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BHAGAVADGITA.
(3) b
INTRODUCTION
TO
BHAGAVADGITA.
Saxsxrit Inprx
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BHAGAVADGITA.
(3) b
INTRODUCTION
TO
BHAGAVADGITA.
IT has become quite a literary commonplace, that—to borrow the words of Professor Max Miiller in one of his recent lectures—history, in the ordinary sense of the word, is almost unknown in Indian literature’. And it is certainly a remarkable irony of fate, that we should be obliged to make this remark on the very threshold of an introduction to the Bhagavadgit4 ; for according to the eminent French philosopher, Cousin?, this great deficiency in Sanskrit literature is due, in no inconsiderable measure, to the doctrines propounded in the Bhagavadgita itself. But however that may be, this much is certain, that the student of the Bhagavadgita must, for the present, go without that reliable historical information touching the author of the work, the time at which it was composed, and even the place it occupies in literature, which one naturally desires, when entering upon the study of any work. More especially in an attempt like the present, intended as it mainly is for students of the history of religion, I should have been better pleased, if I could, in this Introduction, have concentrated to a focus, as it were, only those well ascertained historical results, on which there is something like a consensus of opinion among persons qualificd to judge. But there is no exaggeration in saying, that it is almost impossible to lay down even a single proposition respecting any important
* Hibbert Lectures, p. 131.
* Lectares on the History of Modern Philosophy (translated by O. W. Wight), vol. i, pp. 49, §0. At p. 433 sey. of the second volume, M. Cousin gives a general view of the doctrine of the Gita, See also Mr. Maurice's and Ritte:’s Hutories of Philosophy.
(8) Bp. 2 matter connected with the Bhagavadgita, about which any such consensus can be said to exist. The conclusions arrived at in this Introduction must, therefore, be distinctly understood to embody individual opinions only, and must be taken accordingly for what they are worth.
(8) Bp. 2 matter connected with the Bhagavadgita, about which any such consensus can be said to exist. The conclusions arrived at in this Introduction must, therefore, be distinctly understood to embody individual opinions only, and must be taken accordingly for what they are worth.
The full name of the work is Bhagavadgité. In common parlance, we often abbreviate the name into Gita, and in Sanskrit literature the name occurs in both forms. In the works of Sankardfarya, quotations from the Gita are introduced, sometimes with the words ‘In the Gita,’ or ‘In the Bhagavadgit4,’ and sometimes with words which may be rendered ‘In the Gitds,’ the plural form being used’. In the colophons to the MSS. of the work, the form current, apparently throughout India, is, ‘In the Upanishads sung (Gitas) by the Deity.’ Sankarésarya, indeed, sometimes calls it the fsvara Gita? which, I believe, is the specific title of a different work altogether. The signification, however, of the two names is identical, namely, the song sung by the Deity, or, as Wilkins translates it, the Divine Lay.
This Divine Lay forms part of the Bhishma Parvan of the Mahabhdarata—one of the two well-known national epics of India. The Gita gives its name to a subdivision of the Bhishma Parvan, which is called the Bhagavadgita Parvan, and which includes, in addition to the eighteen chapters of which the Gita consists, twelve other chapters. Upon this the question has naturally arisen, Is the Gita a genuine portion of the Mahabharata, or is it a later addition? The question is one of considerable difficulty. But I cannot help saying, that the manner in which it has been generally dealt with is not altogether satisfactory to my mind. Before going any further into that question, however, it is desirable to state some of the facts on which the decision must be based. It appears, then, that the royal family of Hastinapura was divided into two branches: the one called the Kauravas, and the other the Pamdavas. The
' bx gr. Sariraka Bhashya, vol. ii, p. 840, It is also often cited as a Smriti, ibid. vol. i, p. 182.
2 See inter alia Sarfraka Bhashya, vol. i, p. 485, vol. ii, p. 687, and Colebrvoke's Essays, vol. i, p. 355 (Madras, ; Iasscn’s cdition of the Gita, XXXV.
p. 3
The
' bx gr. Sariraka Bhashya, vol. ii, p. 840, It is also often cited as a Smriti, ibid. vol. i, p. 182.
2 See inter alia Sarfraka Bhashya, vol. i, p. 485, vol. ii, p. 687, and Colebrvoke's Essays, vol. i, p. 355 (Madras, ; Iasscn’s cdition of the Gita, XXXV.
p. 3
former wished to keep the latter out of the share of the kingdom claimed by them ; and so, after many attempts at an amicable arrangement had proved fruitless, it was determined to decide the differences between the two parties by the arbitrament of arms. Each party accordingly collected its adherents, and the hostile armies met on the ‘holy field of Kurukshetra,’ mentioned in the opening lines of our poem. At this juncture, Krishna Dvaipayana, alias Vyasa, a relative of both parties and endowed with more than human powers, presents himself before Dhritardshéra, the father of the Kauravas, who is stated to be altogether blind. Vy4sa asks Dhritarashfra whether it is his wish to look with his own eyes on the course of the battle; and on Dhritardsh/ra’s expressing his reluctance, Vyasa deputes one Safigaya to relate to Dhritarashéra all the events of the battle, giving to Sa#gaya, by means of his own superhuman powers, all necessary aids for performing the duty. Then the battle begins, and after a ten days’ struggle, the first great general of the Kauravas. namely Bhishma, falls'. At this point Safgaya comes up to Dhritarashéra, and announces to him the sad result, which is of course a great blow to his party. Dhrétardsh¢ra then makes numerous enquiries of Sa#gaya regarding the course of the conflict, all of which Safgaya duly answers. And among his earliest answers is the account of the conversation between Krishva and Arguna at the commencement of the battle, which constitutes the Bhagavadgitéa. After relating to Dhritardshéra that ‘ wonderful and holy dialogue,’ and after giving an account of what occurred in the intervals of the conversation, Safigaya proceeds to narrate the actual events of the battle.
With this rough outline of the framework of the story before us, we are now in a position to consider the opposing arguments on the point above noted. Mr. Talboys Wheeler writes on that point as follows?: ‘But there remains one
* The whol: story is given in brief by the late Professor Goldstiicker in the Westminster Kevicw, April 1868, p. 393 seq. Sce now his Literary Remains, II, 824 sexy. ® History of Incia, vol. i, p. 293. B2
4 BHAGAVADGITA.
Talboys Wheeler writes on that point as follows?: ‘But there remains one
* The whol: story is given in brief by the late Professor Goldstiicker in the Westminster Kevicw, April 1868, p. 393 seq. Sce now his Literary Remains, II, 824 sexy. ® History of Incia, vol. i, p. 293. B2p. 4 other anomalous characteristic of the history of the great war, as it is recorded in the Mahabharata, which cannot be passed over in silence; and that is the extraordinary abruptness and infelicity with which Brahmanical discourses, such as essays on law, on morals, sermons on divine things, and even instruction in the so-called sciences are recklessly grafted upon the main narrative. ... Krishva and Arguna on the morning of the first day of the war, when both armies are drawn out in battle-array, and hostilities are about to begin, enter into a long and philosophical dialogue respecting the various forms of devotion which lead to the emancipation of the soul; and it cannot be denied that, however incongruous and irrelevant such a dialogue must appear on the eve of battle, the discourse of Krishna, whilst acting as the charioteer of Arguna, contains the essence of the most spiritual phases of Brahmanical teaching, and is expressed in language of such depth and sublimity, that it has become deservedly known as the Bhagavad-gita or Divine Song. . . . Indeed no effort has been spared by the Brahmanical compilers to convert the history of the great war into a vehicle for Brahmanical teaching ; and so skilfully are many of these interpolations interwoven with the story, that it is frequently impossible to narrate the one, without referring to the other, however irrelevant the matter may be to the main subject in hand.’ It appears to me, I own, very difficult to accept that as a satisfactory argument, amounting, as it does, to no more than this—that ‘ interpolations,’ which must needs be referred to in narrating the main story even to make it intelligible, are nevertheless to be regarded ‘as evidently the product of a Brahmanical age!,’ and presumably also a later age, because, forsooth, they are irrelevant and incongruous according to the ‘tastes and ideas '’— not of the time, be it remembered, when the ‘main story’ is supposed to have been written, but—of this enlightened nineteenth century. The support, too, which may be sup-
' History of India, vol. i, p. 288; and compare ge nerally upon this point the remarks in Gladstone's Homer, especially vol. i, p. 70 seq.
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posed to be derived by this argument from the allegation that there has been an attempt to Brahmanize, so to say, the history of the great war, appears to me to be extremely weak, so far as the Gita is concerned. But that is a point which will have to be considered more at large in the sequel’.
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posed to be derived by this argument from the allegation that there has been an attempt to Brahmanize, so to say, the history of the great war, appears to me to be extremely weak, so far as the Gita is concerned. But that is a point which will have to be considered more at large in the sequel’.
While, however, I am not prepared to admit the cogency of Mr. Wheeler’s arguments, I am not, on the other hand, to be understood as holding that the Gita must be accepted as a genuine part of the original Mahabharata. I own that my feeling on the subject is something akin to that of the great historian of Greece regarding the Homeric question, a feeling of painful diffidence regarding the soundness of any conclusion whatever. While it is impossible not to feel serious doubts about the critical condition of the Mahabharata generally; while, indeed, we may be almost certain that the work has been tampered with from time to time’; it is difficult to come to a satisfactory conclusion} regarding any particular given section of it. And it must be remembered, also, that the alternatives for us to choose from in these cases are not only these two, that the section in question may be a genuine part of the work, or that it may be a later interpolation: but also this, as suggested recently, though not for the first time, by Mr. Freeman with reference to the Homeric question, that the section may have been in existence at the date of the original epos. and may have been worked by the author of the epos into his own production. For that absence of dread, ‘either of the law or sentiment of copyright,’ which Mr. Freeman relies upon with regard to a primitive Greek poet, was by no means confined to the Greek people, but may be traced amongst us also. The commentator Madhusddana Sarasvati likens the Gita to those dialogues which oceur in sundry Vedic works, particularly the Upanishads *. Possibly —I will not use a stronger word—possibly the Gita
may have existed as such a dialogue before the Mahabharata, and may have been appropriated by the author of the Mahabhdrata to his own purposes'. But yet, upon the whole, having regard to the fact that those ideas of unity on which Mr. Wheeler and others set so much store are scarcely appropriate to our old literature ; to the fact that the Gita fits pretty well into the setting given to it in the Bhishma Parvan; to the fact that the feeling of Arguna, which gives occasion to it, is not at all inconsistent, but is most consonant, with poctical justice ; to the fact that there is not in the Gita, in my judgment, any trace of a sectarian or ‘ Brahmanizing’ spirit®, such as Mr. Wheeler and also the late Professor Goldstiicker ® hold to have animated the arrangers of the Mahabharata ; having regard, I say, to all these facts, I am prepared to adhere, I will not say without diffidence, to the theory of the genuineness of the Bhagavadgit4 as a portion of the original Mahabharata.
The next point to consider is as to the authorship of the Gita. The popular notion on this subject is pretty well known. The whole of the Mahabharata is, by our traditions, attributed to Vy4sa, whom we have already noticed as a relative of the Kauravas and Pandavas; and therefore the Bhagavadgita, also, is naturally affliated to the same author. The earliest written testimony to this authorship, that I can trace, is to be found in Sankara/arya’s commentary on the Gita‘ itself and on the Bréhadaranyakopanishad*. To a certain extent, the mention of Vyasa in the body of the Gita would, from a historic standpoint, seem to militate against this tradition. But I have not seen in any of the commentaries to which I have had access, any consideration of this point, as there is of the mention in some
* See to this effect M. Fauriel, quoted in Grote’s Greece. II, 198 (Cabinet ed.
* Compare also Weber's History of Indian Literature English translation , p. 187. ‘Tbe instruction, however, as to ‘the reverence due to the priesthood’ from ‘the military caste,’ which is there spoken of, appears to me to be entirely atnent from the Gita; see p. 21 seq. intra.
* Westminster Review, April 1568, p. 388 scq.; and Remains, I, 104, 105.
* P.6 Calcutta ed., Samvat, 1927).
® P. 841 (Bibl. Indic. ed. ; also Svetasvatara, p. 278.
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Smritis and Sitras of the names of those to whom those Smyrstis and Sitras are respectively ascribed '.
intra.
* Westminster Review, April 1568, p. 388 scq.; and Remains, I, 104, 105.
* P.6 Calcutta ed., Samvat, 1927).
® P. 841 (Bibl. Indic. ed. ; also Svetasvatara, p. 278.
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Smritis and Sitras of the names of those to whom those Smyrstis and Sitras are respectively ascribed '.
We must now leave these preliminary questions, unluckily in a state far from satisfactory, and proceed to that most important topic—the date when the Git4 was composed, and the position it occupies in Sanskrit literature. We have here to consider the external evidence bearing on these points, which is tantalizingly meagre ; and the internal evidence, which is, perhaps, somewhat more full And takiog first the internal evidence, the various items falling under that head may be marshalled into four groups. Firstly, we have to consider the general character of the Gita with reference to its mode of handling its subject. Secondly, there is the character of its style and language. Thirdly, we have to consider the nature of the versification of the Gita. And fourthly and lastly, we must take note of sundry points of detail, such as the attitude of the Gita towards the Vedas and towards caste, its allusions to other systems of speculation, and other matters of the like nature. On each of these groups, in the order here stated, we now proceed to make a few observations.
And first about the manner in which the Gita deals with its subject. It appears to me, that the work bears on the face of it very plain marks indicating that it belongs to an age prior to the system-making age of Sanskrit philosophy. In 1875, I wrote as follows upon this point: ‘ My view is, that in the Gita and the Upanishads, the philosophical part has not been consistently and fully worked out. We have there the results of free thought, exercised on different subjects of great moment, unfettered by the exigencies of any foregone conclusions, or of any fully developed theory. It is afterwards, it is at a later stage of philosophical progress, that system-making arises. In that stage some thinkers interpret whole works by the light of some particular doctrines or expressions. And the result is the development of a whole multitude of philosophical sects, following the lead of those thinkers, and all professing to
* See, as to this, Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i, Pp 328 (Madras).
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And the result is the development of a whole multitude of philosophical sects, following the lead of those thinkers, and all professing to
* See, as to this, Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i, Pp 328 (Madras).
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draw their doctrine from the Gita or the Upanishads, yet cach differing remarkably from the other!.’ Since this was written, Professor Max Miiller’s Hibbert Lectures have been published. And I am happy to find, that as regards the Upanishads, his view coincides exactly with that which I have expressed in the words now quoted. Professor Max Miller says: ‘There is not what may be called a philosophical system in these Upanishads. They are in the true sense of the word guesses at truth, frequently contradicting each other, yet all tending in one dircction 2.’ Further corroboration for the same view is also forthcoming. Professor Fitz-Edward Hall, in a passage which I had not noticed before, says*: ‘In the Upanishads, the Bhagavadgita, and other ancient Hindu books, we encounter, in combination, the doctrines which, after having been subjected to modifications that rendered them as wholes irreconcileable, were distinguished, at an uncertain period, into what have for many ages been styled the Sankhya and the Vedanta.’ We have thus very weighty authority for adhering to the view already expressed on this important topic. But as Professor Weber appears to have expressed an opinion * intended perhaps to throw some doubt on the correctness of that view, it is desirable to go a little more into detail to fortify it by actual reference to the contents of the Gita. the more especially as we can thus clucidate the true character of that work. Before doing so, however, it may be pointed out, that the proposition we have laid down is one, the test of which lies more in a comprehensive review of the whole of the Gita, than in the investigation of small details on which there is necessarily much room for difference of opinion.
And first, Ilct us compare that indisputably systematized work, the current Yoga-sdtras*, with the Bhagavadgita on
* See the Introductory Essay to my Bhayavadgita, translated into English blank verse, p. Ixvii. See also Goldstucher’s Remains, I, 48, 773 II, 10.
* P. 317; cf. also p. 338.
* Preface to Sankhya Sara, p. 7 (Bibl. Indic. ed.)
* History of Indian Literature, p. 28.
® Are we to infer from the circumstance mentioned in Weber's History of
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Ixvii. See also Goldstucher’s Remains, I, 48, 773 II, 10.
* P. 317; cf. also p. 338.
* Preface to Sankhya Sara, p. 7 (Bibl. Indic. ed.)
* History of Indian Literature, p. 28.
® Are we to infer from the circumstance mentioned in Weber's History ofp. 9 one or two topics, where they both travel over common ground. In the Gita, chapter VI, stanzas 33, 34 (p. 71), we have Arguna putting what is, in substance, a question to Krishna, as to how the mind, which is admittedly ‘fickle, boisterous, strong, and obstinate, is to be brought under coatrol—such control having been declared by Krishna to be necessary for attaining devotion (yoga)? Krishza answers by saying that the mind may be restrained by ‘practice (abhydsa) and indifference to worldly objects (vaira4gya).’ He then goes on to say, that devotion cannot be attained without self-restraint, but that one who has self-restraint, and works to achieve devotion, may succeed in acquiring it. Here the subject drops. There is no further explanation of ‘ practice’ or ‘ indifference to worldly objects,’ no exposition of the mode in which they work, and so forth. Contrast now the Yoga-sitras. The topic is there discussed at the very outset of the work. As usual the author begins with ‘Now therefore the Yoga is to be taught... He then explains Yoga by the well-known definition ‘Yoga is the restraint of the movements of the mind.’ And then after pointing out what the movements of the mind are, he proceeds: ‘ Their restraint is by means of practice and indifference to worldly objects 1,—the very terms, be it remarked in passing, which are used in the Bhagavadgita. But having come thus far, the author of the Sdtras does not drop the subject as the author of the Gita does. Ile goes on in this wise: ‘ Practice is the effort for keeping it steady.’ ‘And that becomes firmly grounded when resorted to for a long time, without interruption, and with correct conduct.’ So far we have a discussion of the first requisite specified, namely, practice. Pataggali then goes on to his second requisite for mental restraint. ‘ Indifference to worldly objects is the consciousness of having subdued desires &c. (Vasikara sasigfa) which belongs to one having no longing for objects visible and those which
Indian Literature (p. 223, note 235), that the author of these Sitras was older than Buddha? * Sétra 12, Abhyfse-vairigyibhyfim tannirodhas.
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(Vasikara sasigfa) which belongs to one having no longing for objects visible and those which
Indian Literature (p. 223, note 235), that the author of these Sitras was older than Buddha? * Sétra 12, Abhyfse-vairigyibhyfim tannirodhas.
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are heard of’ (from S4stras &c., such as heaven and so forth). He next proceeds to distinguish another and higher species of ‘indifference, and then he goes on to point out the results of that self-restraint which is to be acquired in the mode he has expounded. That is one instance. Now take another. In chapter VI, stanza 10 and following stanzas, the Git& sets forth elaborately the mode of practically achieving the mental abstraction called Yoga. It need not be reproduced here. The reader can readily find out how sundry directions are there given for the purpose specified, but without any attempt at systematizing. Contrast the Yoga-sitras. In the Sadhanapdda, the section treating of the acquisition of Yoga, Patasigali states in the twenty-ninth aphorism the well-known eight elements of Yoga. Then he subdivides these elements, and expatiatcs on each of them distinctly, defining them, indicating the mode of acquiring them, and hinting at the results which flow from them. ‘That inordinate love of subdivision,’ which Dr. F. E. Hall! has somewhere attributed to the Hindus, appears plainly in these aphorisms, while there is not a trace of it in the corresponding passage in the Bhagavadgita. In my opinion, therefore, these comparisons strongly corroborate the proposition we have laid down regarding the unsystematic, or rather non-systematic, character of the work. In the one we have definition, classification, division, and subdivision. In the other we have a set of practical directions, without any attempt to arrange them in any very scientific order. In the one you have a set of technical terms with specific significations. In the other no such precision is yet manifest. In one word, you have in the Gita the germs, and noteworthy germs too, of a system ?, and you have most of the raw material of a system, but you have no system ready-made.
Let us look at the matter now from a slightly different point of view. There are sundry words used in the Bhaga-
' In the Preface to his Sankhya Sara, I think.
* This is all that we can infer from the few cases of division and classification which we do meet with in the Gita. A subject like that treated of in this work could not well be discussed without some classifications &c.
INTRODUCTION. lr
* This is all that we can infer from the few cases of division and classification which we do meet with in the Gita. A subject like that treated of in this work could not well be discussed without some classifications &c.
INTRODUCTION. lr
vadgita, the significations of which are not quite identical throughout the work. Take, for instance, the word ‘ yoga,’ which we have rendered ‘devotion.’ At Gita, chapter II, stanza 48 (p. 49), a definition is given of that word. In chapter VI, the signification it bears is entirely different. And again in chapter IX, stanza 5, there is still another sense in which the word is used'. The word ‘ Brahman’ too occurs in widely varying significations. And one of its meanings, indeed, is quite singular, namely, ‘ Nature’ (see chapter XIV, stanza 3). Similar observations, to a greater or less extent, apply to the words Buddhi, Atman, and Svabhdva*. Now these are words which stand for ideas not unimportant in the philosophy of the Bhagavadgita. And the absence of scientific precision about their use appears to me to be some indication of that non-systematic character of which we have already spoken.
There is one other line of argument, which leads, I think, to the same conclusion. There are several passages in the Gita which it is not very easy to reconcile with one another ;
land no attempt is made to harmonise them. Thus, for example, in stanza 16 of chapter VII, Krishna divides his devotees into four classes, one of which consists of ‘ men of knowledge,’ whom, Krishna says, he considers ‘as his own self." It would probably be difficult to imagine any exprestion which could indicate higher esteem. Yet in stanza 45 of chapter VI, we have it laid down, that the devotee is superior not only to the mere performer of penances, but even to the men of knowledge. The commentators betray their gnostic bias by interpreting ‘men of knowledge’ in this latter passage to mean those who have acquired erudition in the Sastras and their significations. This is not an interpretation to be necessarily rejected. But there is in it a certain twisting of words, which, under the circumstances here, I am not inclined to accept. And on the other hand, it must not be forgotten, that the implication fairly derivable
* In chapter X the word occurs in two different senses in the same stanza (st. 7).
* Compare the various passages, references to which are collected in the Sanskrit Index at the end of this volume.
12 BHAGAVADGITA.
7). * Compare the various passages, references to which are collected in the Sanskrit Index at the end of this volume.
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from chapter IV, stanza 38 (pp. 62, 63), would seem to be rather that knowledge is superior to devotion—is the higher stage to be reached by means of devotion as the stepping-stone. In another passage again at Gita, chapter XII, stanza 12, concentration is preferred to knowledge, which also seems to me to be irreconcileable with chapterVII, stanza 16. Take still another instance. At Gita, chapter V, stanza 15, it is said, that ‘the Lord receives the sin or merit of none.’ Yet at chapter V, stanza 29, and again at chapter IX, stanza 24, Krishna calls himself ‘the Lord and enjoyer’ of all sacrifices and penances. How, it may well be asked, can the Supreme Being ‘enjoy’ that which he does not even ‘receive?’ Once more, at chapter X, stanza 29, Krishna declares that ‘none is hateful to me, none dear.’ And yet the remarkable verses at the close of chapter XII seem to stand in point-blank contradiction to that declaration. There through a most elaborate series of stanzas, the burden of Krishva’s eloquent sermon is ‘ such a one is dear to me.’ And again in those fine verses, where Krishna winds up his Divine Lay, he similarly tells Aruna, that he, Arguna, is ‘dear’ to Krishna. And Krishaa also speaks of that devotce as ‘dear’ to him, who may publish the mystery of the Gita among those who reverence the Supreme Being!. And yet again, how are we to reconcile the same passage about none being ‘hateful or dear’ to Krishna, with his own words at chapter XVI, stanza 18 and following stanzas? The language used in describing the ‘demoniac’ people there mentioned ‘is not remarkable for sweetness towards them, while Krishva says positively, ‘I hurl down such people into demoniac wombs, whereby they go down into misery and the vilest condition.’ These persons are scarcely characterised with accuracy ‘as neither hateful nor dear’ to Krishva. It seems to me, that all these are rcal inconsistencies in the Gita, not such, perhaps, as might not be explained away, but such, I think, as indicate a mind making guesses at truth, as Professor Max
* And see, too, chapter VII, stanza 17, where the man of knowledge is declared to be ‘dear’ to Krishaa,
‘
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p. 13
Muller puts it, rather than a mind elaborating a complete and organised system of philosophy. There is not even a trace of consciousness on the part of the author that these inconsistencies exist. And the contexts of the various passages indicate, in my judgment, that a half-truth is struck out here, and another half-truth there, with special teference to the special subject then under discussion ; but no attempt is made to organise the various half-truths, which are apparently incompatible, into a symmetrical whole, where the apparent inconsistencies might possibly vanish altogether in the higher synthesis. And having regard to these various points, and to the further point, that the sequence of ideas throughout the verses of the Gita is not always easily followed, we are, I think, safe in adhering to the opinion expressed above, that the Gita is a nonsystematic work, and in that respect belongs to the same class as the older Upanishads. — We next come to the consideration of the style and language of the Bhagavadgita. And that, I think, furnishes a strong argument for the proposition, that it belongs to an age considcrably prior to the epoch of the artificial department of Sanskrit literature—the epoch, namely, of the dramas and poems. In its general character, the style impresses me as quite archaic in its simplicity. Compounds, properly so called, are not numerous; such as there are, are not long ones, and very rarely, if ever, present any puzzle in analysing. The contrast there presented with what is called the classical literature, as represented by Bana or Dasdin, or even KaAlid4sa, is not a little striking. In Kalidasa, doubtless, the love for compounds is pretty well subdued, though I think his works have a perceptibly larger proportion of them than the Gita. But after K4lidasa the love for compounds goes through a remarkable development, till in later writings it may be said almost to have gone mad. Even in Bana and Dandin, Subandhu and Bhavabhati, the plethora of compounds is often wearisome. And the same remark applies to many of the copperplate and other inscriptions which have been recently
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Even in Bana and Dandin, Subandhu and Bhavabhati, the plethora of compounds is often wearisome. And the same remark applies to many of the copperplate and other inscriptions which have been recentlyp. 14 deciphered, and some of which date from the early centuries of the Christian era. Take again the exuberance of figures and tropes which is so marked in the classical style. There is little or nothing of that in the Gita, where you have a plain and direct style of natural simplicity, and yet a style not by any means devoid of xsthetic merit like the style of the Sdtra literature. There is also an almost complete absence of involved syntactical construc tions; no attempt to secure that jingle of like sounds, which scems to have proved a temptation too strong even for Kaliddsa’s muse entirely to resist. But on the contrary, we have those repetitions of words and phrases, which are characteristic, and not only in Sanskrit, of the style of an archaic period’. Adverting specially to the language as distinguished from the style of the Gita, we find such words as Anta, Bhasha, Brahman, some of which are collected in the Sanskrit Index in this volume, which have gone out of use in the classical literature in the significations they respectively bear in the Gita. The word ‘ha,’ which occurs once, is worthy of special note. It is the equivalent of ‘gha,’ which occurs in the Vedic Samhitas. In the form ‘ha’ it occurs in the Brahmamas. But it never occurs, I think, in what is properly called the classical literature. It is, indeed, found ian the Purdvzas. But that is a class of works which occupies a very unique position. There is a good deal in the Purawas that, I think, must be admitted to be very ancient?; while undoubtedly also there is a great deal in them that is very modern. It is, therefore, impossible to treat the use of ‘ha’ in that class of works as negativing an inference of the antiquity of any book where the word occurs; while its use in Vedic works and its total absence from modern works indicate such
* Compare Muir, Sanskrit Texts, vol. i, p. §. See, too, Goldstucker's Kemains, 1,177.
3 Thi, opinion, which I had expressed as long ago as 1874 in the Introduction to my edition of Bhartrshari’s Satakas, is, I find, also held by Dr. Bubler; see hiv Introduction to Apastamba in this series, p. xx seq., note. Puraas are mentioned in the Sutta Nipata (p.115), as to the cate of which, see inter alia Swamy’s Introduction, p. xvii.
p. 15
Bubler; see hiv Introduction to Apastamba in this series, p. xx seq., note. Puraas are mentioned in the Sutta Nipata (p.115), as to the cate of which, see inter alia Swamy’s Introduction, p. xvii.
p. 15
antiquity pretty strongly. We may, therefore, embody the result of this part of the discussion in the proposition, that the Gita is removed by a considerable linguistic and chronological distance from classical Sanskrit literature. And so far as it goes, this proposition agrees with the result of our investigation of the first branch of internal evidence. The next branch of that evidence brings us to the character of the versification of the Gita. Here, again, a survey of Sanskrit verse generally, and the verse of the Git4 in particular, leads us to a conclusion regarding the position of the Gita in Sanskrit literature, which is in strict accord with the conclusions we have already drawn. In the verse of the Vedic Samhitas, there is almost nothing like a rigidly fixed scheme of versification, no particular collocation of long and short syllables is absolutely necessary. If we attempt to chant them in the mode in which classical Sanskrit verse is chanted, we invariably come across lines where the chanting cannot be smooth. If we come next to the versification of the Upanishads, we observe some progress made towards such fixity of scheme as we have alluded to above. Though there are still numerous lines, which cannot be smoothly chanted, there are, on the other hand, a not altogether inconsiderable number which can be smoothly chanted. In the Bhagavadgita a still further advance, though a slight one, may, I think, be marked. A visibly larger proportion of the stanzas in the Git4 conform to the metrical schemes as laid down by the writers on prosody, though there are still sundry verses which do not so conform, and cannot, accordingly, be chanted in the regular way. Lastly, we come to the Kavyas and NAfakas—the classical literature. And here in practice we find everywhere a most inflexible rigidity of scheme, while the theory is laid down in a rule which says, that ‘even masha may be changed to masha, but a break of metre should be avoided.’ This survey of Sanskrit verse may, I think, be fairly treated as showing, that adhesion to the metrical schemes is one test of the chronological position of a work—the later the work, thep. 16 more undeviating is such adhesion. I need not stay here to point out, how this view receives corroboration from the rules given on this subject in the standard work of Pingala on the AAandas Sastra. I will only conclude this point by saying, that the argument from the versification of the Gita, so far as it goes, indicates its position as being prior to the classical literature, and nearly contemporaneous with the Upanishad literature.
I will only conclude this point by saying, that the argument from the versification of the Gita, so far as it goes, indicates its position as being prior to the classical literature, and nearly contemporaneous with the Upanishad literature.
We now proceed to investigate the last group of facts falling under the head of internal evidence, as mentioned above. And first as regards the attitude of the Gita towards the Vedas. If we examine all the passages in the Gita, in which reference is made to the Vedas, the aggregate result appears to be, that the author of the Gita does not throw the Vedas entirely overboard. He feels and expresses reverence for them, only that reverence is of a somewhat special character. He says in effect, that the precepts of the Vedas are suitable to a certain class of people, of a certain intellectual and spiritual status, so to say. So far their authority is unimpeached. But if the unwise sticklers for the authority of the Vedas claim anything more for them than this, then the author of the Gita holds them to be wrong. He contends, on the contrary, that acting upon the ordinances of the Vedas is an obstacle to the attainment of the summum bonum!. Compare this with the doctrine of the Upanishads. The coincidence appears to me to be most noteworthy. In one of his recent lectures, Professor Max Miller uses the following eloquent language regarding the Upanishads*: ‘Lastly come the Upanishads; and what is their object? To show the utter uselessness, nay, the mischievousness of all ritual performances (compare our Gita, pp. 47, 48, 84°); to condemn every sacrificial act which has for its motive a desire or hope of reward (comp. Gita, p. 119 *); to deny, if not the existence, at least the exceptional and exalted characterp. 17 of the Devas (comp. Gita, pp. 76-84"); and to teach that there is no hope of salvation and deliverance except by the individual self recognising the true and universal self, and finding rest there, where alone rest can be found?’ (comp. our Gita Translation, pp. 78-83).
* Compare the passages collected under the word Vedas in our Index.
* Hibbert Lectures, p. 340 seq. 2 IL, 42-453 IX, 20, 21.
* XVII, 12.
p. 17
of the Devas (comp. Gita, pp. 76-84"); and to teach that there is no hope of salvation and deliverance except by the individual self recognising the true and universal self, and finding rest there, where alone rest can be found?’ (comp. our Gita Translation, pp. 78-83).
The passages to which I have given references in brackets will show, that Professor Max Miiller’s words might all be used with strict accuracy regarding the essential teaching ef the Bhagavadgitéa. We have here, therefore, another strong circumstance in favour of grouping the Gita with the Upanishads. One more point is worthy of note. Wherever the Gita refers to the Vedas in the somewhat disparaging manner I have noted, no distinction is taken between the portion which relates to the ritual and the portion which relates to that higher science, viz. the science of the soul, which Sanatkumdra speaks of in his famous dialogue with Narada*. At Gita, chapter II, stanza 45, Arguna is told that the Vedas relate only to the effects of the three qualities, which effects Arguna is instructed to overcome. At Gitd, chapter VI, stanza 44, Arguna is told that he who has acquired some little devotion, and then exerts himself for further progress, rises above the Divine word—the Vedas. And there are also one or two other passages of the like nature. They all treat the Vedas as concemed with ritual alone. They make no reference to any portion of the Vedas dealing with the higher knowledge. If the word Ved4nta, at Gita, chapter XV, stanza 15 (p. 113), signifies, as it seems to signify, this latter portion of the Vedas, then that is the only allusion to it. But, from all the passages in the Gita which refer to the Vedas, I am inclined to draw the inference, that the Upanishads of the Vedas were composed at a time not far removed from the time of the composition of the Gita, and that at that period the Upanishads had not yet risen to the position of
* See A bandogya-uapanishad, p. 473, or rather I ought to have referred to the Mendaka-epanishad, where the superiority and inferiority is more distinctly stated> in words, pp. 266, 267.
(8) Ccp. 18 high importance which they afterwards commanded. In the passage referred to at chapter XV, the word Vedantas probably signifies the Aranyakas, which may be regarded as marking the beginning of the epoch, which the composition of the Upanishads brought to its close. And it is to the close of this epoch, that I would assign the birth of the Gita, which is probably one of the youngest members of the group to which it belongs.
And it is to the close of this epoch, that I would assign the birth of the Gita, which is probably one of the youngest members of the group to which it belongs.
It appears to me, that this conclusion is corroborated by the fact that a few stanzas in the Gita are identical with some stanzas in some of the Upanishads. With regard to the epic age of Greece, Mr. E. A. Freeman has said that, in carrying ourselves back to that age, ‘we must cast aside all the notions with which we are familiar in our own age about property legal or moral in literary compositions. It is plain that there were phrases, epithets, whole lines, which were the common property of the whole epic school of poetry'.’ It appears to me that we must accept this proposition as equally applicable to the early days of Sanskrit literature, having regard to the common passages which we mect with in sundry of the Vedic works, and also sometimes, I believe, in the different Puravas. If this view is correct, then the fact that the Gita contains some stanzas in the very words which we meet with in some of the Upanishads, indicates, to my mind, that the conclusion already drawn from other data about the position of the Gita with regard to the Upanishads, is not by any mcans unwarranted, but one to which the facts before us rather seem to point.
And here we may proceed to draw attention to another fact connected with the relation of the Gita to the Vedas. In stanza 17 of the ninth chapter of the Gita, only A7é, Saman, and Yagus are mentioned. The Atharva-veda is not referred to at all. This omission does certainly seem a very noteworthy one. For it is in a passage where the Supreme Being is identifying himself with everything, and where, therefore, the fourth Veda might fairly be expected
* Contemporary Review, February 1879.
p. 19
This omission does certainly seem a very noteworthy one. For it is in a passage where the Supreme Being is identifying himself with everything, and where, therefore, the fourth Veda might fairly be expected
* Contemporary Review, February 1879.
p. 19
to be mentioned. I may add that in commenting on SankarakArya's remarks on this passage, Anandagiri (and Madhusddana Sarasvati also) seems evidently to have been conscious of the possible force of this omission of the Atharva-veda. He accordingly says that by force of the word ‘and’ in the verse in question, the Atharvdfgirasas, or Atharva-veda, must also be included. Are we at liberty to infer from this, that the Atharva-veda did not exist in the days when the Gita was composed? The explanation ordinarily given for the omission of that Veda, where such omission occurs, namely, that it is not of any use in ordinary sacrificial matters, is one which can scarcely have any force in the present instance; though it is adequate, perhaps, to explain the words ‘those who know the three branches of knowledge,’ which occur only a few lines after the verse pow under consideration. The commentators render no further help than has been already stated. Upon the whole, however, while I am not yet quite prepared to say, that the priority of the Gita, even to the recognition of the Atharva-veda as a real Veda, may be fairly inferred from the passage in question, I think that the passage is noteworthy as pointing in that direction. But further data in explanation of the omission referred to must be awaited.
If the conclusions here indicated about the relative positions of the Gita and certain Vedic works are correct, we can fairly take the second century B.C. as a terminus before which the Gita must have been composed. For the Upanishads are mentioned in the Mahabhdshya of Patafgali, which we are probably safe in assigning to the middle of that century. The epoch of the older Upanishads, therefore, to which reference has been so frequently made here, may well be placed at some period prior to the beginning of the second century B.c. The Atharva-veda is likewise mentioned by Patafgali', and as ‘ ninefold,’ too, be it remembered; so that if we are entitled to draw the conclusion which has been mentioned above from chapter IX, stanza 17, we come to the same period for the date of the Gita.
* See also Sutta Nipfta, p. 115. C2
p. 20
* See also Sutta Nipfta, p. 115. C2
p. 20
Another point to note in this connexion is the reference to the SAma-veda as the best of the Vedas (see p. 88). That is a fact which seems to be capable of yielding some chronological information. For the estimation in which that Veda has been held appears to have varied at different times. Thus, in the Aitareya-brahmana!, the glory of the SAman is declared to be higher than that of the Rsk. In the KAandogya-upanishad * the Saman is said to be the essence of the Xk, which Sankara interprets by saying that the Saman is more weighty. In the Prasna-upanishad °, too, the implication of the passage V, 5 (in which the Saman is stated as the guide to the Brahmaloka, while the Yagus is said to guide to the lunar world, and the Az& to the human world) is to the same effect. And we may also mention as on the same side the Nrisimha TApini-upanishad and the Vedic passage cited in the commentary of Sankara on the closing sentence of the first khavda of that Upanishad*. On the other side, we have the statement in Manu that the sound of the SAma-veda is unholy ; and the consequent direction that where the sound of it is heard, the Atk and Yagus should not be recited*®. We have also the passages from some of the Purazas noted by Dr. Muir in his excellent work, Original Sanskrit Texts, which point in the same direction®. And we have further the direction in the Apastamba Dharma-sitra, that the Saman hymns should not be recited where the other Vedas are being recited’, as well as the grouping of the sound of the Saman with various classes of objectionable and unholy noises, such as those of dogs and asses. It is pretty evident that the view of Apastamba is based on the same theory as that of Manu. Now in looking at the two classes of authoritics thus marshalled, it is plain that the Gita ranges itself with those which are unquestionably the more ancient.
* Hauy’s edition, p. 68.
® Bibl. Ind. ed., p. 12. ® Bibl. Ind. ed., p. 221 seq.
* Bibl. Ind. ed., p. 11. 5 Chapter IV, stanzas 123, 124.
* Vol. iii (and ed.., p. rt seq. Cf. Guldstucker’s Kemains, I, 4, 28, 266; I, 67.
, Apastambea Ihuhler's ed. I, 3,17, 18 ‘pp. 38, 39 in this series’; sce further on this point Mr. Bumell’s Devatadhyaya-brahmasa, Introd., pp. viii, ix, and notes.
p. 21
And among the less ancient works, prior to which we may place the Gita on account of the facts now under consideration, are Manu and Apastamba. Now Manu’s date is not ascertained, though, I believe, he is now generally considered to belong to about the second or third century B.c.' But Dr. Buhler, in the Preface to his Apastamba in the present series, has adduced good reasons for holding that Apastamba is prior to the third century B.C.3, and we therefore obtain that as a point of time prior to which the Gita must have been composed.
Buhler, in the Preface to his Apastamba in the present series, has adduced good reasons for holding that Apastamba is prior to the third century B.C.3, and we therefore obtain that as a point of time prior to which the Gita must have been composed.
The next important item of internal evidence which we have to note, is the view taken of caste in the Bhagavadgita. Here, again, a comparison of the doctrine of the Gita with the conception of caste in Manu and Apastamba is interesting and instructive. The view of Manu has been already contrasted by me with the Gita in another place *. I do not propose to dwell on that point here, as the date of Manu is far from being satisfactorily ascertained. I prefer now to take up Apastamba only, whose date, as just now stated, is fairly well fixed by Dr. Buhler. The division of castes, then, is twice referred to in the Bhagavadgita. In the first passage (p. 59) it is stated that the division rests va differences of qualities and duties; in the second (pp. 126, 127) the various duties are distinctly stated according to the differences of qualities. Now in the first place, noting as we pass along, that there is nothing in the Gita to indicate whether caste was hereditary, according to its view, whereas Apastamba distinctly states it to be such, let us compare the second passage of the Gita with the Satras of Apastamba bearing on the point. The view enunciated in the Git4 appears to me plainly to belong to an earlier age— to an age of considerably less advancement in social and religious development. In the Git, for instance, the duties of a Brahmawa are said to be tranquillity, self-restraint, and
' Professor Tiele (History of Ancient Religions, p. 127) considers the ‘main features’ of Manu to be ‘ pre-Buddhistic.’
> P. axxv.
* See the Introductory Essay to my Bhagavadgitd in English verse, published ws 1875, p. cari.
p. 22
127) considers the ‘main features’ of Manu to be ‘ pre-Buddhistic.’
> P. axxv.
* See the Introductory Essay to my Bhagavadgitd in English verse, published ws 1875, p. cari.
p. 22
so forth. In Apastamba, they are the famous six dutics, namely, study, imparting instruction, sacrificing, officiating at others’ sacrifices, making gifts, and receiving gifts; and three others, namely, inheritance, occupancy, and gleaning ears of corn, which, it may be remarked en passant, are not stated in Manu. The former scem to my mind to point to the age when the qualities which in early times gave the Brahmaaas their pre-eminence in Hindu society were still a living reality’. It will be noted, too, that there is nothing in that list of duties which has any necessary or natural connexion with any privilege as belonging to the caste. The Law lays down these duties, in the true sense of the word. In Apastamba, on the contrary, we sce an advance towards the later view on both points. You have no reference to moral and religious qualities now. You have to do with ceremonies and acts. You have under the head ‘duties’ not mere obligations, but rights. For the duty of receiving gifts is a right, and so is the duty of teaching others and officiating at others’ sacrifices; as we know not merely from the subsequent course of events, but also from a comparison of the duties of Brahmavas on the one hand, and Kshatriyas, Vaisyas, and Sddras on the other, as laid down by Manu and Apastamba themselves. Apastamba’s rules, therefore, appear to belong to the time when the Brahmanas had long been an established power, and were assuming to themselves those valuable privileges which they have always claimed in later times. The rules of the Gita, on the other hand, point to a time considerably prior to this—to a time when the Brahmaaas were by their moral and intellectual qualities laying the foundation of that preeminence in Hindu society which afterwards enabled them to lord it over all castes. These observations mutatis mutandis apply to the rules regarding the other castes also. Here again, while the Gita still insists on the inner qualities, which properly constitute the military profession, for instance, the rules of Apastamba indicate the powerful
* The remarks in the text will show bow little there is in the Git of that ‘ Brahmanizing * which bas been shortly noticed on a previous page.
p. 23
p. 23
influence of the Brahmavas'. For, as stated before, officiating at others’ sacrifices, instructing others, and receiving presents, are here expressly prohibited to Kshatriyas as also to Vaisyas. The result of that is, that the Brahmavas become indispensable to the Kshatriyas and Vaisyas, for upon both the duty of study, of offering sacrifices, and making gifts and presents is inculcated. In his outline of the History of Ancient Religions, Professor Tiele, speaking of the ‘increasing influence of the Brahmans,’ writes as follows: ‘Subject at first to the princes and nobles, and dependent on them, they began by insinuating themselves into their favour, and representing it as a religious duty to show protection and liberality towards them. Meanwhile they endeavoured to make themselves indispensable to them. gradually acquired the sole right to conduct public worship, and made themselves masters of instruction 2.’ And after pointing out the high position thus achieved by the Brahmans, and the low position of the K4nd4las and others of the inferior castes, he adds: ‘Such a position could not long be endured ; and this serves to explain not only the rise of Buddhism, but also its rapid diffusion, and the radical revolution which it brought about*.’ To proceed, however, with our comparison of the Gita and Apastamba. The superiority distinctly claimed by the latter for the Brahmawa is not quite clearly brought out in the Gita. ‘Holy Brahmazas and devoted royal saints’ are bracketed together at p. 86; while the Kshatriyas are declared to have been the channel of communication between the Deity and mankind as regards the great doctrine of devotion propounded by the Bhagavadgita. That indicates a position for the Kshatriyas much more like what the Upanishads disclose‘, than even that which
* As to the Kshatriyas the contrast with Manu’s rules is even stronger than with Apastamba’s. See our Introduction to the Gité in English verse, p. cxiil.
> P. 120. ® Pp. 129, 130.
* See p. §8 infra; and compare with this Weber's remarks on one of the clagees into which he divides the whole body of Upanishads, History of Indian Lacrature, p. 165. See also Muir, Sanskrit Texts, vol.i, p. 08; Max Muller, Upanishads, vol. i, p. Ixxv.
24 BHAGAVADGITA.
120. ® Pp. 129, 130.
* See p. §8 infra; and compare with this Weber's remarks on one of the clagees into which he divides the whole body of Upanishads, History of Indian Lacrature, p. 165. See also Muir, Sanskrit Texts, vol.i, p. 08; Max Muller, Upanishads, vol. i, p. Ixxv.
p. 24
Apastamba assigns to them. The fact is further noteworthy, that in the Gita each caste has its own entirely distinct set of duties. There is no overlapping, so to say. And that is a circumstance indicating a very early stage in the development of the institution’. Besides, as already indicated, the duties laid down by Apastamba and Manu as common to Kshatriyas and Vaisyas are the very duties which make those castes dependent to a very great extent on the Brahmamas, Lastly, it is not altogether unworthy of note, that in the elaborate specification of the best of every specics which we find in chapter X, the Brahmaza is not mentioned as the best of the castes, there is nothing to indicate the notion contained in the well-known later verse, ‘The Brahmama is the head of the castes.’ On the contrary, the ruler of men is specified as the highest among men ?, indicating, perhaps, a state of society such as that described at the beginning of the extract from Professor Tiele’s work quoted above.
We come now to another point. What is the position of the Gita in regard to the great reform of S&kya Muni? The question is one of much interest, having regard particularly to the remarkable coincidences between Buddhistic doctrines and the doctrines of the Gita to which we have drawn attention in the foot-notes to our translation. But the materials for deciding the question are unhappily not forthcoming. Professor Wilson, indeed, thought that there was an allusion to Buddhism in the Gita’. But his idea was bascd on a confusion between the Buddhists and the Karvakas or matcrialists*. Failing that allusion, we have nothing very tangible but the unsatisfactory ‘ negative argument’ based on mere non-mention of Buddhism in the Gita. That argument is not quite satisfactory to my own mind, although, as I have elsewhere pointed out 5, some of
* Cf, Sutta Nipata, p. 32; and also Mr. Davids’ note on that passage in his Buddhism, p. 131.
2 P. 8g infra. * Essays on Sanskrit Literature, vol. iii, p. 150.
* See our remarks on this point in the Introductory Essay to our Gita in verse, p. ii seq.
* Introduction to Gita in English verse, p. v seq.