12-14. ei 8€...tTecoapdkoyta. It isnot evident how Aristotle reduces the number from 55 to 47. If Callippus’ extra spheres for the sun and the moon, and the corresponding reagent spheres ofthe sun, be deducted, the total is reduced only by six. Alexander makes three suggestions (706. 8-15): (1) that Aristotle subtracts the two Callippean spheres of the sun, and the two reagent spheres to correspond, and similarly subtracts four spheres from the moon, forgetting that there are here no reagent spheres to be subtracted. (2) that he subtracts all the extra spheres assigned to the sun and the moon by Callippus and himself, forgetting that two of the extra sun-spheres are needed to counteract two of the Eudoxean sun-spheres. (3) that, as Sosigenes had suggested, we should read évvéa for érrd.
Another suggestion has been made by Krische, who (followed by Schwegler and Bz.) holds that the motions to be subtracted are the four reagent motions of Mercury which prevent its forward motions from affecting the sun, and the four reagent motions of the sun which prevent its forward motions from affecting the moon. These, he thinks, may be omitied because, the sun and the moon being far from one another and from the planets, there is no danger of their being affected by the forward movements of Mercury and the sun respectively. To this view there are three objections. (a) Aristotle says nothing of a greater isolation of the sun and the moon, and it is clear that he believed all the spheres to be in contact (De Caelo 287% 5-11)— presumably assigning various thicknesses to the shells of the spheres. (4) The reagent spheres are spoken of as belonging to the system of the outer, not the inner, of the two planets concerned (I. 1), so that the meaning required by Krische’s view would have been expressed by saying ‘if one were not to assign fo Mercury and to the sun the motions we spoke of’. (c) Krische ignores De Caelo 29135 éAdrrovs yap Avs Kal oedyvn KWotvTa KWyoes HY TOV TAGVW_EVWOV aoTpwV eva. This of course refers to the forward motions only. Now the greatest number of forward motions assigned to any of the planets is five, so that Aristotle must have assigned less than five forward motions to the sun and the moon; i.e. the reduction of the total number of spheres
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to 47 is not got by subtracting reagent spheres only, as Krische supposes.
Dreyer (p. 114) suggests, after Martin, that Aristotle might have meant to dispense not only with the extra Callippean spheres of the sun and the moon but also with one of the Eudoxean spheres of the sun, that which was devised to explain the-supposed motion of the sua in latitude, and accordingly to reduce the reagent spheres of the sun to one. This would give the number 47, but as Dreyer observes Aristotle is unlikely to have thought of this reduction. There is at any rate nothing in this passage to suggest it.
The most probable explanation of Aristotle’s meaning is the second given by Alexander, viz. that as regards the sun and the moon Aristotle proposes to return to Eudoxus’ theory. But if this be so, he holds that the sun and the moon have fewer motions than any of the planets; why then does he say in the De Caelo (loc. cit.) that they have fewer motions than some of the planets? ‘The answer is that the paradox he is examining there is that the number of motions of the heavenly bodies does not increase steadily as we proceed inward from the sphere of the fixed stars, which has one only, but first increases and then decreases. It is enough for the statement of the paradox to say that the sun and the moon have fewer motions than some of the planets, and Aristotle does not say more than the statement of the paradox requires.
14. The manuscripts and Alexander have opa:pav, while Them.¢ and Simpl.¢ have opdv, and read xai ras aicOyras |. 16, which is omitted by Alexander. If these last words are kept, they must refer to the spheres, and since the number of the spheres cannot be inferred from itself, odaipdv in 1. 14 cannot stand. qopdy is probably an early emendation which has come in for this reason. But it does not suit the context. It is not the case that Aristotle has so far enumerated motions and only now proceeds to infer corresponding spheres. Spheres have been mentioned throughout the passage 1073) 17— 1074%14, and the enumeration in 1074 6-14 has been expressly stated as an enumeration of spheres. oda:pdv therefore is right. But if so, xat ras aicOnras, as we have seen, cannot also be right. In any case the word dpxat is not appropriate to the sensible things in question, the spheres, but to their movers, and it is to these that the word ovtcia also is in the context applied (1. 22), The argument in ll. 17-24 is purely an argument from the number of the spheres (or movements) to the number of the moving causes. Goebel is therefore right in omitting kal ras aicOyras.
17-24. The argument is: (1) There is no motion in the heavens which does not contribute to the motion of a star. (2) Every substance which is free from outside influence (draOys |. 19 = axivyros |. 15) and is enjoying the sammum donum must be an end, and must produce a motion by final causality (1. 22). In other words,
All motions in the heavens are motions required to explain the behaviour of the heavenly bodies.
Every perfect substance produces a motion in the heavens.
Therefore the number of perfect substances is the number of the motions required to explain the motion of the heavenly bodies.
20. Bz. is clearly right in proposing to read téAogs (which is read by two manuscripts of Alexander); this is shown by as téAos odaar popas bea.
21. tavtas, the 55 (or 47) unmoved movers answering to the 55 (or 47) spheres.
22-23. The movers of the planetary spheres are here said to act as final causes on the planetary spheres, as God does on the sphere of the fixed stars; i.e. a sort of desire is ascribed to the planetary spheres ; cf. De Caelo 292% 20-25. The relation of their movers to God is nowhere stated, but is presumably also one of desire.
Though the mover is the téAos opas here, the moved body is the tédos hopas in 1. 30; i.e. the mover is the of évexa in the sense of the rwvds, and the moved is the o@ évexa in the sense of the rwi, to use the language of 1072? 2.
31-38. The unity of the universe is proved on physical grounds in De Caelo i. 8, 9; Aristotle here offers the metaphysical proof which he there merely refers to, 2779. Schwegler points out a difficulty into which Aristotle falls. If the immateriality of the first mover proves its uniqueness, how can there be 55 immaterial movers, as Aristotle’s theory implies? The objection goes back to Plotinus, Lym, v. 1.9 mas 6& Kat TOAAG ovTws dowpara dvra VAys"od xwpilovons; and is difficult to answer. Cf. Introduction, cxxxix f.
On this’section cf. note at beginning of ch.
33- S00 dpiOug awoddd, UAnv exe. Ch Z. 1044% 7, De Caelo 278° 18,
34. els yap Adyos kal 6 adTds ToOAGy, otov avOpdmou, ZwKpdtys Se ets. Aristotle expresses himself rather obscurely, but the point seems to be this: One and the same definition, e. g. that of man, applies to. many individuals, but Socrates is only one, and therefore must have in him something over and above the definition of man, something to dis- tinguish him from other men, i.e. must have An.
35-36. 76 Se ti fy etvar. .. 7d mp@Tor, i.e. the prime mover, which has been described in 1072? 25 as pure actuality or essence.
38-14. For Aristotle’s views on the element of truth in popular religion see De Caelo 270) 5-9, 2848 2-13, » 3, Meteor. 339” 19-30, and cf, Pl. Crat. 397 c, Phil. 16 c. Towards the defazls of popular belief Aristotle adopts a somewhat contemptuous attitude; cf B. 10007 9, De Caelo 2847 18.
3. obro. The reference is rather vague—either to the beings that move the stars (® 22) or more probably to the stars themselves (4 30). Cf. 1073* 3-» 17 n. and n. at beginning of ch.
3-8. ta 8€ ora... cipypevors. Aristotle speaks as if Cronos, Zeus, Ares, Aphrodite, and Hermes were primarily star-gods and only later had human characteristics assigned to them. This is not historically true; the application of these names to the planets is late (cf: 1073 31-35 n.). His meaning is probably more general—that
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the gods of mythology have their origin in the prime forces that lie behind nature, and that early religion is right in recognizing the divine behind nature (Il. 8-10).
4. For the utilitarian value of myth cf. a. 995 4.
5-7. The anthropomorphism of the early beliefs is referred to simi- larly in B. 997" 10, Pol. 1252» 26. In Aristotle’s own view the stars are really much more divine than men (Z. WV. 1141 34).
6. kai tv dddwv Lowy dpotous trot, Alexander refers to the Egyptian mythology, and Aristotle may have had this in mind, since he refers to barbarians, and indeed to the Egyptians, in a similar connexion (De Caelo 240 5, Pol. 1329”25-33).
The traces of zoolatry in Greek religion are very slight and their meaning notclear. Cf. Farnell, Cud/s of the Greek States, iii, 58-62 on the horse-headed Demeter, iv. 115-116 on Apollo Avxevos.
10. For the belief in cycles of artistic and scientific discovery cf. De Caelo 240 19, Meteor. 339” 27, Pol. 1329 25. Plato already has the notion; he speaks more than once of past destructions of mankind by fire or water (Zim. 22.c, 23 a B, Crd. 109 pv, Laws 788 B).
The mode of existence of the supreme reason (ch. 9).
1074515. What must be the mode of existence of reason, if it is the most divine thing in the world? (1) If it thinks nothing, it is no better than a man asleep. (2) If it thinks, but its thinking depends on something else, it being itself only potency, not it but its thinking will be the best thing. (3) What does it think? Itself or something else? If the latter, either the same object always or different things at different times. Does it make a difference whether its object is noble or trivial? Evidently it must contemplate what is most divine, and without changing; any change would be for the worse and would infect with movement what is unmovable.
28. (Return to question (2).) If it is only a potency, (a) the continuity of its thought will be laborious; (4) its object will be nobler than it. The potency may be realized in the thinking of the worst possible object, so that the mere thinking is not what is best.
33. (Return to question (3).) Therefore, since reason is the best thing in the universe, it must think itself; its thinking is a thinking of thinking.
35. (4) But how can this be? All apprehension seems to be of another, and of itself only by the way, And (5) is it thinking or being thought that gives reason its goodness ?
38. (Answer to question (4).) Where the object is immaterial it is
identical with the subject, and this is the case with the object of reason,
1075* 5. (6) Is the object composite? If so, the thought of it involves transition. No; everything immaterial is indivisible, As the human reason (or rather that of composite beings) is in a certain period of time (for it possesses its good not in this or in that but in a whole, since its good is different from itself), so is the divine self-thought throughout eternity.
Aristotle now turns to the consideration of 6 vots, i.e. of the supreme intellect which has in ch. 7 been shown to be implied as the cause of the movement of the heavens,
107416. The description of the supreme reason as the most divine Tov Patvonever is strange, since ra pavdueva Means properly things apprehended by sense. But ¢atveoOar can also be used of what is discovered by reason (Bz. /udex 809* 8), and seems to be used here of all the things discovered whether by sense or by reason,