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1^ metaphysics and the various concep- tions of the absolute leads to the discovery that philosophers, in spite of their apparent divergencies, agree in distinguishing two profoundly diflferent ways of knowing a thing. The first implies that we move round the object; the second that we enter into it. The first depends on the point of view at which we are placed and on the symbols by which we express ourselves. The second neither depends on a point of view nor relies on any symbol. The first kind of knowledge may be said to stop at the relative; the second, in those cases where it is possible, to attain the absolute. I An Introduction to Consider, for example, the movement of an object in space. My perception of the motion will vary with the point of view, moving or stationary, from which I observe it. My expression of it will vary with the systems of axes, or the points of reference, to which I relate it; that is, with the sym- bols by which I translate it. For this donble reason I call such motion relative: in the one case, as in the other, I am placed outside the object itself. But when I speak of an absolute movement, I am attributing to the moving object an interior and, so to speak, states of mind; I also imply that I am in sympathy with those states, and that I insert myself in them by an effort of imagination. Then, according as the ob- ject is moving or stationary, according as it adopts one movement or another, what I experience will vary. And what I ex- perience will depend neither on the point of view I may take up in regard to the object, since I am inside the obj< Bor on the aymbols by which I m Metaphysics 3 late the motion, since I have rejected all translations in order to possess the original. In short, I shall no longer grasp the move- ment from without, remaining where I am, but from where it is, from within, as it is in itself. I shall possess an absolute. Consider, again, a character whose ad- ventures are related to me in a novel. The author may multiply the traits of his hero's character*, may make him speak and act as much as he pleases, but all this can never be equivalent to the simple and indivisible feeling which I should experience if I were able for an instant to identify myself with the person of the hero himself. Out of that indivisible feeling, as from a spring, all the words, gestures, and actions of the man would appear to me to flow naturally. They would no longer be accidents which, added to the idea I had already formed of the character, continually enriched that idea, without ever completing it. The character would be given to me all at once, in its entirety, and the thousand incidents An Introduction to which manifest it, instead of adding them- selves to the idea and so enriching it, would Beein to me, on tlie contrary, to detach themselves from it, without, however, ex- hausting it or impoverishing its essence.
2o me all at once, in its entirety, and the thousand incidents An Introduction to which manifest it, instead of adding them- selves to the idea and so enriching it, would Beein to me, on tlie contrary, to detach themselves from it, without, however, ex- hausting it or impoverishing its essence. All the things I am told about the man provide me with so many points of view from which I can observe him. All the traits which describe him. and which can make him known to me only by so many comparisons with persons or things I know already, are siRns by which he is expressed more or less symbolically. Symbols and points of view, therefore, place me outside him; they give me only what he has in cominou with others, and not what belongs to him and to him alone. But that which is properly himself, that which constitutes his essence, cannot 1k^ perceived from without, being internal by definition, nor t)e expressed by Myiubols, being incom- mensurable with everything else. De- scription, history, and analysis leave me here in I he relative. Coincidence with Metaphysics 5 the person himself would alone give me;' the absolute. ! It is in this sense, and in this sense only, \ that absolute is synonymous with perfec-r tion. Were all the photographs of a town, taken from all possible points of view, to go on indefinitely completing one another, they would never be equivalent to the solid town in which we walk about. Were all the translations of a poem into all possible languages to add together their various shades of meaning and, correcting each other by a kind of mutual retouching, to give a more and more faithful image of the poem they translate, they would yet never succeed in rendering the inner mean- ing of the original. A representation taken \ from a certain point of view, a translation ) made with certain symbols, will always / remain imperfect in comparison with the / object of which a view has been taken, op/. which the symbols seek to express. But the \ absolute, which is the object and not its representation, the original and not its I I 4 6 An Introduction to translation, is perfect, by being perfectly what it is. / It is doubtless for this reason that th6 jl absolute has often been identified with the } infinite. Suppose that I wished to com- municate to some one who did not know Greek the extraordinarily simple impres- sion that a passage in Homer makes upon me; I should first give a translation of the lines, I should then comment on my trans- lation, and then develop the commentary; in this way, by piling up explanation on explanation, I might approach nearer and nearer to what I wanted to express; but I should never quite reach it.
3in Homer makes upon me; I should first give a translation of the lines, I should then comment on my trans- lation, and then develop the commentary; in this way, by piling up explanation on explanation, I might approach nearer and nearer to what I wanted to express; but I should never quite reach it. When you raise your arm, you accomplish a movement of which you have, from within, a simple perception; but for me, watching it from the outside, your arm passes through one point, then through another, and between these two there will be still other points; so that, if I began to count, the operation would go on for ever. Viewed from the ^ inside, then, an absolute is a simple thing; Metaphysics 7 but looked at from the outside, that is tol say, relatively to other things, it becomes, ' in relation to these signs which express it, j the gold coin for which we never seem able ; to finish giving small change. Now, that which lends itself at the same time both to an indivisible apprehension and to an inexhaustible enumeration is, by the very ■ definition of the word, an infinite. It follows from this that an absolute . could only be given in an intmtion^ whilst i everything else falls within the province of i analysis. By intuition is meant the kind i of intellectual sympathy by which one'^' places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and con- sequently inexpressible. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it 'and other objects. To analyze, therefore, is to ex- press a thing as a function of something other than itself. All analysis is thus a translation, a development into symbols, a 8 An Introduction to representation taken from auccesaive points of view from which we not« as many re- semblances &s possible between the new object which we are studying and others which we believe we know already. In its eternally unsatisfied desire to embrace the object around which it is compelled to turn, analysis multiplies without end the number of its points of view in order to complete its always incomplete representa- tion, and ceaselessly varies its symbols that it may perfect the always imperfect trans- lation. It goes on, therefore, to infinity. But intuition, if intuition is possible, is a simple act. Now it is easy to see that the ordinary function of positive science is analysis. Positive science works, then, above all, with symbols. Even the most concrete of the natural sciences, those concerned with life, confine themfielves to the visible form of living beings, their organs and anatomical elements. They make comparisons between these forms, they i-educe the more complex Metaphysics 9 to the more simple; in short, they study the workings of life in what is, so to speak, only its visual symbol.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
1^ metaphysics and the various concep- tions of the absolute leads to the discovery that philosophers, in spite of their apparent divergencies, agree in distinguishing two profoundly diflferent ways of knowing a thing. The first implies that we move round the object; the second that we enter into it. The first depends on the point of view at which we are placed and on the symbols by which we express ourselves. The second neither depends on a point of view nor relies on any symbol. The first kind of knowledge may be said to stop at the relative; the second, in those cases where it is possible, to attain the absolute. I An Introduction to Consider, for example, the movement of an object in space. My perception of the motion will vary with the point of view, moving or stationary, from which I observe it. My expression of it will vary with the systems of axes, or the points of reference, to which I relate it; that is, with the sym- bols by which I translate it. For this donble reason I call such motion relative: in the one case, as in the other, I am placed outside the object itself. But when I speak of an absolute movement, I am attributing to the moving object an interior and, so to speak, states of mind; I also imply that I am in sympathy with those states, and that I insert myself in them by an effort of imagination. Then, according as the ob- ject is moving or stationary, according as it adopts one movement or another, what I experience will vary. And what I ex- perience will depend neither on the point of view I may take up in regard to the object, since I am inside the obj< Bor on the aymbols by which I m Metaphysics 3 late the motion, since I have rejected all translations in order to possess the original. In short, I shall no longer grasp the move- ment from without, remaining where I am, but from where it is, from within, as it is in itself. I shall possess an absolute. Consider, again, a character whose ad- ventures are related to me in a novel. The author may multiply the traits of his hero's character*, may make him speak and act as much as he pleases, but all this can never be equivalent to the simple and indivisible feeling which I should experience if I were able for an instant to identify myself with the person of the hero himself. Out of that indivisible feeling, as from a spring, all the words, gestures, and actions of the man would appear to me to flow naturally. They would no longer be accidents which, added to the idea I had already formed of the character, continually enriched that idea, without ever completing it. The character would be given to me all at once, in its entirety, and the thousand incidents An Introduction to which manifest it, instead of adding them- selves to the idea and so enriching it, would Beein to me, on tlie contrary, to detach themselves from it, without, however, ex- hausting it or impoverishing its essence.
2o me all at once, in its entirety, and the thousand incidents An Introduction to which manifest it, instead of adding them- selves to the idea and so enriching it, would Beein to me, on tlie contrary, to detach themselves from it, without, however, ex- hausting it or impoverishing its essence. All the things I am told about the man provide me with so many points of view from which I can observe him. All the traits which describe him. and which can make him known to me only by so many comparisons with persons or things I know already, are siRns by which he is expressed more or less symbolically. Symbols and points of view, therefore, place me outside him; they give me only what he has in cominou with others, and not what belongs to him and to him alone. But that which is properly himself, that which constitutes his essence, cannot 1k^ perceived from without, being internal by definition, nor t)e expressed by Myiubols, being incom- mensurable with everything else. De- scription, history, and analysis leave me here in I he relative. Coincidence with Metaphysics 5 the person himself would alone give me;' the absolute. ! It is in this sense, and in this sense only, \ that absolute is synonymous with perfec-r tion. Were all the photographs of a town, taken from all possible points of view, to go on indefinitely completing one another, they would never be equivalent to the solid town in which we walk about. Were all the translations of a poem into all possible languages to add together their various shades of meaning and, correcting each other by a kind of mutual retouching, to give a more and more faithful image of the poem they translate, they would yet never succeed in rendering the inner mean- ing of the original. A representation taken \ from a certain point of view, a translation ) made with certain symbols, will always / remain imperfect in comparison with the / object of which a view has been taken, op/. which the symbols seek to express. But the \ absolute, which is the object and not its representation, the original and not its I I 4 6 An Introduction to translation, is perfect, by being perfectly what it is. / It is doubtless for this reason that th6 jl absolute has often been identified with the } infinite. Suppose that I wished to com- municate to some one who did not know Greek the extraordinarily simple impres- sion that a passage in Homer makes upon me; I should first give a translation of the lines, I should then comment on my trans- lation, and then develop the commentary; in this way, by piling up explanation on explanation, I might approach nearer and nearer to what I wanted to express; but I should never quite reach it.
3in Homer makes upon me; I should first give a translation of the lines, I should then comment on my trans- lation, and then develop the commentary; in this way, by piling up explanation on explanation, I might approach nearer and nearer to what I wanted to express; but I should never quite reach it. When you raise your arm, you accomplish a movement of which you have, from within, a simple perception; but for me, watching it from the outside, your arm passes through one point, then through another, and between these two there will be still other points; so that, if I began to count, the operation would go on for ever. Viewed from the ^ inside, then, an absolute is a simple thing; Metaphysics 7 but looked at from the outside, that is tol say, relatively to other things, it becomes, ' in relation to these signs which express it, j the gold coin for which we never seem able ; to finish giving small change. Now, that which lends itself at the same time both to an indivisible apprehension and to an inexhaustible enumeration is, by the very ■ definition of the word, an infinite. It follows from this that an absolute . could only be given in an intmtion^ whilst i everything else falls within the province of i analysis. By intuition is meant the kind i of intellectual sympathy by which one'^' places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and con- sequently inexpressible. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it 'and other objects. To analyze, therefore, is to ex- press a thing as a function of something other than itself. All analysis is thus a translation, a development into symbols, a 8 An Introduction to representation taken from auccesaive points of view from which we not« as many re- semblances &s possible between the new object which we are studying and others which we believe we know already. In its eternally unsatisfied desire to embrace the object around which it is compelled to turn, analysis multiplies without end the number of its points of view in order to complete its always incomplete representa- tion, and ceaselessly varies its symbols that it may perfect the always imperfect trans- lation. It goes on, therefore, to infinity. But intuition, if intuition is possible, is a simple act. Now it is easy to see that the ordinary function of positive science is analysis. Positive science works, then, above all, with symbols. Even the most concrete of the natural sciences, those concerned with life, confine themfielves to the visible form of living beings, their organs and anatomical elements. They make comparisons between these forms, they i-educe the more complex Metaphysics 9 to the more simple; in short, they study the workings of life in what is, so to speak, only its visual symbol.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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