inherently, it proceeds unitedly, together with its more total causes. Hence it abides impartible and undivided, being preserved by undefiled and inflexible powers, while another life is distributed and divided about the parts of the um- verse. Plato therefore, delivers the first: hypostasis of the universe from fabrica- tion, viz. an hypostasis according to wholeness; according to which it becomes animated, divine, and endued with intelleet, conformably to a similitude to all- perfect animal. But he adds asecond hypostasis, which divides the world ac- cording to wholes, and the production of total parts; soul and the corporeal- formed nature existing according to this hypostasis. For intellect is entirely unbe- gotten, as we have said, because it is without generation and indivisible; except that it proceeds in an unbegotten manner, from the providence of the Demiurgus. But he calls the nature which receives intellect, the evolution ἡ itself into light of soul. For the Demiurgus himself places the circles of soul in intellect, unfolding it without division, as being impartible, and without figure, as being pertectly unfigured. And he delivers after this, the third hypostasis of the universe, divid- ing it according to parts, and giving perfection to each of the parts. For he delivers to us, how fire and air, water and earth are generated. But in the Jast place, he surveys the energy of fabrication which is effective of body ; and neither in this does he descend to particulars," but abides in the whole elements. — For the total fabrication is the fabrication of wholes, and of total parts. But he deli- vers the formation of individuals, and of things which are truly partial, to. the junior Gods ; in order that imitating the providence of their father about wholes, they also may receive a similar fabrication about particulars, and may have that analogy to him which he has to the intelligible paradigm. For being intellectual as with reference to this paradigm, and having the order of intellect, as with relation to intelligible intellect, he becomes himself intelligible to the mundane Gods.
As we have said therefore, fabrication being triple, the first, according to whole- ness, the second, according to a division into wholes, and the third, according to a division into parts,’ Plato now intends to deliver to us the middle or second fabrication ; having indeed a transition of this kind consentaneous from. things themselves 5 and having also an opportune progression to this from what had been
" For aagaow here, read expavau.
* For ra sadeora, read ra καθέκαστα.
Ὁ In otber words fabrication is either Jovian, or Dienysiacal, or Adontical, as was before observed by Proclus.
Book 111. Tim/Eus of Plato. 369
before said. For since he had defined the world to be one visible animal, compre- hending within it all such things as are naturally allied to it; that the world indeed is one, he demonstrated from the onlyness of the paradigm ; but that it is visible, and that it is comprehensive of all kindred natures, is rendered manifest to us by the division of the universe into wholes. For if we can discover from what cause the world is visible, and how all the elements are co-arranged in it, and through what analogies, we shall easily perceive that it comprehends all kindred natures, and that there is nothing sensible which is not contained in the one ambit of the world. Perceiving this however, we shall sufficiently obtain the object. of investigation, For this was, how the world is visible, and how it is comprehep- sive of all things which are naturally allied to it. For from what has been before said, we assume that the world is alone; but from these things, that it is all-per- fect.
“Since, however, it is necessary that what is generated of a corporeal nature should be visible and tangible ; but without fire nothing can become visible, neither can any thing be tangible without a certain solid, nor solid without earth ;—hence divinity beginning to fabricate, constituted the body of the universe from fire and earth.”
Plato having a little before given the definition of that which is generated, call- ing it that which is becoming to be, and which is perishable, he defined it to be that which is the object of opinion in conjunction with sense. But demonstrating that the world is generated, he converts the definition. For he says that sensibles are seen to be things which are becoming to be, and are generated. But now transferring that which is itself generated, to the order of a subject, he predicates of it the visible and tangible. For these are the extremes of sensibles, just as the sight and the touch are the extremes of the senses. Hence there, as 1 have ob- served in what he says respecting the world being generated, he converts the definition. But here he gives it according to nature. For that which is becoming to be was in the order of the indefinite. But as he said in the hypotheses, that which is the object of opinion in conjunction with sense, is to be assumed in the definition. Ie says therefore, it is necessary that what is generated should be | sensible, not indeed every generated nature, but that which we before called gene- rated, viz. the composite nature, and which is always becoming to be through the whole of time. For soul also is generated, but the discourse is not about this.
200 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox 11.
If however, some one should say that according to Plato material forms and qualities themselves are apprehended by sense, and yet are incorporeal, and at the same time have generation, let him know, says the divine Tamblichus, that these likewise contribute to the hypostasis of bodies, and are surveyed in conjunc- tion with them. Since therefore the world has a certain corporeal and likewise an incorporeal portion in it, and this latter is two-fold, one being inseparable, but the other separate from body; since also the portion of the incorporeal, which is separate from body is two-fold, viz. psychical and intellectual; and further still, since the world also has the unbegotten and the generated, but the whole of every thing which consists of the unbeyotten and the generated, is generated, Plato very properly calls the whole world something generated and corporeal. formed. For if a whole consists of the mortal and the immortal, the whole is mortal ; if from the unbegotten and the generated, the whole is generated 5 and if from the incorporeal and the corporeal, the whole has the form of a corporeal nature. For if indeed, the incorporeal itself is co-passive with body, it becomes itself corporeal-formed, and not the whole only. Ty, however, that which is prin- cipally and properly incorporeal, is itself exempt and impassive, being raised above body, this more excellent nature is not indeed body, since it remains tn its own purity, but the whole may more justly be denominated corporeal-formed. Hence, since the world participates of many and blessed prerogatives from. its generator, but partakes also of body, itis deservedly called corporeal-formed, visible and tangible, according to the whole of itself Tor it is generated. But that which is generated is visible and tangible and has a body, as was rightly asserted before.
Plato beginning therefore from body, in the first place gives it to be sensible according to the extreme senses. In the next place, he imparts to it that which is more perfect than this, viz. the bond through analogy, which is connective of the bodies it contains, In the third place, he makes it to be a whole consisting of the wholes of the elements. Afterwards, in the fourth place, he gives ita sphe- rical figure, in order that it may be most similar to itself according to form. In the fifth place, he shows that the world suffers all things in itself, In the sixth place, he distributes to it an appropriate motion. Afterwards, in the seventh place, he animates it through a divine soul. In the eighth place, he imparts to it atemporal period. Afterwards, in the ninth place, he establishes the senes '
For cepa here, itis necessary to read σειρα.
βοοκ 111.] Tim.Lus of Plato. 391
of Gods in it, who conjointly produce the perfect year. And _ in the tenth place, he makes it to be perfect from all animals which are assimilated to the four ideas {in animal itself]. And thus through the decad he gives completion to the whole fabrication of things. ‘These particulars Lowever will be unfolded as we proceed.
Now therefore, we shall observe, that since the world possesses interval, and is apprehended by sense, it is known through the sight and the touch; being visible indeed, in consequence of being wholly filled through the whole of itself with light ; but existing tangible in consequence of being a solid. For itis suf- ficient for it to receive through these senses, all sensible aatures. The visible also, and the tangible conceived as always existing in the world in the four ele- ments, are contraries. For these as being most distant from each other and un- der the same genus, are contraries. For both are sensibles, and this is their com- mon genus, and they are most distant from each other, since the one is immedi- ately sensible, but the other is not sensible without a medium. If however, we lvestigated the contraries in the elements so far as they are mutable, we should not say that they are fire and earth, but fire and water. For water espe- cially extinguishes fire. Each also of the assertions is true. For it is common to both to have their contrariety consist in being extremes. And in this the asser- tions accord, as in senstbles indeed, carth being contrary to fire, but asin things of a mutable nature, water to fire. Hence also Plato opposes the visible to the tangible. Or, [it may be said] that he assumes the sensible clements, as not yet considering the mutation of them, according to which water is more contrary to fire than earth. What Plato therefore here says, is not as Theophrastus thought, imperfect : for he doubts as follows: Why does Plato say that the peculiarity of five is visi- bility, and of earth tanzibility, but does not at all mention the peculiarities of the other elements? We reply, it is because we see the world, and also touch it, but we do not taste, or hear, or smell it. The world itself also is visible and tangible to itself. And as being luciform indeed, itis visible, perceiving itself through divine light, which is extended through all heaven, and is similar, as Socrates says in the Republic, to the rainbow. or this divine light is that which is primarily visible, and pervades through the whole world. For as the sphere of the sun is the sight of the soul which is in it, thus also the sight of the sphere" is that divine light, which pervades through all visive* natures, and operates on, and imparts life to things that are visible. You may likewise say, that this is
* For ψυχης here, it is necessary to read ogaipas. * Instead of eparwy in this place, I read σρατικων.
392 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 111.
the first and most principal sight, but not that which subsists in conjunction with passion, and which is separated from visible natures. But again, the world as being solid and full of life, has what is called a co-sensation of itself. For we also have a co-sensation of the motions or passions which inwardly subsist in us. And through this consciousness, the world becomes tangible to itself. The most proper solution however of the doubt, is that which says, that Plato assumes the extreme elements prior to the others, because the latter subsist for the sake of the former. And he intends to show that the rest are constituted as the bond of the extremes. Orit may be said, that through the extremes he also comprehends the media. For as the universe is defined through fire and earth, and the media which are comprehended in these, thus also through the visible and the tangible he comprehends all the variety of sensible natures.