co-adaptation, is for intellect not to be prevented from accomplishing its proper work, either by indigence, or excess. For that which is less excellent, is co-arranged for the sake of that which is more excellent. Thus in the world, every part that is always passive, subsists for the sake of that which is always moved. And in the conjunction of animals, the female subsists for the sake of the male. For the latter sows, generating a soul ; but the former alone imparts matter to that which is generated. In the soul however, the irrational sub- sists for the sake of the rational part. For anger and desire are co-arranged in subserviency to the first part of the soul; the former as a certain satellite, and guardian of the body; but the latter as a dispensator and provident curator of necessary wants. But intellect being established in the highest summit of the body, and having a prospect in that which is on all sides splendid and transparent,! investigates the wisdom of [real] beings. And this is the work of it according to nature, viz. having investigated, and obtained the possession [of truth] to follow those beings who are more excellent and more honorable than itself. For the knowledge of things divine and most honorable, is the principle, cause, and rule of human blessedness.
live. In the etherial vehicle of the soul, which when the soul energizes intellectually is spherical, and is moved circularly. This vehicle also is ai-yoedys, or luciform, throughout diaphanous, and of a star-like nature. Hence Marcus Antoninus beautifully observes ; oPaupad Pux7s abroedys, (lege avyoedys) Stay pyre éxreivyrac éme tt, pyre tow ovvtpéxy pyre clic, GAAA Gre Aaprytar, w TH dAyOeay Spa riv Tavtwv, Kat Tiv év airy. Lib. II. ie. “ The sphere of the soul is then luciform, when the soul is neither extended to anything [external] nor inwardly concurs with it, nor is depressed by it, but is illuminated with a light by which she sees the truth of all things, and the truth that is in herself.”
METOPUS,
CONCERNING VIRTUE.
Tue virtue of man is the perfection of the nature of man. For every being becomes perfect, and arrives at the summit of excellence according to the proper nature of its virtue. Thus the virtue of a horse, is that which leads the nature of a horse to its summit. And the same reasoning is applicable to che several parts ofathing. Thus the virtue of the eyes is acuteness of vision: and this in the nature of the eyes is the summit. The virtue of the ears also, is acuteness of hearing: and this is the summit of the nature of the ears. Thus too, the virtue of the feet is swiftness: and this is the summit of the nature of the feet. It is necessary how- ever, that every virtue should have these three things, reason, power, and deliberate choice; reason indeed, by which it judges and contemplates; power, by which it prohibits and vanquishes; and deliberate choice, by which it loves and delights in [what is proper]. ‘To judge, therefore, and contemplate, pertain to the dia- noetic part of the soul; but to prohibit and vanquish are the peculiarity of the irrational 1 part of the soul;
1M. Meibomius observes, that Canter did not see that Aoytorixw should be written in this place for dAoyw. Canter however was right in retaining dAoyw. For the dianoetic is the same with the logistic part of the soul; and it is evident that a part of the soul different from the dianoetic is here intended to be signified. Besides, as Aristotle shows in his Nicomachean Ethics, when the irrational becomes obedient to the rational part of the soul, the former then prohibits and van-
quishes base appetites in conjunction with the latter.
and to love and delight in what is proper, pertain to
both the rational and irrational parts. For deliberate
choice consists of dianoia [or the discursive energy of
reason] and appetite. Dianoia therefore, belongs to
the rational, but appetite to the irrational part of the
soul. The multitude however, of all the virtues, may
be perceived from the parts of the soul; and in a
similar manner the generation and nature of virtue.
For of the parts of the soul, there are two that rank
as the first, viz. the rational and the irrational parts.
And the rational part indeed, is that by which we
judge and contemplate; but the irrational part is that
by which we are impelled and desire. ‘These however,
are either concordant or discordant with each other.
But the contest and dissonance between them, are
produced through excess and defect. It is evident
therefore, that when the rational vanquishes the irra-
tional part of the soul, endu ance and continence are
roduced; and that when the former leads, and the
atter follows, and both accord with each other, then
virtue is generated. Hence, endurance and con-
tinence are generated accompanied with pain; but
endurance resists pain, and continence pleasure. In-
continence however, and effeminacy, neither resist nor
vanquish [pleasure]. And on this account it happens
that men fly from good through pain, but reject it
through pleasure. Praise likewise, and blame, and
every thing beautiful in human conduct are produced
in these parts of the soul. And in short, the nature
of virtue derives its subsistence after this manner.
The species however, and the parts of it, may be
surveyed as follows: Since there are two parts of the
soul, the rational and the irrational; the latter is
divided into the irascible and appetitive. And the
rational part indeed, is that by which we judge and
contemplate; but the irrational part is that by which
we are impelled and desire. And of this, that which
is as it were adapted to defend us, and revenge inci-
dental molestations, is denominated the irascible part;
but that which is as it were orectic of, and desires to
preserve the proper constitution of the body, is the
appetitive part. It is evident therefore, that the
multitude of the virtues, their differences, and their
peculiarities, follow conformably to these parts of the soul.
FROM CLINIAS.
Every virtue is perfected, as was shown by us in the beginning, from reason, deliberate choice, and power. Each of these, however, is not by itself a part of virtue, but the cause of it. Such therefore, as have the in- tellective and gnostic part of virtue,! are denominated skilful and intelligent; but such as have the ethical and pre-elective part of it, are denominated useful and equitable.? Since however, man is naturally adapted to act unjustly from exciting causes; and these are three, the love of pleasure in corporeal enjoyments; avarice, in the accumulation of wealth; and ambition, in surpassing those that are equal and similar to him; —this being the case, it is necessary to know, that it is possible to oppose to these such things as procure fear, shame, and desire in men; viz. fear through the laws, shame through the Gods, and desire through the energies of reason. Hence, it is necessary that youth should be taught from the first to honor the Gods and the laws. For from these, it will be manifest, that every human work, and every kind of human life, by the participation of sanctity and piety, will sail pros- perously [over the sea of generation].
1 viz. Such as have the theoretic virtues. 2 i.e. Such as have the ethical and political virtues.
THEAGES,
ON THE VIRTUES.
Tue principles of all virtue are three; knowledge,
power, and deliberate choice. And knowledge indeed,
is that by which we contemplate and form a judgment
of things; power is as it were a certain strength of the
nature! from which we derive our subsistence, and is
that which gives stability to our actions; and deliberate
choice is as it were certain hands of the soul by which
we are impelled to, and lay hold on the objects of our
choice. The order of the soul also subsists as follows:
One part of it is the reasoning power, another part is
anger, and another is desire. And the reasoning power
indeed, is that which has dominion over knowledge;
anger is that which rules over the ardent impulses of
the soul; and desire is that which willingly rules over
appetite. When therefore, these three pass into one,
so as to exhibit one co-adaptation, then virtue and
concord are produced in the soul; but when they are
seditious, and divulsed from each other, then vice
and discord are generated in the soul. And when the
2 The original is, d 5% Svvayus, olov dAnd Tis Tw oxdveos ¢ tpuiord- peda, cai eupévopes tos mpdypacw. This sentence in its present stateis certainly unintelligible. For oxdveos therefore, I read diceus, and then the sense will be as in the above translation. The version of Canter is certainly absurd; for it is “‘ Facultas tanquam robur et cause, quo ferimus, et in rebus permanemus.” And Gale, as usual,
takes no notice of the absurdity.
reasoning power prevails over the irrational parts of the soul, then endurance and continence are produced; endurance indeed, in the retention of pains; but con- tinence in the abstinence from pleasures. But when the irrational parts of the soul prevail over the reason- ing power, then effeminacy and incontinence are pro- duced; effeminacy indeed, in flying from pain; but incontinence, in the being vanquished by pleasures. When however, the better part of the soul governs, but the less excellent part is governed; and the former leads, but the latter follows, and both consent, and are concordant with each other, then virtue and every good are generated in the whole soul. When likewise the appetitive follows the reasoning part of the soul, then temperance is produced; but when this is the case with the irascible part, fortitude is produced; and when it takes place in all the parts of the soul, then justice is the result. For justice is that which sepa- rates all the vices and all the virtues of the soul from each other. And justice is a certain established order of the apt conjunction of the parts of the soul, and perfect and supreme virtue. For every good is con- tained in this; but the other goods of the soul cannot sub- sist without this. Hence justice possesses great strength both among Gods and men. For this virtue contains the bond by which the whole and the universe are held together, and also by which Gods and men are connected. Justice therefore, is said to be Themis among the celestial, but Dice among the terrestrial Gods; and Law among men. These assertions how- ever, are indications and symbols, that justice is the supreme virtue. Hence virtue, when it consists in contemplating and judging, is called prudence; when in sustaining things of a dreadful nature, it is de- nominated fortitude; when in restraining pleasure, temperance; and when in abstaining from gain, and from injuring our neighbours, justice.
Moreover, the arrangement of virtue according to
right reason, and the transgression of it contrary to
right reason, produce [in the former case] a tendency
to the decorous as the final mark, and [in the latter]
the frustration of it. The decorous however, is that
which ought to be. But this does not require either
addition or ablation; since it is that which it is
requisite to be. But of the indecorous there are two
species; one of which is excess, and the other defect.
And excess indeed, is more, but deficiency is less, than
is decorous. Virtue also, is a certain habit of the
decorous. Hence it is directly, both a summit and a
medium. For thus, things that are decorous are both
media and summits. They are media indeed, because
they fall between excess and deficiency; but they are
summits, because they do not require either addition
or ablation. For they are the very things themselves
which they ought to be.
Since however, the virtue of manners is conversant
with the passions, but of the passions pleasure and pain
are supreme, it is evident that virtue does not consist
in extirpating the passions of the soul, pleasure and
pain, but in co-harmonizing them. For neither does
health, which is a certain apt mixture of the powers
of the body, consist in eepalliag the cold and the hot,
the moist and the dry; but in these being [appropri-
ately] mingled together. For it is as it were, a certain
symmetry of these. ‘Thus too, in music, concord does
not consist in expelling the sharp and the flat; but when
these are co-harmonized, then concord is produced,
and dissonance is exterminated. In a similar manner,
the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry, being
harmoniously mingled together, health is produced, and
disease destroyed. But when anger and desire are co-
harmonized, the vices and the [other] passions are ex-
tirpated, and the virtues and manners are ingenerated.
Deliberate choice however, in beautiful conduct, is the
greatest peculiarity of the virtue of manners. For it
Is pomabie rs use reason and power without virtue;