Iamblichus — Life of Pythagoras (trans. Thomas Taylor, 1818)

but in completely possessing its own proper powers which are adapted to actions. For man is not self- perfect, but imperfect. And he becomes perfect, partly from himself, and gs from an external cause. He is likewise perfect, either according to nature, or according to life. And he is perfect indeed according to nature, if he becomes a good man. For the virtue of each thing is the summit and perfection of the nature of that thing. Thus the virtue! of the eyes is the summit and perfection of the nature of the eyes; and this is also true of the virtue of the ears. "Thus too, the virtue of man is the summit and perfection of the nature of man. But man is perfect according to life, when he becomes happy. For felicity is the perfection and completion of human goods. Hence, again, virtue and prosperity become the parts of the life of man. And virtue, indeed, is a part of him so far as he is soul, but prosperity so far as he is connected with body. But both are parts of him so far as he is an animal. For it is the province of virtue to use in a becoming manner the goods which are conformable to nature; but of prosperity to impart the use of them. And the former, indeed, imparts deliber- ate choice and right reason; but the latter, energies and actions. For to wish what is beautiful in conduct and to endure things of a dreadful nature, is the proper business of virtue. But it is the work of prosperity to render deliberate choice successful, and to cause actions to arrive at the[desired]end. For the general conquers in conjunction with virtue and good fortune. The pilot sails well in conjunction with art and prosperous winds. ‘The eye sees well in conjunction with acuteness of vision® and light. And the life of man becomes most excellent through virtue itself, and prosperity.

1 Gale says in his notes, that after dpOadpwv he adds dvcvos, but he should evidently have added dpera, as in the above translation.

2In the original ovv ra dfvdopxig, which Canter very defectively translates, videndi facultate.

HIPPARCHUS,

ON TRANQUILLITY.

Since men live but for a very short period, if their
life is compared with the whole of time, they will
make a most beautiful journey as it were, if they pass
through life with tranquillity. This however they will
possess in the most eminent degree, if they accurately
and scientifically know themselves, viz. if they know
that they are mortal and of a fleshly nature, and that
they have a body which is corruptible and can be easily
injured, and which is exposed to every thing most
grievous and severe, even to their latest breath. And
in the first place, let us direct our attention to those
things which happen to the body; and these are
pleurisy, inflammation of the lungs, phrensy, gout,
stranguary, dysentery, lethargy, epilepsy, putrid ulcers,
and ten thousand other diseases. But the diseases
which happen to the soul are much greater and more
dire than these. For all the iniquitous, evil, illegal,
-and impious conduct in the life of man, originates from
the passions of the soul. For through preternatural im-
moderate desires many have become subject to unre-
strained impulses, and have not refrained from the most
unholy pleasures, arising from being connected with
daughters or even mothers. Many also have been induced
to destroy their fathers, and their own offspring. But
what occasion is there to be prolix in narrating exter-
nally impending evils, such as excessive rain, drought,

violent heat and cold; so that frequently from the

anomalous state of the air, sear ootad and famine are
produced, and all-various calamities, and whole cities
become desolate? Since therefore many such-like cala-
mities are impendent, we should neither be elevated
by the possession of corporeal goods, which may rapidly
be consumed by the incursions of a small fever, nor
with what are conceived to be prosperous external
circumstances, which frequently in their own nature
perish more rapidly than they accede. For all these
are uncertain and unstable, and are found to have their
existence in many and various mutations; and no one
of them is permanent, or immutable, or stable, or in-
divisible. Hence well considering these things, and
also being persuaded, that if what is present and is
imparted to us, is able to remain for the smallest
portion of time, it is as much as we ought to expect;
we shall then live in tranquillity and with hilarity,
generously bearing whatever may befal us.

Now, however, many previously conceiving in im-
agination, that all that is present with, and imparted
to them by nature and fortune, is better than it is,
and not thinking it to be such as it is in reality, but
such as it is able to become when it has arrived at the
summit of excellence, they burden the soul with many
great, nefarious, and stupid evils, when they are sud-
denly deprived of [these evanescent goods]. And thus
it happens to them that they lead a most bitter and
miserable life. But this takes place in the loss of
riches, or the death of friends or children, or in the
privation of certain other things, which are conceived
by them to be most honorable possessions. Afterwards,
weeping and lamenting, they assert of themselves, that
they alone are most unfortunate and miserable, not
remembering that these things have happened, and
even now happen, to many others; nor are they able
to understand the life of those that are now in existence,
and of those that have lived in former times, nor to see
in what great calamities and waves of evils, many of

the present time are, and of the past have been involved. Considering with ourselves therefore, that many having lost their property, have afterwards on account of this very loss been saved, since hereafter they might either have fallen into the hands of robbers, or into the power of a tyrant; that many also who have loved certain persons, and have been benevolently disposed towards them in the extreme, have afterwards greatly hated them ;—considering all these things, which have been delivered to us by history, and likewise learning that many have been destroyed by their children, and by those that they have most dearly loved; and comparing our own life with that of those who have been more unhappy than we have been, and taking into account human casualties [in general] and not only such as happen to ourselves, we shall pass through life with greater tranquillity. For it is not lawful that he who is himself a man, should think the calamities of others easy to be borne, and not his own, since he sees that the whole of life is naturally exposed to many calamities. Those however, that weep and lament, besides not being able to recover what they have lost, or recal to life those that are dead, impel the soul to greater perturbations, in consequence of its being filled with much depravity. It is requisite therefore, that, being washed and purified, we should by all possible contri- vances wipe away our inveterate stains by the reason- ings of philosophy. But we shall accomplish this by adhering to prudence and temperance, being satisfied with our present circumstances, and not aspiring after many things. For men who procure for themselves a great abundance [of external goods], do not consider that the enjoyment of them terminates with the present life. We ought therefore to use the goods that are present; and by the assistance of the beautiful and venerable things of which philosophy is the source, we shall be liberated from the insatiable desire of depraved possessions.

In His Treatise Concerning

In the first place, it is requisite to know this, that the good man is not immediately happy from necessity; but that this is the case with the man who is both happy and good. For the happy man obtains both praise and the predication of blessedness; but the good man [so far as he is good] obtains praise alone. The praise also arises from virtue; but the predication of blessedness from good fortune. And the worthy man, indeed, becomes such from the goods which he possesses; but the happy man is sometimes deprived of his felicity. For the power of virtue is perfectly free, but that of felicity 1s subject to restraint. For long-continued diseases of the body, and deprivations of the senses, cause the flourishing condition of felicity to waste away. God, however, differs from a good man in this, that God indeed not only possesses virtue genuine and purified from every mortal passion, but his power also is unwearied and unrestrained, as being adapted to the most venerable and magnificent production of eternal works. Man indeed, by the mortal condition of his nature, not only enjoys this power and this virtue in a less degree; but sometimes through the want of symmetry! in the goods which he possesses, or through powerful custom, or a depraved nature, or through many other causes, he is unable to possess in the extreme a good which is perfectly true.

1 For ov perpiav here, I read dovpperpiav.

Since therefore of goods, some are eligible for their own sakes, and not for the sake of another thing; but others are eligible for the sake of something else, and not on their own account; there is also a certain third species of goods, which is eligible both on its own account, and for the sake of another thing. What, therefore, is the good which is eligible on its own account, and not for the sake of something else? It is evident that it is felicity. For we aspire after other things for the sake of this, but we do not desire this for the sake of any thing else. Again, what are those goods which we desire indeed for the sake of something else, but which we do not desire on their own account? It is evident they are such things as are useful, and pre- eligible goods, which become the causes of our obtaining things which are eligible [on their own account]; such as corporeal labors, exercise, and frictions which are em- ployed for the sake of a good habit of body; and also reading, meditation, and study, which are undertaken for the sake of things beautiful and virtue. But what are the things which are eligible on their own account, and also for the sake of something else? They are such things as the virtues, and the habits of them, deliberate choice and actions, and whatever adheres to that which is really beautiful. Hence, that indeed which is eligible on its own account, and not on account of something else, is a solitary good and one. But that which is eligible for‘its own sake, and for the sake of another thing, is triply divided. For one part of it indeed subsists about the soul; another about the body; and another pertains to externals. And that which is about the soul, consists of the virtues of the soul; that which is about the body, of the virtues of the body; and that which pertains to externals, consists of friends, glory, honor, and wealth. ‘There is likewise a similar reasoning with respect to that which is eligible on account of something else. For one part of it indeed is effective of the goods of the

soul ; another part of it, of the goods of the body;
and that which pertains to externals is the cause of
wealth, glory, honor, and friendship.

That virtue however happens to be eligible for its
own sake, is evident from A following considerations.
For if things which are naturally subordinate, I mean
the goods of the body, are eligible for their own sakes,
but the soul is better than the body, it is evident that
we love the goods of the soul on their own account,
and not for the sake of the consequences with which
they are attended.