involved in obscurity. But if for devepyodoa we read dopifotea as in the above translation, the meaning is clear.
Tue prudent [i.e. the wise] man will especially become
so as follows: In the first place, being naturally saga-
cious, possessing a good memory, and being a lover of
labor, he should exercise his dianoetic power imme-
diately from his youth in reasonings and disciplines,
and in accurate theories, and adhere to genuine phil-
osophy. But after this he should acquire knowledge
and experience in what pertains to the Gods, the laws,
and human lives. For there are two things from which
the disposition of prudence is produced; one of which
consists in obtaining a mathematical and gnostic habit;
but the other, in a man perceiving by himself many
theorems and things, and understanding other things
through a certain different mode. For neither is he
sufficient to the possession of prudence, who imme-
diately from his youth has exercised his dianoetic power
in reasonings and disciplines; nor he who being desti-
tute of these, has heard and has been conversant with
a multitude of things. But the latter will have his
dianoetic power blind, through judging of particulars;
and the former through always surveying universals.
For as in computations the amount of the whole is
obtained by the addition of the parts, thus also in
things, reason is able to delineate the theory of uni-
versals; but experience has the power of forming a
judgment of particulars.
ON DISCIPLINES.
IT is necessary that you should become scientific,
either by learning from another person, or by dis-
covering yourself the things of which you have a
scientific knowledge. If, therefore, you learn fromm
another person, that which you learn is foreign; but
what you discover yourself is through yourself, and is
your own. Moreover, if you investigate, discovery will
be easy, and soon obtained; but if you do not know
how to investigate, discovery will be to you impossible.
And [right] reasoning indeed, when discovered, causes
sedition to cease, and increases concord. For through
this the inexhaustible desire of possessing is suppressed,
and equality prevails; since by this we obtain what is
just in contracts. Hence, on account of this, the poor
receive from those who are able to give; and the rich
give to those that are in want, both of them believing
that through this they shall obtain the equal. This
however will be a rule and an impediment to those
that act unjustly, viz. that men who possess scientific
knowledge will appease their anger, prior to the com-
mission of an injury, being persuaded that the per-
petrators of it will not be concealed when it is com-
mitted; but that those who do not possess scientific
knowledge, becoming manifest in the commission of
an injury, will be restrained from acting unjustly.
POLUS,
ON JUSTICE.
Ir appears to me that the justice which subsists among men, may be called the mother and the nurse of the other virtues. For without this a man can neither be temperate, nor brave, nor prudent. For it is the harmony and peace, in conjunction with elegance, of the whole soul. The strength however of this virtue will become more manifest, if we direct our attention to the other habits. For they have a partial utility, and which is referred to one thing; but this is referred to whole systems, and to a multitude. In the world therefore, it conducts the whole govern- ment of things, and is providence, harmony, and Dice, by the decree of a certain genus of Gods. But in a city it is justly called peace, and equitable legislation. And in a house, it is the concord between the husband and wife; the benevolence of the servant towards the master; and the anxious care of the master for the welfare of the servant. In the body likewise, which is the first and dearest thing to all animals, [so far as they are animals,] it is the health and intireness of all the parts. But in the soul, it is the wisdom, which among men subsists from science and justice. If therefore, this virtue thus disciplines and saves both the whole and the parts [of every thing] rendering things con- cordant and familiar with each other, how is it possible it should not be called by the decision of all men, the
mother and the nurse of all things?
The following fragments also, from the Treatise of
Archytas on Wisdom, are preserved by Iamblichus,
in the 3rd Chapter of his Protreptics, or Exhorta-
tions to Philosophy.
“Archytas therefore, in the beginning of his Treatise on Wisdom, exhorts to the possession of it as follows:
1. “Wisdom as much excels in all human affairs as
the sight does the [other] corporeal senses, intellect
the soul, and the sun the stars. For the sight is the
most far-darting, and the most multiform of all the
senses; intellect is the supreme part of the soul,
judging by reason and dianoia what is fit, and existing
as the sight and power of the most honorable things;
and the sun is the eye and soul of things which have
a natural subsistence. For through it all things
become visible, are generated, and rise into existence.!
Deriving also their roots, and being generated from
thence, they are nourished, increased and excited by
it In conjunction with sense.
2. ““Man was generated by far the wisest of all
[terrestrial] animals. For he is able to contemplate
the things which exist, and to obtain from all things
science and wisdom. ‘To which also it may be added,
that divinity has engraved and exhibited in him the
system of universal reason, in which all the forms of
things in existence are distributed, and the significa-
tions of nouns and verbs. For a place is assigned for
the sounds of the voice, viz. the pharynx, the mouth,
and the nostrils. But as man was generated the
instrument of the sounds, through which nouns and
verbs are signified, so likewise of the conceptions which
are beheld in the things that have an existence. And
this appears to me to be the work of wisdom, for the
accomplishment of which man was generated and con-
stituted, and received organs and powers from divinity.
3. “Man was generated and constituted, for the
1 For voyras in this place, I read @verat.
purpose of contemplating the reason of the whole of
nature, and in order that, being himself the work of
wisdom, he might survey the wisdom of the things
which exist.—For if the reason of man 1s contemplative
of the reason of the whole of nature, and the wisdom
also of man perceives and contemplates the wisdom of
the things in existence,—this being acknowledged, it
is at the same time demonstrated, that man is a part
of universal reason, and of the whole of the intellectual
nature.
4. “Wisdom is not conversant with a certain definite
existing thing, but is simply conversant with all the
things that exist. And it is requisite, that it should
not first eile fa the principles of itself, but the
common principles of all beings. For wisdom so sub-
sists with reference to all beings, that it is the province
of it to know and contemplate the universal accidents
of all things. And on this account wisdom discovers
the principles of all beings.
5. ‘“‘Whoever, therefore, is able to analyze all the
genera which are contained under one and the same
principle, and again to compose and con-numerate
them, he appears to me to be the wisest of men, and
to possess the most perfect veracity. Farther still, he
will also have discovered a beautiful place of survey,
from which it will be possible to behold divinity, and
all things that are in co-ordination with, and successive
to him, subsisting separately, or distinct from each
other. Having likewise entered this most ample road,
1 Neither of the Latin translators North and Arcerius have under- stood this passage, and therefore have erroneously translated it. For the original is: xai wavra ra év tq ovorotyxeia Kai Tater Ta éKxeivou xaraxexwpiopeva. This North translates: ‘ Atque omnia in rerum serie et ordine ab illo separata.” But Arcerius: “ Atque omnia que sunt in nature cognatione ordineque ab illo separata.” By the things however co-ordinate with, and successive to God, Archytas means the other Gods, who, though subordinate to the supreme, yet in consequence of partaking of the same nature, are said to be co-ordinate with him. Gale, likewise, did not perceive the error of the Latin translators.
being impelled in a right direction by intellect, and
having arrived at the end of his course, he will have
conjoined beginnings with ends, and will know that
God is the principle, middle, and end, of all things
which are accomplished according to justice and right
reason.” 1
1 Plato says this of God in his Laws.
PYTHAGORIC ETHICAL SENTENCES STOBAUS,
Which are omitted in the Opuscula Mythologica, &Sc. of Gale.
Do not even think of doing what ought not to be done.
Choose rather to be strong in soul than in body.
Be persuaded that things of a laborious nature con- tribute more than pleasures to virtue.
Every passion of the soul is most hostile to its salvation.
It is difficult to walk at one and the same time in many paths of life.}
Pythagoras said, it is requisite to choose the most
excellent life; for custom will make it pleasant. Wealth
is an infirm anchor, glory is still more infirm; and ina
similar manner the body, dominion, and honor. For
all these are imbecile and powerless. What then are
powerful anchors? Prudence, magnanimity, fortitude.
These no tempest can shake. This is the law of God,
that virtue is the only thing that is strong; and that
every thing else is a trifle.
Al the parts of human life, in the same manner as those of a statue, ought to be beautiful.
A statue indeed standing on its basis, but a worthy
man on the subject of his deliberate choice, ought to
be immovable.
1 The above sentences are from Stobzi Sententiz, p. 3. (the edition
that of 1609,) and are ascribed to Pythagoras.
Frankincense ought to be given to the Gods, but praise to good men.
It is requisite to defend those who are unjustly accused
of having acted injuriously, but to praise those who
excel in a certain good.
Neither will the horse be judged to be generous, that
is sumptuously adorned, but the horse whose nature is
illustrious; nor is the man worthy who possesses great
wealth, but he whose soul is generous.
When the wise man opens his mouth, the beauties
of his soul present themselves to the view, like the
statues in a temple.!
Remind yourself that all men assert that wisdom is
the greatest good, but that there are few who stren-
uously endeavour to obtain this greatest good.?
Pythagoras.
Be sober, and remember to be disposed to believe; for these are the nerves of wisdom. Epicharmus.
It is better to live lying on the grass, confiding in
divinity and yourself, than to lie on a golden bed with
perturbation.
You will not be in want of any thing, which it is in the power of Fortune to give and take away.?
Despise all those things, which when liberated from
the body you will not want; and exercising yourself in
those things of which when liberated from the body
you will be in want, invoke the Gods to become your
helpers.*
Neither is it possible to conceal fire in a garment, nor a base deviation from rectitude in time.
1 The above seven sentences are to be found in p. 4. of Stobzus, and as it appears to me are erroneously ascribed to Socrates. For I conceive them to have been written either by Democrates or Demo- philus.
2 Stob. p. 48.
3 Hence the dogma of the Stoics derived its origin, that the wise man is independent of Fortune.
4 Stob. p. 65. These three sentences are ascribed to Pythagoras,
Wind indeed increases fire, but custom love.
Those alone are dear to divinity, who are hostile to injustice.”
Those things which the body necessarily requires,
are easily to be procured by all men, without labor and
molestation; but those things to the attainment of
which labor and molestation ate requisite, are objects
of desire, not to the body, but to depraved opinion.
Aristoxenus Pythag. Stob. p. 132.
Of desire also, he [i.e. Pythagoras] said as follows:
This passion is various, laborious, and very multiform.
Of desires however, some are acquired and adventitious,
but others are connascent. But he defined desire
itself to be a certain tendency and impulse of the soul,
and an appetite of a plenitude or presence of sense,
or of an emptiness and absence of it, and of non-
perception. He also said, that there are three most
known species of erroneous and depraved desire, viz.
the indecorous, the incommensurate, and the un-
seasonable. For desire is either immediately in-
decorous, troublesome, and illiberal; or it is not
absolutely so, but is more vehement and lasting than
is fit. Orin the third place, it is impelled when it is
not proper, and to objects to which it ought not to
tend. Ex Aristoxeni Pythag. Sententiis. Stob. p. 132.