16-35. There are certain difficulties, which must be met if we are to succeed in describing the supreme reason in such a way as to make it the most divine of all the things we know. (1) LI. 17, 18. We must not describe it as knowing nothing, This is to make it an unrealized potentiality, which is no fit object of worship. (2) LI. 18-21. We must not say that it knows but something else determines it to know. This is to make it essentially a dvvayis, which must be inferior to its actuality and therefore not the best thing in the world. (3) Li. 21-27. It must know (a) itself or (6) something else, and if something else, then either (i) always the same object or (ii) different objects at different times. Now the object of knowledge makes a difference to the value of the knowledge; the object of the supreme reason must therefore be what is most divine, and therefore not different things at different times. Any change must be a change for the worse, and, apart from this, no change should be ascribed to that which has been shown in ch, 7 to be unchangeable. (ii) is thus set aside.
Aristotle now (I. 28) recurs to the second difficulty, though this has already been dealt with in ll. 18-21. He has in ll. 21, 22, implied that that question is not quite settled, and he returns to it because it has a bearing on the third. If the supreme reason is a mere faculty of knowing, then (a) it will find continuous knowledge toil- some (cf. @. ro50%24, De Somno 454° 26), which is absurd, and (4) the object of its knowledge, which as we have seen (Il. 25, 26) must be the most divine thing in the world, will be more precious than the reason or its knowing, since, if reason is a mere faculty, it is a Svapus rdv évavtiwy and is capable of being actualized as the knowledge of the worst thing in the world, so that its mere actualization cannot be the best thing in the world.
As
398 Commentary
This enables Aristotle (I. 33) to set aside not only the suggestion that the supreme reason is a mere faculty, but also the suggestion (3 (2) above) that it knows anything other than itself. Since it is the most divine thing in the world (I. 16), and its object is the most divine thing in the world (ll. 25, 26), it must be its own object. Its knowing is a knowing of knowing. —_
The argument is somewhat confused by the failure to keep the
—second and the third question distinct.
For the doctrine of vonaews vonats cf. 1072) 20.
18-21. Alexander supposes Aristotle to be here setting aside the suggestion that not reason as a whole but some part of it is what strictly speaking knows (xvpiov). But this interpretation is ruled out by Gd\Aa ddvapyis 1. 20 and by ere vods ere vénows |. 21, where vots answers to dvvamuis |. 20. ddAo Kvproy is ‘some external condition determining reason to activity’.
35-38. Of the two difficulties raised here, Aristotle answers the first in 38—1075%5; he points out that the divine véyois knows itself not év wapepyw but as its only object. The second question is left unanswered. The answer Aristotle probably has in mind is something like this: If A knows B and is known by C the question may fairly be asked ‘is it in virtue of its knowing or of its being known that A is good?’ But when A knows itself, the question becomes ‘is it because A knows A or because A is known by A that A is good?’ and this is an unmeaning question.
36. atts 8 év mapépyw, e.g. the medical man knows primarily about health, and secondly that his knowledge is knowledge about health.
10757 1-3. émt pev . . . vonors, ‘in the arts the knowledge is the substance and essence of its object, and in it only the matter of the object is omitted, while in the sciences the definition and knowing is the very object’ (since the object in this case, being universal, contains no matter), Cf. Z. 10324 32-6 14, De An. 430% 2, 19.
3-5. ox érépou... pia. ‘The object of thought and the thought not being different in the case of immaterial things, the supreme thought and its object will be the same, and the thinking will be one with its object.’ Aristotle uses a certain amount of tautology here for the sake of emphasis.
6. petaBdddor yap . . . Sdov, ‘for if so, reason would change in passing from part to part of the whole’, whereas reason has been shown in ch. 7 to be unchangeable.
7. dowep, Bz. reads aorep ydp, but in the style of Bk. A the asyndeton seems possible. 7 dd.aiperov... 10. aidva; is an example of ‘binary structure’ with domep. Cf. A. 983) 16 n.
8. 46 ye tav cuvOéTwy. Bz. (after Ravaisson) brackets 7 and trans- lates ‘although its objects are composite things’. But (1) ye cannot mean ‘although’. (2) vods with an objective genitive is difficult (cf., however, De An. 430» 28 6 rod ti eat, sc. vots). (3) It is doubtful if vods would be described as apprehending ra ovvGera, which are pro-
A. 9g. 1074) 18 — 10757 10 399
perly the objects of émuoryuy (didvoiw). It is therefore better to follow Alexander’s interpretation: ‘As the human reason, or rather the reason of beings compounded out of matter and form’; the last words extend the remark so as to make it refer to any beings other than man who have reason and also have matter. It is awkward that ovvGerov should refer in |. 5 to the object and in 1. 8 to the subject of knowledge, but this is not unlike Aristotle’s manner; he is care- less in such matters.
For the opposition of 76 cvv@erov, that which is half-divine, half- animal, to God, cf. £. V. 1177 28, 1178%20.
&y tu xpévw. Bz. compares 1072» 15 puxpov xpovov Huty, 25 ws Hyets more, but the comparison is misleading. éy tue xpdvw Means not ‘for a certain time’ nor ‘at certain times’ but ‘in a certain time’. The meaning of évy when used of time is seen from such passages as £. NV. rior 11 ék re Tov Towvrwr (sc. druxnudtwv) odk ay yévorTo madw evdaipwv ev ddAlyo xpdvm, 1174%27 odk eorw ev dtwodv xpdvw aBety kivnow Tedciav TO cider, GAA’ eirep, ev 7G away, Meteor. 355% 28 & ye tw Tetaypévors xpdvois arodidwor Trav 7d Andbev. The reference is therefore not to the enjoyment of the swmmum bonum in moments of illumination but to its progressive attainment év Biw teheiw (£. WV. 109818). Cf. MW. M. 1185? 4 ovd? (sc. éorar 1) eddau- povia) ev xpovw ye aredel, GAN’ ev TeAclw.
It is doubtful whether ypovm is to be understood with rod. . Twdt... dw Twi in |. g. If it is, the meaning will be ‘for it does not possess the good in this particular time or in that, but it possesses the swmmum bonum in a certain whole period’. If ypdvw is not to be supplied, the meaning is ‘for it does not possess the good in this par- ticular activity or in that, but it possesses the summum bonum in an organized life of activity’.
9. dv adXo tt is Opposed to air) atts. It is because man’s summum bonum is different from himself, because he is a ovv6eror, including in him unrealized potentialities, that time is needed for their realization. God, being pure activity, pure self-thought, enjoys com- pletely in each moment and throughout eternity the bliss which man can be said to enjoy only in a complete life.
10. Bz.’s ovrws 841s not improbably right. But for 8 after a com- parative clause cf. T. 1003>5n. There is a certain degree of opposi- tion between the principal and the subordinate clause which makes dé not unnatural; cf. B. 999% 27 n.
How the good exists in the world (ch. 10),
1075*11. Is the good a separate element in the universe, or the per- vading order? It is both, as in an army—though the general is the good in a higher sense than the order, since it depends on him and
400 Commentary
not vice versa. All things are ordered together for the common weal though as in a household the higher members are less free than the lower. All must, at least in their dissolution, contribute to the whole.
Difficulties in other views.
25. (1) All other thinkers make all things out of contraries. But neither ‘all things’ nor ‘out of contraries’ is right. Further, con- traries cannot act on one another. Our solution is that there is a tertium quid, the substratum. But other thinkers make one of the contraries matter (e.g. the unequal, the many). We refute this by saying that the matter which is one for all things is contrary to nothing. Further, on this view all things except the One will share in evil, since evil is one of the two elements.
36. Others do not even make the good and the bad first principles. Yet in all things the good is a principle. The former view rightly makes it a principle, but does not say whether it is final, efficient, or formal cause.
br. Empedocles has a strange view. He makes love the good, but makes it both an efficient and a material cause. Even if the same thing is both, their essence is not the same. In which capa- city, then, is love a principle? It is strange also that he makes strife (which = evil) imperishable.
8. Anaxagoras makes the good the efficient cause, for reason is the source of movement ; but this implies an end other than reason (unless the efficient and final cause are identified, as by us), Further, why does he not assume a contrary to the good?
11. None of those who speak of contraries use them—unless we recast their views. And no one tells us how, if all things have the same causes, some things are perishable, some not. Further, some make the things-that-are out of not-being ; others to avoid this make all things one.
16. (2) No one states a proper efficient cause of generation. Those who posit two principles need a third, supreme one; and those who posit Ideas need a supreme principle. Why do particulars share in Ideas?
20. Other thinkers are bound to assume a contrary to first philo- sophy ; we need not, since we assume no contrary to its object, for all contraries have matter and potentiality.
24. If there is xothzng but sensibles, there is no governing principle, no order, no generation, no celestial movements, but, as in mytho-
Mer tO, 10759 LI—22 401
logy and in physics, we are referred from one principle always to another.
27. If on the other hand there are Ideas or numbers, (a) they cause nothing or at least no motion. Further, (4) how can things that are unextended produce what is extended? Number cannot be either efficient or formal cause of a continuum. Further, (c) no contrary can be the efficient cause, since all contraries are capable of not being, and their activity is at least posterior to their potentiality, so that things could not be eternal if contraries were their cause. But there are eternal things. Therefore the premises must be revised in the way we have stated.
(d) No one tells us what unifies a number, or soul and body, or form and thing. The only true answer is, ‘the efficient cause’.
37. (¢) Those who put mathematical number first and make a series of kinds of substance, each kind with distinct principles, make the universe disjointed, with many governing principles. But such it must not have.
1075* 11-15. The doctrine here stated is that goodness exists not only immanently in the world but transcendently in God, and even more fundamentally in Him, since He is the source of the good in the world, which is produced by the desire for Him as the order in an army is produced by its striving to do the will of its leader.
15. Sia thy tog... Sid tobTov. dua seems to mean not ‘for the sake of’ but ‘by reason of’.
16-23. Bz. thinks that aAX’ domep (I. 19) answers to ddd’ oix dpotws, and that cal odx otrws... cvvréraxtot is parenthetical, ex- plaining mdvra ovvréraxrat mws. This leaves pev in 1. 18 without anything answering to it, and in general seems highly unnatural. It is more natural to make two sentences as Bekker does—(1) ravra 8€ owvréraxtar ... €or tT, (2) mpds pev yap ev... Pvors eoriv, |. 23. The second sentence then Tepeats the first in greater detail; instead of saying merely ddd’ odx Suotus Aristotle describes the difference by using the instance of the household, dN’ (otrw ovvréraxrat) domep év oikia KX,