Iamblichus — Life of Pythagoras (trans. Thomas Taylor, 1818)

but it is not possible to use deliberate choice without it. For deliberate choice indicates the dignity of manners. Hence also, the reasoning power subduing by force anger and desire, produces continence and endurance. And again, when the reasoning power is violently dethroned by the irrational parts, then incon- tinence and effeminacy are produced. Such disposi- tions however, of the soul as these, are half-perfect virtues, and half-perfect vices. For the reasoning ower of the soul is [according to its natural subsistence] in a healthy, but the irrational parts are in a diseased condition. And so far indeed, as anger and desire are governed and led by the rational part of the soul, continence and endurance become virtues; but so far as this is effected by violence, and not voluntarily, they become vices. For it is necessary that virtue should perform such things as are fit, not with pain, but with pleasure. Again, so far as anger and desire govern the reasoning power, effeminacy and incontinence are pro- duced, which are certain vices. But so far as they gratify the passions with pain, knowing that they are erroneous, in consequence of the eye of the soul being sane,—so far as this is the case, they are not vices. Hence, it is evident that virtue must necessarily per- form what is fit voluntarily; that which is involun- tary indeed, not being without pain and fear; and that which is voluntary, not subsisting without pleasure and delight.

By division also it will at the same time be found
that this is the case. For knowledge and the per-
ception of things, are the province of the rational part
of the soul; but power pertains to the irrational part.
For not to be able to resist pain, or to vanquish
pleasure, is the peculiarity of the irrational part of the
soul. But deliberate choice subsists in both these, viz.
in the rational, and also in the irrational part. For it
consists of dianoia and appetite; of which, dianoia
indeed, pertains to the rational, but appetite to the

irrational part. Hence every virtue consists in a co-
adaptation of the parts of the soul; and both will
and deliberate choice, entirely subsist in virtue.
Universally therefore, virtue is a certain co-adapta-
tion of the irrational parts of the soul to the rational
part. Virtue however, is produced through pleasure
and pain receiving the boundary of that which is fit.
For true virtue is nothing else than the habit of that
which is fit. But the fit, or the decorous, is that
which ought to be; and the unfit, or indecorous, is
that which ought not to be. Of the indecorous how-
ever, there are two species, viz. excess and defect.
And excess indeed, is more than is fit; but defect is
less than is fit. But since the fit is that which ought
to be, it is both asummit anda middle. It is a summit
indeed, because it neither requires ablation, nor
addition; but it is a middle, because it subsists
between excess and defect. The fit, however, and
the unfit, are to each other as the equal and the
unequal, that which is arranged, and that which is
without arrangement; and both the two former
and the two latter are finite and infinite.1 On this
account, the parts of the unequal are referred to
the middle, but not to each other. For the angle
is called obtuse which is greater than a right angle;
but that is called acute, which is less than a right angle.
The right line also [in a circle] is greater, which sur-
passes that which is drawn from the center. And the
day is longer indeed, which exceeds that of the equinox.
Diseases, likewise, of the body are generated, through
the body becoming more hot or more cold [than is
proper]. For that which is more hot [than is fit]
exceeds moderation; and that which is more cold

1 viz. The equal and that which is arranged, belong to the order of bound, and the unequal and that which is without arrangement, to the order of infinity. And bound and infinity are the two great principles of things after the ineffable cause of all. See the third book of my translation of Proclus, On the Theology of Plato.

[than is fit] is below mediocrity. The soul also, and
such things as pertain to it, have this disposition and
analogy. For audacity indeed, is an excess of the
decorous in the endurance of things of a dreadful
nature; but timidity is a deficiency of the decorous.
And prodigality is an excess of what is fit in the ex-
penditure of money; but illiberality is a deficiency in
this. And rage indeed, is an excess of the decorous
in the impulse of the irascible part of the soul; but
insensibility is a deficiency of this. The same reason-
ing likewise applies to the opposition of the other
dispositions of the soul. It is necessary however, that
virtue, since it is a habit of the decorous, and a medium
of the passions, should neither be [wholly] impassive,
nor immoderately passive. For impassivity indeed,
causes the soul to be unimpelled, and to be without
an enthusiastic tendency to the beautiful in conduct;
but immoderate passivity causes it to be full of per-
turbation, and inconsiderate. It is necessary therefore,
that passion should so present itself to the view, in
virtue, as shadow and outline in a picture. For the
animated and the delicate, and that which imitates
the truth, in conjunction with goodness of colors,
are especially effected in a picture through these [i.e.
through shadow and outline]. But the passions of the
soul are animated by the natural incitation and enthu-
siasm of virtue. For virtue is generated from the
passions, and when generated, again subsists together
with them; just as that which is well harmonized
consists of the sharp and the flat, that which is well
mingled consists of the hot and the cold, and that
which is in equilibrium derives its equality of weight
from the heavy and the light. It is not therefore
necessary to take away the passions of the soul; for
neither would this be profitable; but it is requisite
that they should be co-harmonized with the rational
part, in conjunction with fitness and mediocrity.

The Treatise of

ARCHYTAS ON ETHICAL ERUDITION.

I say that virtue will be found sufficient to the avoidance of infelicity, and vice to the non-attainment of felicity, if we judiciously consider the habits [by which these are produced]. For it is necessary that the bad man should always be miserable; whether he is in affluence, for he employs it badly; or whether he is in penury; just as the blind man, whether he has light, and the most splendid visible object before him, or whether he is in the dark [is always necessarily without sight]. But the good man is not always happy; for felicity does not consist in the possession, but in the use of virtue. For neither does he who has sight always see; for he will not see, if he is without light. Life, however, is divided into two paths; one of which is more arduous, and in which the patient Ulysses walked; but the other is more free from molestation, and is that in which Nestor proceeded. I say therefore that virtue desires the latter, but is able to proceed in the former of these paths. The nature however of felicity proclaims it to be a desirable and stable life, because it gives perfection to the decision of the soul. Hence the virtuous man who does not obtain such a life as this, is not indeed happy, nor yet entirely miser- able. No one therefore will dare to say that the good man should be exempt from disease, and pain, and sorrow. For as we leave certain painful things to the

body, so likewise we must permit them to be present
with the soul. The sorrows, however, of fools are
most irrational; but those of wise men proceed only
as far as reason, which gives limitation to things, per-
mits. Moreover, the boast of apathy dissolves the
generosity of virtue, when it opposes itself to things
of-an indifferent nature, and not to evils such as death,
and pain, and poverty. For things which are not
evils are easily vanquished. We should therefore exer-
cise ourselves in the mediocrity of the passions, as we
shall then equally avoid insensibility, and too much
passivity, and shall not speak higher of our nature
than we ought.

I say then that the good man is one who uses in a
beautiful manner great things and opportunities. He
likewise is able to bear well both prosperity and
adversity. In beautiful and honorable circumstances
also, he becomes worthy of the condition in which he
is placed; and when his fortune is changed, receives it
in a proper manner. In short, on all occasions, he con-
tends well from contingencies that may arise. Nor
does he only thus prepare himself [for whatever may
happen], but likewise those who confide in and contend
together with him.

CRITO,

PRUDENCE AND PROSPERITY.

PrupeNnce and prosperity subsist, with reference to
each other, as follows: Prudence indeed is effable and
possesses reason; for it is something orderly and defi-
nite. But prosperity is ineffable and irrational; for
it is something disorderly and indefinite. And pru-
dence, indeed, is prior, but prosperity is posterior in
beginning and in power. For the former is naturally
adapted to govern and define; but the latter to be
governed and defined. Moreover, both prudence and
prosperity receive co-adaptation, since they concur in
one and the same thing. For it is always necessary
that the thing which bounds and co-arranges, should
have a nature which is effable and participates of
reason; but that the thing which is bounded and co-
arranged, should be naturally ineffable and irrational.
For the reason of the nature of the infinite and of
that which bounds, thus subsists in all things. For
infinites are always naturally disposed to be bounded
and co-arranged by things which possess reason and
prudence, since the former have the order of matter
and essence with relation to the latter. But finites are
co-arranged and bounded from themselves, since they
have the order of cause, and of that which is energetic.

The co-adaptation, however, of these natures in
different things, produces a great and various differ-
ence of co-adapted substances. For in the compre-
hension of the whole of things, the co-adaptation of

both the natures, i.e. of the nature which is always moved, and of that which is always passive, is the world. For it is not possible for the whole and the universe to be otherwise saved, than by that which is generated being co-adapted to that which is divine, and that which is always passive to that which is always moved.! In man, likewise, the co-adaptation of the irrational to the rational part of the soul, is virtue. For it is not possible in these, when there is sedition in both the parts, that virtue should have a subsistence. In a city also, the co-adaptation of the governors to the governed, produces strength and concord. For to govern is the peculiarity of the better nature; but to be governed, is easier to the subordinate [than to the more excellent] nature. And strength and concord are common to both. There is, however, the same mode of adapta- tion in the universe and in a family: for allurements * and erudition concur with reason in one and the same thing; and likewise pains and pleasures, prosperity and adversity. For the life of man requires intension and remission, sorrow and gladness, prosperity and adver- sity. For some things are able to collect and retain the intellect to industry and wisdom; but others impart relaxation and delight, and thus render the intellect vigorous and prompt to action. If however one of these prevails in life, then the life of man be- comes of one part, and verges to one part, tending either to sorrow and difficulty, or to remission and levity. But the co-adaptation of all these ought to subsist with reference to prudence. For this separates and distinguishes ® bound and infinity inactions. Hence

1 viz. The salvation of the universe arises from the co-adaptation

of the sublunary region to the heavens. 2In the Greek érwdas ; on which Gale observes, “‘ Forte dud6ias, nisi aliud subsit mysterium.” But it appears to me that there is no occasion to substitute any other word for érwéas. For in the educa- tion of youth, it is certainly requisite to unite allurement with erudition. And the substitution of duaOcas, ignorance, is monstrous. 3 In the original dura yap d Stevepyotoa, instead of which Gale

prudence is the leader and mother of the other virtues.
For all of them are co-harmonized and co-arranged
with reference to the reason and law of this virtue.
And now my discussion of this subject is terminated.
For the irrational and the effable are in all things.
And the latter defines and bounds; but the former is
defined and bounded. That, however, which con-
sists of both these, is the apt composition of the whole
and the universe.

The following beautiful fragment of Criro on
Prudence, is from the Physical Eclogues of
Stobzus, p. 198, and is omitted by Gale in his
Collection of Pythagoric Ethical Fragments
in Opusc. Mythol. &c.

God fashioned man in such a way as to render it
manifest, that he is not through the want of power,
or of deliberate choice, incapable of being impelled
to what is beautiful in conduct. For he implanted in
him a principle of such a kind as to comprehend at one
and the same time the possible and the pre-eligible;
so that man might be the cause of power, and the
possession of good, but God of impulse and incitation
according to right reason. On this account also, he
made him tend to heaven, gave him an intellective
power, and implanted in him a sight called intellect,
which is capable of beholding God. For it is not
possible without God to discover that which is best
and most beautiful, nor without intellect to see God,
since every mortal nature is established in conjunction
with a kindred privation of intellect. ‘This however
is not imparted to it by God, but by the essence of
generation, and by that impulse of the soul which is
without deliberate choice.
proposes to read ara yap dde évepyoura, which still leaves the sentence