Lasthenia the Arcadian. Abrotelia, the daughter of Abroteles the Tarentine. Echecratia the Phliasian. Tyrsenis, the Sybarite. Pisirrhonde, the Tarentine. Nisleadusa, the Lacedemonian. Bryo, the Argive. Babelyma, the Argive. And Cleechma, the sister of Autocharidas the Lacedemonian. In all seventeen.
FRAGMENTS OF THE
Ethical Writings
Of Certain
PYTHAGOREANS.
HIPPODAMUS, THE THURIAN,
ON FELICITY.
Or animals, some are the recipients of felicity, but
others are incapable of receiving it. And those animals,
indeed, are receptive of it that have reason. For feli-
city cannot subsist without virtue; and virtue is first
ingenerated in that which possesses reason. But those
animals are incapable of receiving felicity, that are
destitute of reason. For neither can that which is
deprived of sight, receive the work or the virtue of
sight; nor can that which is destitute of reason, be
the recipient of the work, or the virtue of that which
possesses reason. With respect to felicity, however,
and virtue, the former is as a work, but the latter as a
certain art, to that which possesses reason. But of
animals which possess reason, some are self-perfect, and
these are such as are perfect through themselves, and
are indigent of nothing external, either to their exist-
ence, or to their existing well and beautifully. And
such, indeed, is God. ‘Those animals, however, are
not self-perfect, which are not perfect through them-
selves, but are in want of external causes to their per-
fection. And man is an animal of this kind. Of
animals, therefore, which are not self-perfect, some
indeed are perfect, but others are not perfect. And
those indeed are perfect which derive their subsistence
both from their own [proper] causes, and from ex-
ternal causes. And they derive it indeed from their
own causes, because they obtain from thence both an excellent nature and deliberate choice; but from ex- ternal causes, because they receive from thence equitable legislation and good rulers. But the animals which are not perfect, are either such as participate of neither of these, or of some one of these, or whose souls are entirely depraved. And such will the man be who is of a description different from the above.
Moreover, of perfect men there are two differences.
For some of them are naturally perfect; but others
are perfect according to life. And those indeed alone
that are good, are naturally perfect. But these are
such as possess virtue. For the virtue of the nature
of every thing is a summit and perfection. Thus the
virtue of the eye is the summit and perfection of the
nature of the eye. But the virtue of man is the sum-
mit and perfection of the nature of man. Those also
are perfect according to life, who are not only good,
but happy. For felicity, indeed, is the perfection of
human life. But human life is a system of actions:
and felicity gives completion to the actions. Virtue
also and fortune give completion to actions; virtue,
indeed, according to use; but good fortune according
to prosperity. God therefore is neither good through
learning virtue from any one, nor is he happy through
being attended by good fortune. For he is good by
nature, and happy by nature, and always was and will
be, and will never cease to be, such; since he is incor-
ruptible, and naturally good. But man is neither
happy nor good by nature, but requires discipline and
providential care. And in order to become good, in-
deed, he requires virtue; but in order to become happy,
good fortune. On this account, human felicity sum-
marily consists of these two things, viz. of praise, and
the predication of beatitude. Of praise indeed, from
virtue; but of the predication of beatitude, from pros-
perity. It possesses virtue therefore, through a divine
destiny, but prosperity through a mortal allotment.
But mortal are suspended from divine concerns, and
terrestrial from such as are celestial. Things subordi-
nate, also, are suspended from such as are more ex-
cellent. And on this account, the good man who
follows the Gods is happy; but he who follows mortal
natures is miserable. For to him who possesses wisdom,
prosperity is good and useful. It is good, indeed,
through his knowledge of the use of it; but it is useful,
through his co-operating with actions. It is beautiful,
therefore, when prosperity is present with intellect,
and when sailing as it were with a prosperous wind,
actions are performed looking to virtue; just as a
pilot looks to the motions of the stars. For thus, he
who does this will not only follow God, but will also
co-arrange human with divine good.
This also is evident, that [human] life becomes
different from disposition and action. But it is neces-
sary that the disposition should be either worthy or
depraved; and that action should be attended either
with felicity or misery. And a worthy disposition,
indeed, participates of virtue; but a bad one of vice.
With respect to actions, also, those that are prosperous
are attended with felicity; (for they derive their com-
pletion through looking to reason) but those that are
unfortunate, are attended with misery; for they are
frustrated of the end. Hence, it is not only necessary
to learn virtue, but also to possess and use it, either
for security, or increase, [of property when it is too
little] or, which is the greatest thing of all, for the
emendation of families and cities. For it is not only
necessary to have the possession of things beautiful, but
also the use of them. All these things, however, will
take place, when a man lives in a city that uses equit-
able laws. And these, indeed, I say, are what is called
the horn of Amalthea. For all things are contained
in equitable legislation. And without this, the greatest
good of human nature can neither be effected, nor,
when effected, be increased and become permanent.
For this comprehends in itself virtue, and the tendency
to virtue; because excellent natures are generated
according to it. Manners, likewise, studies, and laws,
subsist through this in the most excellent condition;
and besides these, rightly-deciding reason, and piety
and sanctity towards the most honorable natures. So
that it is necessary that he who is to be happy, and
whose life is to be prosperous, should live and die in a
country governed by equitable laws, relinquishing all
illegality. At the same time what has been said is
attended with necessity. For man is a part of society,
_and hence from the same reasoning, will become entire
and perfect, if he not only associates with others, but
associates in a becoming manner. For some things are
naturally adapted to subsist in many things, and not
in one thing; others in one thing, and not in many;
but others both in many, and in one thing, and on
this account in one thing, because in many. For
harmony, indeed, and symphony and number, are
naturally adapted to be ingenerated in many things.
For nothing which makes a whole from these parts, is
sufficient to itself.t But acuteness of seeing and hear-
ing, and swiftness of feet, subsist in one thing alone.
Felicity, however, and the virtue of soul, subsist both
in one thing and in many, in a whole, and in the uni-
verse. And on this account they subsist in one thing,
because they also subsist in many: and they subsist
in many, because they are inherent in a whole and in
the universe. For the orderly distribution of the
whole nature of things methodically arranges each
particular. And the orderly distribution of particu-
lars gives completion to the whole of things and to
the universe. But this follows from the whole being
naturally prior to the part, and not the part to the
1 In the original, ov8é ydp airdpxes, o Trourav TOV popiwy move Td dAov. This Canter erroneously translates, “ Quandoquidem horum
nulla pars totum queat constituere.” And Gale has not noticed the error. ,
whole. For if the world was not, neither the sun nor
the moon would exist, nor the planets, nor the fixed
stars. But the world existing, each of these also
exists.
The truth of this also may be seen in the nature itself of animals. For if animal had no existence, there would neither be eye, nor mouth, nor ear. But animal existing, each of these likewise exists. As the whole, however, is to the part, so is the virtue of the whole to the virtue of the part. For harmony not existing, and a divine inspection of mundane affairs, things which are adorned would no longer be able to remain in an excellent condition. And equitable legislation not existing in a city, it is not possible for a citizen to be good or happy. Health, likewise, not existing in the animal, it is not possible for the foot or the hand to be strong and healthy. For harmony indeed is the virtue of the world; equitable legislation is the virtue of a city; and health and strength are the virtue of the body. Each of the parts likewise in these things is co-arranged on account of the whole and the universe. For the eyes see on account of the whole body. And the other parts and members are co-arranged for the sake of the whole [body] and the universe.
EURYPHAMUS,
CONCERNING HUMAN LIFE.
Tue perfect life of man falls short indeed of the life of God, because it is not self-perfect, but surpasses that of irrational animals, because it participates of virtue and felicity. For neither is God in want of external causes; since being naturally good and happy, he is perfect from himself; nor any irrational animal. For brutes being destitute of reason, they are also destitute of the sciences pertaining to actions. But the nature of man partly consists of his own proper deliberate choice, and partly is in want of the assistance derived from divinity. For that which is capable of being fashioned by reason, which has an intellectual perception of things beautiful and base, can erectly extend itself from earth, and look to heaven, and can perceive with the eye of intellect the highest Gods,— that which is capable of all this, participates likewise of assistance from the Gods. But in consequence of possessing will, deliberate choice, and a principle of such a kind in itself as enables it to study virtue, and to be agitated by the storms of vice, to follow, and also to apostatize from the Gods,—it is likewise able to be moved by itself. Hence it is a partaker of praise and blame, honor and ignominy, partly from the Gods and partly from men, according as it zealously applies itself either to virtue or vice. For the whole reason of the thing is as follows: Divinity introduced man into the world as a most exquisite animal, to be reciprocally
honored with himself, and as the eye of the orderly
distribution of things. Hence also man gave names to
things, becoming himself the character of them. He
likewise invented letters, procuring through these a
treasury of memory. And he imitated the established
order of the universe, co-harmonizing by judicial pro-
ceedings and laws the communion of cities. For no
work is performed by men more decorous to the world,
or more worthy of the notice of the Gods, than the
apt constitution of a city governed by good laws, and
an orderly distribution of laws and a polity. For
though each man himself by himself is nothing, and
is not himself by himself sufficient to lead a life con-
formable to the common concord, and apt composition
of a polity, yet he is well adapted to the whole and to
the perfect system of society. For the life of man is
the image of a lyre accurately [harmonized,] and in
every respect perfect. For every lyre requires these
three things, apparatus, apt composition, and a certain
musical contrectation. And apparatus indeed, is a
preparation of all the appropriate parts; viz. of the
chords, and of the instruments which co-operate with
the well-sounding and striking of the lyre. But the
apt composition of the commixture of the sounds with
each other. And the musical contrectation is the
motion of these conformably to the apt composition.
Thus also human life requires these same three things.
Apparatus, indeed, which is the completion of the
parts of life. But the parts of life are the goods of
the body, of riches, renown, and friends. The apt
composition is the co-arrangement of these according
to virtue and the laws. And the musical contrecta-
tion is the commixture of these conformably to virtue
and the laws; virtue sailing with a prosperous wind,
and having nothing externally resisting it. For
felicity does not consist in being driven from the purpose
of voluntary intentions, but in obtaining them; nor in
virtue being without attendants and ministrant aids;