There are likewise three definite times of human life; one of prosperity; another of adversity; and a third subsisting between these. Since therefore, he is a good man who possesses and uses virtue; but he uses it according to three seasons; for he uses it either in adversity, or in prosperity, or in the time between these; and in adversity indeed he is unhappy, but in prosperity happy, and in the middle condition, he is not happy [though he is not miserable];—this being the case, it is evident that felicity is nothing else than the use of virtue in prosperity. We now speak, how- ever, of the felicity of man. But man is not soul alone, but is likewise body. For the animal which consists of both, and that which is constituted from things of this kind is man. For though the body is naturally adapted to be the instrument of the soul, yet this as well as the soul is a part of man [so far as he is an animal.1] Hence of goods also, some are the goods of man, but others, of the parts of man. And the good of man, indeed, is felicity. But of the parts of man, the good of the soul is prudence, fortitude, justice, and
1 i.e. So far as he is considered as energizing in conjunction with the body ; but so far as he has an energy independent of the body, viz. so far as he is a rational soul, the body is not to be considered as a part of his essence. And the energy of the rational soul by itself alone, without any assistance from the corporeal organs, constitutes the true man, into the definition of which body does not enter.
temperance. And the good of the body is beauty, health, a good corporeal habit, and excellence of sen- sation. With respect to externals however, wealth, glory, honor, and nobility, are naturally adapted to be attendant on man, and to follow precedaneous goods. The less, also, are ministrant to the greater goods. Thus friendship, glory, and wealth, are ministrant both to the body and the soul; but health, strength, and excellence of sensation, are subservient to the soul; and prudence [i.e. wisdom] and justice are ministrant to the intellect of the soul. Jntellect, however, is the satellite of Deity. For God is the most excellent, and the leader and ruler of all things. And for the sake of these, it is necessary that other goods should be present. For the general, indeed, is the leader of the army; the pilot, of the ship; God, of the world; and intellect, of soul. But prudence is the leader of the felicity pertaining to life. For prudence is nothing else than the science of the felicity which respects human life, or the science of the goods which naturally pertain to man.
And the felicity, indeed, and life of God are most
excellent; but the felicity of man consists of science,
and virtue, and in the third place of prosperity 4
corporalized. But I mean by science, the wisdom
1 Canter, in his version of these Pythagoric fragments, uniformly translates edrvyia felicitas, contrary to the obvious meaning of the word, as is evident in this, and many other passages. It is also directly contrary to what Aristotle says in cap. 13. lib. 7. of his Nicomachean Ethics: da de to rpoadacbae trys Tuxys, Soxer tise TavTov evar y evTuxia TH Evdatpovig, OUK OVTA: EEL KaL aUTN VTEPBadXAoUTA, EeuTrodios ectt. i.e. ‘* Because felicity requires fortune, it appears to some persons that prosperity is the same with felicity. This however is not the case ; since prosperity, when it is excessive, is an impediment to felicity.” But Canter did not, I believe, pretend to have any knowledge of philosophy ;: and Gale, who did, has not corrected him in this and many other places in which he has erred through the want of this knowledge. Gale however, though verbally learned, was but a garrulous smatterer in philosophy, as is evident from his notes on Iamblichus de Mysteriis.
pertaining to things divine and demoniacal; and by prudence, the wisdom pertaining to human concerns, and the affairs of life. For it is requisite to call the virtues which employ reasonings and demonstrations, sciences. But it 1s fit to denominate virtue ethical, and the best habit of the irrational part of the soul, according to which we are said to possess certain qualities ertaining to manners; viz. by which we are called iberal, just, and temperate. But it is requisite to call prosperity, the preter-rational presence of goods, [or a supply of goods without the assistance of reason, | and which is not effected on account of it. Since therefore virtue and science are in our power, but prosperity is not; and since also felicity consists in the contemplation and performance of things [truly] beautiful; but contemplations and actions, when they are not prosperous, are attended with ministrant offices and necessity, but when they proceed in the right path, produce delight and felicity; and these things are effected in prosperity ;—this being the case, it is evident that felicity 15 nothing else than the use of virtue in prosperity. Hence the good man is disposed with respect to prosperity, in the same manner as he who has an excellent and robust body. For such a one is able to endure heat and cold, to raise a great burden, and to sustain easily many other molestations.
Since therefore felicity is the use of virtue in pros-
perity, we must speak concerning virtue and prosperity,
and in the first place concerning prosperity. For of
goods, some indeed do not admit of excess, and this is
the case with virtue. For there is not any virtue which
is excessive, nor any worthy man who is beyond
measure good. For virtue has the fit and becoming
for a rule, and is the habit of the decorous in practical
concerns. But prosperity receives excess and diminu-
tion. And when it is excessive indeed, it generates
certain vices, and removes a man from his natural habit;
so that he frequently through this opposes the constitu-
tion of virtue. And this is not only the case with
prosperity, but many other causes likewise may effect
the same thing. For it is by no means proper to
wonder, that some of those who play on the pipe
should be arrogant men, who, bidding farewell to
truth, ensnare by a certain false imagination those who
are unskilled in music; and to disbelieve that a thing
of this kind does not take place in virtue. For the more
venerable a thing is, so much the more numerous are
those that pretend to the possession of it. For there
are many things which distort the habit and form of
virtue; some of which are insidious arts and affectation;
others are kindred physical passions, which sometimes
roduce an indecorum ! contrary to the true disposition foe virtue]. This also is effected through manners in which men have been nurtured for a long time; and it not unfrequently happens that it is produced through youth or old age, and through prosperity or adversity; and by other very numerous ways. Hence, we ought never to wonder, if sometimes a distorted judgment is formed of all things, the true disposition being changed.” Thus we see that the most excellent carpenter fre- quently errs in the works which are the dane at of his art; and this is also the case with the general, the pilot, the painter, and in short, with all artists. And yet at the same time we do not deprive them of the habit which they possess. For as we do not rank among bad men him who at certain times acts intemperately, or unjustly, or timidly; so neither do we place him in the class of good men, who does something right in things pertaining to temperance, or justice, or fortitude. But it must be said that the conduct of bad men in things
1 For érurpéreayv here, I read dwpeéreav.
2 In the original, dare obSéroxa Set Oavpawwer, ei mavr’ dvrectpap- pévws evidxa xpiverar, Tas dAnOwas SiaBeovos perarixrowwas, which Canter erroneously translates as follows: “ Quocirca mirandum non est, si cuncta nonnunquam, vera affectione mutatf, aliter eveniunt.” Nor is the error noticed by Gale.
of this kind is casually right, and that good men [some-
times] err. A true judgment however [in these in-
stances] is to be formed, not by looking to a certain
occasion, or to a certain extent of time, but to the
whole of life. But as indigence and excess are in-
jurious to the body, yet excess and what are called
superfluities, are naturally adapted to produce greater
diseases [than those caused by indigence]; thus also
prosperity or adversity injure the soul, when they un-
seasonably happen; yet that which is called by all men
prosperity, is naturally adapted to produce greater
diseases [than adversity], since it intoxicates like wine
the reasoning power of good men.
Hence it is more difficult to bear prosperity in a
becoming manner than adversity. For all men when
they continue in adversity, are seen for the most part
to be moderate and orderly in their manners; but in
prosperity they are brave, magnificent, and magnani~-
mous [when they bear it in a becoming manner]. For
adversity has the power of contracting and depressing
the soul; but prosperity, on the contrary, elevates and
expands it. Hence all those that are unfortunate, are
in their manners cautious and prudent; but those that
are fortunate are insolent and confident. But the
boundary of prosperity, is that which a good man would
deliberately choose to co-operate with him in his own
proper actions; just as the [proper] magnitude of a
ship, and the [proper] magnitude of a rudder, are such
as will enable a good pilot to sail over a great extent
of sea, and to accomplish a great voyage. An excess
of prosperity, however, is not naturally adapted to be
vanquished by, but to vanquish the soul. For as a
[very] splendid light causes an obscuration of sight in
the eyes; thus also excessive prosperity darkens the
intellect of the soul. And thus much may suffice con-
cerning prosperity.
THEAGES,
ON THE VIRTUES.
Tue order of the soul subsists in such a way, that one part of it is the reasoning power, another is anger, and another is desire. And the reasoning power, indeed, has dominion over knowledge; anger over impetus; and desire intrepidly rules over the appetitions of the soul. When therefore these three parts pass into one, and exhibit one appropriate composition, then virtue and concord are produced in the soul. But when they are divulsed from each other by sedition, then vice and discord are produced in the soul. It is necessary, how- ever, that virtue should have these three things, viz. reason, power, and deliberate choice. The virtue, therefore, of the reasoning power of the soul is prudence; for it is a habit of judging and contemplating. But the virtue of the irascible part, is fortitude; for it is a habit of resisting, and enduring things of a dreadful nature. And the virtue of the epithymetic or appetitive part is temperance; for it is a moderation and detention of the pleasures which arise through the body. But the virtue of the whole soul is justice. For men indeed become bad, either through vice, or through incontinence, or through a natural ferocity. But they injure each other, either through gain, or through pleasure, or through ambition. Vice, therefore, more appropriately belongs to the reasoning part of the soul.
For prudence indeed is similar to art; but vice to 161 II
pernicious art. For it invents contrivances for the
purpose of acting unjustly. But incontinence rather
pertains to the appetitive part of the soul. For con-
tinence consists in subduing, and incontinence in not
subduing pleasures. And ferocity pertains to the
irascible part of the soul. For when some one, through
acting ill from desire, is gratified not as a man should
be, but as a wild beast, then a thing of this kind is
denominated ferocity. The effects also of these dis-
positions are consequent to the things for the sake of
which they are performed. For avarice is consequent
to vice; but vice is consequent to the reasoning part
of the soul. And ambition, indeed, follows from the
irascible part; and this becoming excessive, generates
ferocity. Again, pleasure pertains to the appetitive
part; but this being sought after more vehemently,
generates incontinence. Hence, since the acting un-
justly is produced from so many causes, it is evident
that acting justly is effected through an equal number
of causes. For virtue, indeed, is naturally beneficent
and profitable; but vice is productive of evil, and is
noxious.
Since, however, of the parts of the soul, one is the
leader, but the other follows, and the virtues and the
vices subsist about these, and in these; it is evident
that with respect to the virtues also, some are leaders,
others are followers, and others are composed from
these. And the leaders, indeed, are such as prudence;
but the followers are such as fortitude and temperance;
and the composites from these, are such as justice.
The passions, however, are the matter of virtue; for
the virtues subsist about, and in these. But of the
passions, one is voluntary, but another is involuntary.
And the voluntary, indeed, is pleasure; but the in-
voluntary is pain. Men also, who have the political
virtues, give intension and remission to these, co-
harmonizing the other parts of the soul, to that part
which possesses reason. But the boundary of this