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1Wantage, that it keeps us in the concrete. i>Io image can replace the intuition of dura- tion, Tjut many diverse images, borrowed from very different orders of things, may, by the convergence of their action, direct, consciousness to the precise point where there is a certain intuition to be seized. By choosing images as dissimilar as pos- sible, we shall prevent any one of them from usurping the place of the intuition it is intended to call up, since it would then be driven away at once by its rivals. By providing that, in spite of their differences f of aspect, they all require from the mindi the same kind of attention, and in somei sort the same degree of tension, we shall gradually accustom consciousness to a par- Metaphysics 17 Hcnlar and clearly-defined disposition — that precisely which it must adopt in order to appear to itself as it really is, without any veil. But, then, consciouenefis must at least consent to make the effort. For it will have been shown nothing ; it will simply have been placed in the attitude it must take up in order to make the de- sired effort, and so come by itself to the intuition. Concepts on the contrary — especially if they are simple — have the disadvantage of being in reality symbols substituted for the object they symbolize, and demand no effort on our part. Ex- amined closely, each of them, it would be ^Eteen, retains only that part of the object ^Khich is common to it and to others, and ^"fecpresBes, still more than the image does, a comparison between the object and others' w hich resemble it. But as the comparison ^8 made manifest a resemblance, as the lemblance is a property of the object, and (I a pi-operty has every appearance of being Lparf of the object which possesses it, we 1 8 An Introduction to easily persuade ourselves that by setting concept beside concept we are reconstruct- ing the whole of the object with its parts, thus obtaining, so to speak, its intellectual equivalenti'-'ni this way we believe that we ^ can form a faithful representation of dura- j tion by setting in line the concepts of \ unity, multiplicity, continuity, finite or in- \\ finite divisibility, etc. There precisely is \ the illusion. There also is the danger. Just in so far as abstract ideas can render service to analysis, that is, to the scientific study of the object in its relations to other objects, so far are they incapable of replac- . ing intuition, that is, the metaphysical in- vestigation of what is essential and unique in the object. For on the one hand these concepts, laid side by side, never actually give us more than an artificial reconstruc- tion of the object, of which they can only ' symbolize certain general, and, in a way, . impersonal aspects; it is therefore useless ! to believe that with them we can seize a reality of which they present to us the Metaphysics 19 shadow alone. And, on the other hand, besides the illusion there is also a very serious danger.
2can only ' symbolize certain general, and, in a way, . impersonal aspects; it is therefore useless ! to believe that with them we can seize a reality of which they present to us the Metaphysics 19 shadow alone. And, on the other hand, besides the illusion there is also a very serious danger. For the concept general- izes at the same time as it abstracts. The concept can only symbolize a particular property by making it common to an in- finity of things. It thei'cfore always more or less deforms the property by the exten- sion it gives to it. Replaced in the meta- physical object to which it belongs, a property coincides with the object, or at least moulds itself on it, and adopts the same outline. Extracted from the metaphysical object, and presented in a concept, it grows indefinitely larger, and goes beyond the object itself, since henceforth it has to con- tain it, along with a number of other objects. Thus the different concepts that we form of the properties of a thing inscribe round it so many circles, each much too large and none of them fitting it exactly. And yet, in the thing itself the properties coincided with the thing, and coincided consequently with one another. So that if we are bent \' ^•' 20 An Introduction fo on reconstructing the object with concepts, some artifice must be sought whereby this coincidence of the object and its properties can be brought about. For example, we may choose one of the concepts and try, starting from it, to get round to the others. But we shall then soon discover that ac- cording as we start from one concept or another, the meeting and combination of the concepts will take place in an altogether different way. According as we start, for example, from unity or from multiplicity, we shall have to conceive differently the multiple unity of duration. Everything will depend on the weight we attribute to this or that concept, and this weight will always be arbitrary, since the concept ex- tracted from the object has no weight, being only the shadow of a body. In this way, as many different systems will spring up as there are external points of view from which the reality can be examined, or larger circles in which it can he enclosed. Himple concepts have, then, not only the incon- Metaphysics 21 venience of dividing the concrete unity of the object into so many symbolical expres- sions; they also divide philosophy into dis- tinct schools, each of which takes its seat, chooses its counters, and carries on with the others a game that will never end. Either metaB hJaica. is only this play of ideas, or else, if it is a serious occupation of the mind, if it is a science and not simply an exercise, it must transcend concepts in order to reach intuition. Certainly, con^/ cepts are necessary to it, for all the other sciences work as a rule with concepts, and metaphysics cannot dispense with the other sciences.
3it is a serious occupation of the mind, if it is a science and not simply an exercise, it must transcend concepts in order to reach intuition. Certainly, con^/ cepts are necessary to it, for all the other sciences work as a rule with concepts, and metaphysics cannot dispense with the other sciences. But it is only truly itself when it goes beyond the concept, or at least when it frees itself from rigid and ready-made concepts in order to create a kind very dif- ferent from those which we habitually use; I mean supple, mobile, and almost fluid representations, always ready to mould themselves on the fleeting forms of intui- tion. We shall return later to this import- ant point. .Let it suffice us for the moment 22 An Introcjuction to V / to have shown that otr duration can be presented to us directly in an intuition, 'i j that it can be suggested to us indirectly by images, but that it can never — ^if we confine the word concept to its proper meaning — be enclosed in a conceptual f representation. Let us try for an instant to consider our duration as a multiplicity. It will then be necessary to add that the terms of this multiplicity, instead of being distinct, as they are in any other multiplicity, encroach on one another; and that while we can no doubt, by an eflfort of imagination, solidify duration once it has elapsed, divide it into juxtaposed portions and count all these portions, yet this operation is accomplished on the frozen memory of the duration, on the stationary trace which the mobility of duration leaves behind it, and not on the duration itself. We must admit, therefore, that if there is a multiplicity here, it bears no resemblance to any other multiplicity we know. Shall we say, then, that dura- Metaphysics 23 tion has unity? Doubtless, a continuity of elements which prolong themselves into one another participates in unity as much as in multiplicity; but this moving, changing, colored, living unity has hardly anything in common with the abstract, motionless, and empty unity which the concept of pure unity circumscribes. Shall we conclude from this that duration must be defined as unity and multiplicity at the same time? But singularly enough, however much I manipulate the two concepts, portion them out, combine them diflferently, prac- tise on them the most subtle operations of mental chemistry, I never obtain any- thing which resembles the simple in- tuition that I have of duration; while, on the contrary, when I replace myself in ' duration by an effort of intuition, I im- mediately perc^ve how it is unity, multi- plicity, and many other things besides^' These diflFerent concepts, then, were only so many standpoints* from which we could consider duration. Neither separated nor 24 An Introduction to reunited have they made us penetrate inl it. We do penetrate into it, however, and that can only be by an effort of intuition.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
1Wantage, that it keeps us in the concrete. i>Io image can replace the intuition of dura- tion, Tjut many diverse images, borrowed from very different orders of things, may, by the convergence of their action, direct, consciousness to the precise point where there is a certain intuition to be seized. By choosing images as dissimilar as pos- sible, we shall prevent any one of them from usurping the place of the intuition it is intended to call up, since it would then be driven away at once by its rivals. By providing that, in spite of their differences f of aspect, they all require from the mindi the same kind of attention, and in somei sort the same degree of tension, we shall gradually accustom consciousness to a par- Metaphysics 17 Hcnlar and clearly-defined disposition — that precisely which it must adopt in order to appear to itself as it really is, without any veil. But, then, consciouenefis must at least consent to make the effort. For it will have been shown nothing ; it will simply have been placed in the attitude it must take up in order to make the de- sired effort, and so come by itself to the intuition. Concepts on the contrary — especially if they are simple — have the disadvantage of being in reality symbols substituted for the object they symbolize, and demand no effort on our part. Ex- amined closely, each of them, it would be ^Eteen, retains only that part of the object ^Khich is common to it and to others, and ^"fecpresBes, still more than the image does, a comparison between the object and others' w hich resemble it. But as the comparison ^8 made manifest a resemblance, as the lemblance is a property of the object, and (I a pi-operty has every appearance of being Lparf of the object which possesses it, we 1 8 An Introduction to easily persuade ourselves that by setting concept beside concept we are reconstruct- ing the whole of the object with its parts, thus obtaining, so to speak, its intellectual equivalenti'-'ni this way we believe that we ^ can form a faithful representation of dura- j tion by setting in line the concepts of \ unity, multiplicity, continuity, finite or in- \\ finite divisibility, etc. There precisely is \ the illusion. There also is the danger. Just in so far as abstract ideas can render service to analysis, that is, to the scientific study of the object in its relations to other objects, so far are they incapable of replac- . ing intuition, that is, the metaphysical in- vestigation of what is essential and unique in the object. For on the one hand these concepts, laid side by side, never actually give us more than an artificial reconstruc- tion of the object, of which they can only ' symbolize certain general, and, in a way, . impersonal aspects; it is therefore useless ! to believe that with them we can seize a reality of which they present to us the Metaphysics 19 shadow alone. And, on the other hand, besides the illusion there is also a very serious danger.
2can only ' symbolize certain general, and, in a way, . impersonal aspects; it is therefore useless ! to believe that with them we can seize a reality of which they present to us the Metaphysics 19 shadow alone. And, on the other hand, besides the illusion there is also a very serious danger. For the concept general- izes at the same time as it abstracts. The concept can only symbolize a particular property by making it common to an in- finity of things. It thei'cfore always more or less deforms the property by the exten- sion it gives to it. Replaced in the meta- physical object to which it belongs, a property coincides with the object, or at least moulds itself on it, and adopts the same outline. Extracted from the metaphysical object, and presented in a concept, it grows indefinitely larger, and goes beyond the object itself, since henceforth it has to con- tain it, along with a number of other objects. Thus the different concepts that we form of the properties of a thing inscribe round it so many circles, each much too large and none of them fitting it exactly. And yet, in the thing itself the properties coincided with the thing, and coincided consequently with one another. So that if we are bent \' ^•' 20 An Introduction fo on reconstructing the object with concepts, some artifice must be sought whereby this coincidence of the object and its properties can be brought about. For example, we may choose one of the concepts and try, starting from it, to get round to the others. But we shall then soon discover that ac- cording as we start from one concept or another, the meeting and combination of the concepts will take place in an altogether different way. According as we start, for example, from unity or from multiplicity, we shall have to conceive differently the multiple unity of duration. Everything will depend on the weight we attribute to this or that concept, and this weight will always be arbitrary, since the concept ex- tracted from the object has no weight, being only the shadow of a body. In this way, as many different systems will spring up as there are external points of view from which the reality can be examined, or larger circles in which it can he enclosed. Himple concepts have, then, not only the incon- Metaphysics 21 venience of dividing the concrete unity of the object into so many symbolical expres- sions; they also divide philosophy into dis- tinct schools, each of which takes its seat, chooses its counters, and carries on with the others a game that will never end. Either metaB hJaica. is only this play of ideas, or else, if it is a serious occupation of the mind, if it is a science and not simply an exercise, it must transcend concepts in order to reach intuition. Certainly, con^/ cepts are necessary to it, for all the other sciences work as a rule with concepts, and metaphysics cannot dispense with the other sciences.
3it is a serious occupation of the mind, if it is a science and not simply an exercise, it must transcend concepts in order to reach intuition. Certainly, con^/ cepts are necessary to it, for all the other sciences work as a rule with concepts, and metaphysics cannot dispense with the other sciences. But it is only truly itself when it goes beyond the concept, or at least when it frees itself from rigid and ready-made concepts in order to create a kind very dif- ferent from those which we habitually use; I mean supple, mobile, and almost fluid representations, always ready to mould themselves on the fleeting forms of intui- tion. We shall return later to this import- ant point. .Let it suffice us for the moment 22 An Introcjuction to V / to have shown that otr duration can be presented to us directly in an intuition, 'i j that it can be suggested to us indirectly by images, but that it can never — ^if we confine the word concept to its proper meaning — be enclosed in a conceptual f representation. Let us try for an instant to consider our duration as a multiplicity. It will then be necessary to add that the terms of this multiplicity, instead of being distinct, as they are in any other multiplicity, encroach on one another; and that while we can no doubt, by an eflfort of imagination, solidify duration once it has elapsed, divide it into juxtaposed portions and count all these portions, yet this operation is accomplished on the frozen memory of the duration, on the stationary trace which the mobility of duration leaves behind it, and not on the duration itself. We must admit, therefore, that if there is a multiplicity here, it bears no resemblance to any other multiplicity we know. Shall we say, then, that dura- Metaphysics 23 tion has unity? Doubtless, a continuity of elements which prolong themselves into one another participates in unity as much as in multiplicity; but this moving, changing, colored, living unity has hardly anything in common with the abstract, motionless, and empty unity which the concept of pure unity circumscribes. Shall we conclude from this that duration must be defined as unity and multiplicity at the same time? But singularly enough, however much I manipulate the two concepts, portion them out, combine them diflferently, prac- tise on them the most subtle operations of mental chemistry, I never obtain any- thing which resembles the simple in- tuition that I have of duration; while, on the contrary, when I replace myself in ' duration by an effort of intuition, I im- mediately perc^ve how it is unity, multi- plicity, and many other things besides^' These diflFerent concepts, then, were only so many standpoints* from which we could consider duration. Neither separated nor 24 An Introduction to reunited have they made us penetrate inl it. We do penetrate into it, however, and that can only be by an effort of intuition.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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