because it belongs to a per- / son, reflects the whole of a personality. Every feeling, however simple it may be, contains virtually within it the whole past and present of the being experiencing it, and, consequently, can only be separated and constituted into a " state " by an effort of abstraction or of analysis. But it is no ^ ., less incontestable that without this effort / of abstraction or analysis there would be j no possible development of the science of ' psychology. What, then, exactly, is the operation by which a psychologis t detaches a mental state in order to erect it into a v.. more or less independent entity? He be- gins by neglecting that special coloring of the personality which cannot be ex- pressed in known and common terms. Then he endeavors to isolate, in the person already thus simplified, some aspect which lends itself to an interesting inquiry. If 26 An Introduction to he is considering inclination, for exampi he will neglect the inexpressible shade which colors it, and which makes the in- clination mine and not jours; he will fix his attention on the movement by which our personality leans towards a certain object : he will isolate this attitude, and it is this special aspect of the personality, this snapshot of the mobility of the inner life, this " diagram " of concrete inclination, that he will erect into an independent fact. There is in this something very like what an artist passing through Paris does when he makes, for example, a sketch of a tower of Notre Dame. The tower is in- separably united to the building, which is itself no less inseparably united to the ground, to its surroundings, to the whole of Paris, and so on.
2is in this something very like what an artist passing through Paris does when he makes, for example, a sketch of a tower of Notre Dame. The tower is in- separably united to the building, which is itself no less inseparably united to the ground, to its surroundings, to the whole of Paris, and so on. It is first necessary to detach it from all these ; only one aspect of the whole is noted, that formed by the tower of Notre Dame. Moreover, the spe- cial form of this tower is doe to the group- ing of the stones of which it is composed ; ipl^H tade ' Metaphysics 27 but the artist does not concern himself with these stones, he notes only the silhouette of the tower. For the real and internal organi- zation of the thing he substitutes, then, an external and schematic representation. So that, on the whole, his sketch corresponds to an observation of the object from a cer- tain point of view and to the choice of a certain means of representation. But ex- actly the same thing holds true of the operation by which the psychologist ex- tracts a single mental state from the whole I)ersonality. This isolated psychical state is hardly anything but a sketch, the com- mencement of an artificial reconstruction; it is the whole considered under a certain elementary aspect in which we are specially interested and which we have carefully noted. It is not a part, but an element. It has not been obtained by a natural dismemberment, but by analysis. Now beneath all the sketches he has made at Paris the visitor will probably, by way of memento, write the word " Paris." And N 28 ^n Introduction to as he has really seen Paris, he will be able, with the help of the original intnitiou he had of the whole, to place his sketches therein, and so join them up together. But there is no way of performing the inverse operation; it is impossible, even with an infinite number of accurate sketches, and even with the word "Paris" which indi- cates that they must be combined together, to get back to an intuition that one has never bad, and to give oneself an impi-ession of what Paris is like if one has never seen it. This is because we are not dealing here with real parts, but with mere notes of the total impression. To take a still more striking example, where the notation is more completely Rymbolic, suppose that I am shown, mixed together at random, the letters which make up a poem I am ignorant of. If the letters were parts of the poem, I could attempt to reconstitute the poem with them by trying the different possible arrangements, as a child dofs with the pieces of a Chinese puzzle. But I Metaphysics 29 should never for a moment think of attempt- ing such a thing in this ease, because the letters are not component partSy but only partial expressions, which is quite a dif- ferent thing.
3the different possible arrangements, as a child dofs with the pieces of a Chinese puzzle. But I Metaphysics 29 should never for a moment think of attempt- ing such a thing in this ease, because the letters are not component partSy but only partial expressions, which is quite a dif- ferent thing. That is why, if I know the poem, I at once put each of the letters in its proper place and join them up without difficulty by a continuous connection, whilst the inverse operation is impossible. Even when I believe I am actually attempt- ing this inverse operation, even when I put the letters end to end, I begin by thinking of some plausible meaning. I thereby give myself an intuition, and from this intuition I attempt to redescend to the elementary symbols which would reconstitute its ex- pression. The very idea of reconstituting a thing by operations practised on symbolic elements alone implies such an absurdity that it would never occur to any one if they recollected that they were not dealing with fragments of the thing, but only, as / it were, with fragments of its symbol. Such is, however, the undertaking of the / 30 An Introduction to philosophcre who Iry to reconstruct souality with psychical states, whether they confine themselves to those states alone, or whether they add a kind of thread for the purpose of joining the states together. Both empiricists and rationalists are victims of I the same fallacy. Both of them mistake partial notations for real parts, thus con- fusing the point of view of analysis and of intuition, of science and of metaphysics. The empiricists say quite rightly that psychologi<ral analysis discovers nothing more in personality than paychical states. Such is, in fact, the function, and the very definition of analysis. The psychologist has nothing else to do but analyze personality, that is, to note certain states; at the most he may put the lahel " ego " on these states in saying they are " states of the ego," juat as the artist writes the word " Paris " on each of his sketches. On the level at which the psychologist places himself, and on which he must place himself, the "ego only a sign by which the primitive, 1 they 1 Metaphysics 3' moreover very confused, intuition which has furnished the psychologist with his subject-matter is recalled ; it is only a word, and the great error here lies in believing that while remaining on the same level we can find behind the word a thing. Such has been the error of those philosophers who have not been able to resign themselves to being only psychologists in psychology, Taine and Stuart Mill, for example. Psy- chologists in the method they apply, they have remained metaphysicians in the object they set before themselves. They desire an intuition, and by a strange inconsistency ) they seek this intuition in analysis, which/ is the very negation of it.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
1ngs besides^' These diflFerent concepts, then, were only so many standpoints* from which we could consider duration. Neither separated nor 24 An Introduction to reunited have they made us penetrate inl it. We do penetrate into it, however, and that can only be by an effort of intuition. In this sense, an inner, absolute knowledge of the duration of the self by the self is possible. But if metaphysics here demands and can obtain an intuition, science has none the less need of an analysis. Now it is a confusion between the function of analysis and that of intuition which gives birth to the discussions between the schools and the conflicts between systems. Psychology, in fact, proceeds like all the other sciences by analysis. It resolves the self, which has been given to it at first in a simple intuition, into sensations, feelings, ideas, etc., which it studies separately. It substitutes, then, for the self a series of elements which form the facts of psy- chology. But are these elements really parts? That is the whole question, is because it has l)een evaded tl int^H Metaphysics 25 problem of human personality has so often been stated in insoluble terms. It is incontestable that every psychical \ state, simply because it belongs to a per- / son, reflects the whole of a personality. Every feeling, however simple it may be, contains virtually within it the whole past and present of the being experiencing it, and, consequently, can only be separated and constituted into a " state " by an effort of abstraction or of analysis. But it is no ^ ., less incontestable that without this effort / of abstraction or analysis there would be j no possible development of the science of ' psychology. What, then, exactly, is the operation by which a psychologis t detaches a mental state in order to erect it into a v.. more or less independent entity? He be- gins by neglecting that special coloring of the personality which cannot be ex- pressed in known and common terms. Then he endeavors to isolate, in the person already thus simplified, some aspect which lends itself to an interesting inquiry. If 26 An Introduction to he is considering inclination, for exampi he will neglect the inexpressible shade which colors it, and which makes the in- clination mine and not jours; he will fix his attention on the movement by which our personality leans towards a certain object : he will isolate this attitude, and it is this special aspect of the personality, this snapshot of the mobility of the inner life, this " diagram " of concrete inclination, that he will erect into an independent fact. There is in this something very like what an artist passing through Paris does when he makes, for example, a sketch of a tower of Notre Dame. The tower is in- separably united to the building, which is itself no less inseparably united to the ground, to its surroundings, to the whole of Paris, and so on.
2is in this something very like what an artist passing through Paris does when he makes, for example, a sketch of a tower of Notre Dame. The tower is in- separably united to the building, which is itself no less inseparably united to the ground, to its surroundings, to the whole of Paris, and so on. It is first necessary to detach it from all these ; only one aspect of the whole is noted, that formed by the tower of Notre Dame. Moreover, the spe- cial form of this tower is doe to the group- ing of the stones of which it is composed ; ipl^H tade ' Metaphysics 27 but the artist does not concern himself with these stones, he notes only the silhouette of the tower. For the real and internal organi- zation of the thing he substitutes, then, an external and schematic representation. So that, on the whole, his sketch corresponds to an observation of the object from a cer- tain point of view and to the choice of a certain means of representation. But ex- actly the same thing holds true of the operation by which the psychologist ex- tracts a single mental state from the whole I)ersonality. This isolated psychical state is hardly anything but a sketch, the com- mencement of an artificial reconstruction; it is the whole considered under a certain elementary aspect in which we are specially interested and which we have carefully noted. It is not a part, but an element. It has not been obtained by a natural dismemberment, but by analysis. Now beneath all the sketches he has made at Paris the visitor will probably, by way of memento, write the word " Paris." And N 28 ^n Introduction to as he has really seen Paris, he will be able, with the help of the original intnitiou he had of the whole, to place his sketches therein, and so join them up together. But there is no way of performing the inverse operation; it is impossible, even with an infinite number of accurate sketches, and even with the word "Paris" which indi- cates that they must be combined together, to get back to an intuition that one has never bad, and to give oneself an impi-ession of what Paris is like if one has never seen it. This is because we are not dealing here with real parts, but with mere notes of the total impression. To take a still more striking example, where the notation is more completely Rymbolic, suppose that I am shown, mixed together at random, the letters which make up a poem I am ignorant of. If the letters were parts of the poem, I could attempt to reconstitute the poem with them by trying the different possible arrangements, as a child dofs with the pieces of a Chinese puzzle. But I Metaphysics 29 should never for a moment think of attempt- ing such a thing in this ease, because the letters are not component partSy but only partial expressions, which is quite a dif- ferent thing.
3the different possible arrangements, as a child dofs with the pieces of a Chinese puzzle. But I Metaphysics 29 should never for a moment think of attempt- ing such a thing in this ease, because the letters are not component partSy but only partial expressions, which is quite a dif- ferent thing. That is why, if I know the poem, I at once put each of the letters in its proper place and join them up without difficulty by a continuous connection, whilst the inverse operation is impossible. Even when I believe I am actually attempt- ing this inverse operation, even when I put the letters end to end, I begin by thinking of some plausible meaning. I thereby give myself an intuition, and from this intuition I attempt to redescend to the elementary symbols which would reconstitute its ex- pression. The very idea of reconstituting a thing by operations practised on symbolic elements alone implies such an absurdity that it would never occur to any one if they recollected that they were not dealing with fragments of the thing, but only, as / it were, with fragments of its symbol. Such is, however, the undertaking of the / 30 An Introduction to philosophcre who Iry to reconstruct souality with psychical states, whether they confine themselves to those states alone, or whether they add a kind of thread for the purpose of joining the states together. Both empiricists and rationalists are victims of I the same fallacy. Both of them mistake partial notations for real parts, thus con- fusing the point of view of analysis and of intuition, of science and of metaphysics. The empiricists say quite rightly that psychologi<ral analysis discovers nothing more in personality than paychical states. Such is, in fact, the function, and the very definition of analysis. The psychologist has nothing else to do but analyze personality, that is, to note certain states; at the most he may put the lahel " ego " on these states in saying they are " states of the ego," juat as the artist writes the word " Paris " on each of his sketches. On the level at which the psychologist places himself, and on which he must place himself, the "ego only a sign by which the primitive, 1 they 1 Metaphysics 3' moreover very confused, intuition which has furnished the psychologist with his subject-matter is recalled ; it is only a word, and the great error here lies in believing that while remaining on the same level we can find behind the word a thing. Such has been the error of those philosophers who have not been able to resign themselves to being only psychologists in psychology, Taine and Stuart Mill, for example. Psy- chologists in the method they apply, they have remained metaphysicians in the object they set before themselves. They desire an intuition, and by a strange inconsistency ) they seek this intuition in analysis, which/ is the very negation of it.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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