So that there are three leaders, and thrice sixty others, under them. For the angular are of a more ruling nature than the lateral worlds. "This opinion, there- fore, introduces a multitude of finite worlds, and makes the intelligible to be one of them. Unless, indeed, you arrange the intelligible world in the middle, as the
' The words, ovée xara μέρος are omitted in the original; but, as it. appears to me, ought to be inverted.
* These arguments, which possess an invincible strength, fully show the futility of that very popular theory of the moderns, that there are infinite worlds. For like most other modern dogmas, it is unscientific aud rambling.
4 See Plutarch’s Treatise on the Sileuce of the Oracles.
284 PROCLUS ON THE {Boox "1.
root of all things, but the three angular worlds as connective of all things, and causing all things to be one, according to one mundane intellect, one soul, and one nature. Or according to the empyrean, etherial, and material world, For an angle is connective of the sides. But the three sixty worlds may be said to be the multitude according to each sphere of these. For the spheres are twelve in number; and the multitude in each is spherical, of which the pentad is a symbol, being the first spherical number. Hence there are thrice sixty worlds, because there is an intellectual, a psychical, and a physical series, accord - ing to each sphere of which the pentad is a symbol; or because there is an empyrean, etherial, and material multitude of Gods. If, however, some one shomld not admit that these things are obscurely signified (in this narration of Plutarch}, but should assert that the worlds are truly divided according to num- ber, we ask him, whether it is better to make one world comprehensive of all things, or many worlds separated from each other? Por the former makes multitude to be connectedly contained by the monad, and parts by the whole ; but the latter dissipates production into an unco-ordinate multitude; though nature, and every cause of this kind, makes amonad prior to multitude, and a whole connective of parts. Jf likewise the worlds being spherical, touch each other, they will touch according toa point, but in the whole they will be separated from each other, and will be more unsympathetic than sympathetic. Itis neces- sary however that things which proceed from one cause, should be co-passive with each other, and give completion to one lite. Butif they do not at all touch each other, they will be [entirely] separated. How also, Aristotle would say, will things which are upward be downward, and things which are duwnward be upward, interval being external to the worlds?) And how will this thing pertain. ing to the worlds be arranged here, but another there? For that which is upward to us, will be to others downward. Will not the earth therefore of the other worlds, and every thing there which is heavy, be impelled to this world, if the motion of that which is heavy tends downward? But at one and the same time, a body which in one of those worlds tends upward, will, as proceeding to this world, tend downward. And there will not be an order of motions, or powers, or of things which are co-ordinate in the universe. Unless some one should say in answer to this, that there is a different middle in each of the worlds : for the middle isnot the middle of a vacuum, but of a world. Each part therefore of a world tends cither to the middle, or to the circumference of that world, but not to that which is foreign to it. All the things, however, that are in other worlds, are
Rook 11. Timaus of Plato. 335
foreign to each other. If therefore, some one should think that these assertions are worthy of belief, let them remain as such.
Plato however, has chosen the most principal and proper cause of their being but one world, viz. that which is derived from the paradigm of the universe ; but has omitted as concauses the above, and such-like causes. A demonstration also of this kind is definite. For it does not separately confute those who say there is a multitude of worlds, and separately those who introduce an infinite number, dispersed in different places, and intercepted by a vacuum, but at one and the same time he shows that the assertions both of the former and the latter are false, directly proving that the world is one from the onlyness of the paradigm. And farther still, he avoids the modes of argument which are derived from matter. Lor he neither demonstrates, as Aristotle docs, from matter being one, nor from places being definite according to nature, nor from essence, i.e. matter which is a body, being united, according to the doctrine of the Stoics. For Plato alone or especially employed, says Theophrastus, the cause which is derived from prooidential inspection ; beautifully testifying this of Plato. As we have said therefore, he ascribes the onlyness of the world to the paradigm. For if the pa- radigm is one, and the Demiurgus is one, it is necessary that the world should be one. -Or rather, if the paradigm is one, and the world adumbrates the onlyness of the paradigm, the world is onc. But the antecedent is true, and therefore the consequent. For the paradigm is one, as he before demonstrated, and constituted the world conformably to the onlyness of itself, For as the in- telligible paradigm was generated one from the one which is the good, so likewise with reference to itself being one, it constituted the world only-begotten. Hence the world is one. And neither are there many worlds ; for there are not many first paradigms ; nor infinite worlds ; for the infinite according to multitude, does not even exist in mortal natures, so far is it from having a subsistence in perpe- tual beings.
But it is possible, says Porphyry, to use the demonstration of Plato in all other principles. For through this, not only intelligible animal is demonstrated to be one, but also the first Demiurgus. And inshort, it may be demonstrated, that there are not many principles of intelligibles, but one priticiple. For again another principle of their being many would be requisite, through which the principles themselves are unbegotten. For every thing which is naturally inherent mmany things, is necessarily derived from one cause. He therefore who says, that God and matter are principles, must be compelled to admit that there is a certain
Tim, Plat. Vou. I. - 950
380 PROCLUS ON THE TIMZEUS OF PLATO. [woox τι.
other cause prior to them. For neither is matter sufficient to itself, nor will God be comprehensive of all things [if there is another principle independent of him). It is necessary therefore, that there should be a cause prior to these which com- prehends all things, and which is truly suthcient to itself, and is not in want of any other thing.
“ But this heaven (or universe} was generated, is, and will be one and only-begotten.”
The only-begotten indeed, adumbrates the monadic cause, and indicates an essence which is comprehensive of all secondary natures, and has dominion over wholes. Fur the theologist is accustomed to call Proserpine only-begotten ; ας pre- siding ina leading and ruling manner over all mundane natures, and as the cause of only-begotten animals, For the Goddess who ts posterior to her gives subsistence to the animals which are not only-begotten, as being irrational, The theologist there- fore, on this account calls Proserpine only-begotten, though he produces another divinity from the same causes as he produced Proserpine, Unity however, ts imparted to the universe from the one unity of unities. For as the being which ts every where, is derived from being itself, so the one! whichis in all things is from the one itself. But the words “ was generated, ts, and τοῦδ be,” manifest the tem- poral perpetuity of the universe, which is extended with the infinity of time. For the term weas, is indicative of the past, the term is, of the present, and the term will be, of the future time. Again therefore you have the term ove couformably to the image of the one being [the summit of intelligibles); but the terms was, és, and will be, conformably to the image of eternity. Bor the infinity ΟΥ̓ time imitates the eternal infinity. But all these are according to the image of animal itself. For this was) primarily monadic, and traly an eternal one. But the world is monadic and perpetual through the initation of it. Parther still, the term “was generated,” ts significant of perfection ; the term “4s,” of the participation of being ; and the term “will be,” of perpetual yencration, through which the world has a never-failing subsistence. So that of these, the first is from the one; for from thence perfection in imparted to all things, But the second is from the one being, And the third is from eternity ; for from thenee the never-failing is” inhe- rent in wholes.
' For ro ey πᾶσιν ov here, itis obviously necessary to read ro es πᾶσιν ev. ’ y a
BOOK III.
THe present treatise in one way surveys the world according to the wholeness which it contains, conformably to which also it is similar to all-perfect animal, and was generated an only-begotten animal, animated and endued with intellect ; but in another way, according to the division which is in it; as when it divides the soul from body, and likewise things which have a more formal order, But how does the psychical breadth proceed from fabrication, and according to what kind of reasons? For since the world is an animated animal and endued with intellect, three things are exhibited in it, viz. a certain body, soul, and. intellect. ὦ Intellect however, is entirely unbegotten : for it is allotted an eternal essence and energy. But body is entirely generated: for it consists according to the whole of itself. in the whole of time, And soul is of a middle essence. As therefore, it is arranged in the middle of impartible and partible natures, after the same man- ner also, it is the boundary’ of unbegotten and generated essences. Hence it is generated indeed, as with reference to intellect, but is unbegotten, when consi- dered with relation to a corporeal-formed nature. It exists also as the end of eter- nal beings, but ranks as first among things that are generated. On this account therefore, Plato delivers to us an all-various generation of body, producing it wholly from causes different from itself; but he produces soul both trom itself, and from the total fabrication and vivitication. He does not however, in words devise any generation of intellect. For neither is intellect produced according to idea, nor does it admit of any name of generation, being entirely unbegotten, and eternal. It is however unfolded into light from wholes, but abiding in them
* For epwshere, it is necessary to read opos.
388 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK "ι.