said, that the sensible universe has indeed all things according to its own order, and that the soul possesses all reasons, as is evident from the things to which it applies itself, and from assigning to every thing its appropriate reason; but that there is not a certain intelligible, which is truly comprehensive of all intelligibles, Just as soul contains all things dianoetically, and the universe sensibly. For whence is allness derived to these, except from intelligibles? If, therefore, the intelligible is all- perfect, that will be the paradigm of the universe which is prima- rily all. But if one of them is all things, and the other not, these will neither be co-arranged with each other, nor con-numerated 3 but that which has not all things will be inferior to the other, and that which is all-perfect’ will have a more com- prehensive power. Hence the one will be a part, but the other a whole; and both will not be all-pertect animals, but one of them will be more perfect than the other. For that which has a diminished perfection is not all-perfect. But if each of them is all things, whence did they obtain all things? — For it is necessary that they should reccive this allness from something. For as participating of one form, they subsist from one cause, And thus the natures which similarly participate of all things, possess this allness from one cause. There will therefore be a cause prior to them ; since it is necessary that where there are two things there should be an antecedent cause, which conducts them together. This cause, therefore, which is prior to them, is either all things indivisibly, or divisibly. But if indivisibly, another cause will be requisite as amedium. For the medium between that which is perfectly indreisible, and the duad which possesses all things divisibly, is the monad whieh has all things indivistbly;' this indeed being itself united by an indivisible cause, but uniting the allness which is in the duad. Hence that which primarily comprehends all things ts the monad which is prior to the duad. But in that which subsists indivi- sihly, the sced and cause are contained of an allness which is characterized by unity. Deservedly, therefore, is all-perfect animal said to be monadic, and incapable of being the second with another thing, not only as the words appear to say, because it is not conjoined with another, but because if it were arranged with another, it would be secondarily, and no longer primarily all things. For after all-perfect animal, there are causes which are co-arranged with other kindred natures, but which have not primarily all things. hat, however, which primarily possesses all things is monadic. But if it is comprehensive of all things, there will
* The original is, τοῦ yap αδιαιρετως παντὰ ovros, και rns δυαδος τῆς παντὰ ἐχούσης, μεσον ἐστιν ἡ μονας n Tarra ἐχϑυσα διηρημενως. But it appears to me to be neocssary to read, agreeably to the above transla-
tion, τοῦ yap αδιαιρετως παντῇ ovros, καὶ τὴς ἑναδος τὴν παντα ἐχούσης διηρημενως, μέσον φστιν ἢ μονας ἢ ταντὰ ἔχουσα αδιαιρετωι.
380 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK 11.
not be an intelligible animal besides it. For if there were, this would no longer be all-perfect, but a part. And that will be the whole of which this will he alone a part. For it is necessary that multitude should stop at the monad.
Why, however, does Plato say, the second with another thing? For it would have been sufficient to have said, with another by itself, or the second, by itself. But he conjoins both, for the purpose of indicating that the nature which 1s co-ar- ranged with another, and is not monadic, cannot as we have before observed, be the first. Perhaps likewise, it signifies the contrary, and that what is said pertains to thingsand not to words. For the form which is incorruptible natures entirely subsists with another. For the human form is in this individual, and in that, the partici- pants being many, and on this account each is with another. That form, however, which is perpetual, yet not a whole, though it may be monadic, and on this account not with another, yet it is more imperfect than a certain whole. But that which is neither in many things, nora part with another thing, 1s not secon- dary, as being one and a whole, and not a part. Very properly, therefore, does the theologist produce Phanes, the only divinity bearing the seed of the lustrious Gods,’ from the God who 15 occultly all things ; and from Phanes gives subsis- tence to all the second orders of the Gods. For Heaven indeed proceeds toge- ther with Earth. But she,
Again th’ extended heav’n and earth? brought forth.
Aud Saturn proceeds together with Rhea. For according to a third progeny, Earth produced [as the theologist says,] “seven pure beautifal virgins with rolling eyes, and seven sons that were kings, with fine long hair.” But the Demiurgus, who is the great Jupiter, is conjoined with Juno. Hence also, she is said to be of equal rank with him, and proceeds from the same fathers. Phanes, however, proceeds by himself alone, and is celebrated as female and father. 116 also produ- ces the (three) Nights, and is present with the middle Night. For he
Pluck’d the shorn flower of Night.’
According to this theologist therefore, all-perfect animal is not the second with another, but fills the orders of Night, and also fills the celestial orders with the
> For θεὸν κλυτὸν here, it is necessary to read θεων κλυτων.
τ, οὶ The intellectual Earth brought forth the sensible Heaven and Earth.
2 In the original avros yap ens παιδὸς ἀφείλετο covpipoy arfos, But for ens waséos, it appears from Eschenbach to be necessary to read τῆς Nu«res.
Book 11} TIMUs OF PLATO, 381
allness of himself; in imitation of whom, Jupiter likewise, produces twofold orders, the super-celestial and the mundane. Phanes, however, gives subsistence to twofold triads, but Jupiter to twofold duodecads. For on this account bis sceptre is said to consist of four-and-twenty measures. Hence, the demiurgic is always assimilated to the paradigmatic cause, but proceeds into multitude from intelligible union. These things, however, are also elsewhere discussed.
But that animal itself rejoices in onlyness, is also manifested through the Orphic theologies. For as Phanes is the offspring of an egg, it is evident that he isan animal, At the same time also, he is called by Orpheus the happy aad venerable Metis, bearing the seed of the illustrious Gods; to whom Jupiter being analogous, is likewise denominated by Orpheus Metis and a demon.
One power, one demon, the great lord of all.
Thus too, the Oracles call this mighty God (i.e. animal itself] the fountain of fountains, and say that he alone generated all things. “ For from thence the gene ration of abundantly-various matter entirely’ leaps forth. Thence a fiery whirl- wind sweeping along, obscures the flower of fire, leaping at the same time into the cavities of the worlds. For all things thence begin to extend their admirable
rays downwards.”
“For again, another animal would be required about these two, of which they would be parts; and it might be more rightly said, that the
universe is assimilated to this comprehending third, rather than to the
other two.”
This which is now asserted by Platu, may be easily demonstrated from the demiurgic goodness. For ifthe Demiurgus is good, he fabricated the universe with reference to all-perfect aniinal. Buthe is good and the best of causes, and therefore he assimilated the world to all-perfectanimal. Forit is necessary that the first Demi- urgus should be intellective of the first paradigm ; and that being intellective of it, he should be the maker of that which is in every respect most similar to it. Forif there is nothing which is intellective of it, it will no longer have the order of a
paradigm, with respect to that which is fabricated by the first Demiurgus. If,
however, you should say, that it is necessary there should be other secondary causes, which produce with reference to more partial paradigms, you say well
* For Oey aby here, read ενθεν apdny. And for apvépow, αμνδροι.
382 τ PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ τι.
indeed, but at the same time you should preserve the universe one, For the fabri- cations of these partial paradigms are parts of the universe, in the same manner as the paradigms, and vice versa. As therefore paradigms are parts of paradigms, demiurgic’ are parts of demiurgic causes, and fabrications of fabrications, it is necessary that the wholeness of the universe should be the image of all-perfect animal; and that a!l-perfect animal should be the paradigm of the universe. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that animal itself is one, and alone, as being monadic. The world therefore is one and monadic, in order that it may perfectly imitate its paradigm. For as it primarily receives a simuar idea of it, how is it possible it should not adumbrate all the nature of it, im consequence of having been generated intellectual, perpetual, and monadic?
“Tn order, therefore, that the world from its onlyness or being alone, might be similar to all-perfect animal, on this account the artificer nei- ther made infinite, nor two worlds.”
Again, Plato reminds us of the Demiurgic cause, in order that we may un- derstand also from this, that every thing which is generated by the whole fabri- cation, 15 monadic, perpetual, and intellectual; and that the Demiurgus is the cause of all things, in consequence of producing the monnds of them; but that he delivered the multitndinous and partial fabrication to the yunior Gods. | Farther still, he also latently teaches us who this all-perfeet intellect is, the name of which is so celebrated by the more modern philosophers ; viz. that it is intelligible intellect, in which the universe primarily subsists. Before, therefore, he called it distributedly “ according to all things perfect,” because he then celebrated its all- ness; but now speaking of it collectively, he calls it “ a/-perfect,” since his dis- course is about the only-begotten.
The infinite, however, in a certain respect is, and ina certain respect is not. Buta thing is said to be infinite ina three-fold manner ; either according to power, or according to multitude, or according to magnitude. The infinite therefore according to power isin divine natures, and in the world. For thenever-failing, and the per- petual, are the peculiarities of the infinite according to power. But the injinite ac- cording to multitude partly is, and partly ts not, Lor it has not an at-once collected subsistence, but exists according to a part. And the infinite according ta
Ἰ Instead of δημιονρ npura here, itis neccessary to read δημιονργικα,
Book 11 Tim.Zeus of Plato. 383
magnitude, neither erists according to a part,’ nor has any existence whatever Hence the infinite according to multitude, if it exists in the worlds, in the first place, will be without arrangement with reference to itself. For what order can there be in the intinite of things first and second, where there is no first? Jn the nevl place, it will not hace one producing cause. Lor if ithad, that cause would produce the one prior to multitude, and the whole prior to parts. For being itself one it would first assimilate to itself the things posterior to itself. For every cause which is effective of things according to nature, produces things similar to itself. But there is no first in those worlds, since they are infinite. And if they suppose other worlds consisting of others, either the causes of them will be unco-ordinate or co-ordinate. And if co-ordinate, it is necessary that the worlds should have one co-arrangement. But in the infinite there is no order. To which we may add, that the intervention of a vacuum in the middle, will separate the worlds. Bat if the causes are unco-ordinate, we must admit that there is a divided and unsympathetic multitude in the principles. This, however, will entirely abolish both all the causes themselves, and the things posterior to them. For the causes will be corruptive of each other, not being able to subsist in conjunction with, in consequence of being perfectly foreign from each other. But the things which proceed from them, collapsing, will stop, and will not have any thing from whence again they can be generated, the principles being destroyed.
Perhaps, however, some one may say that there is neither one world, nor infi- nite worlds, but many and finite. For we have heard of a certain Barbaric opinion, which the Cheronean Plutarch relates,’ placing in one equilateral. tri- angle the intelligible world according to the middle of it, in each of the sides sixty worlds, about the intelligible, and in each angle one world; all of them (except the intelligible) being such worlds as that in which we are comprehended,