animal itself} is only-begotten, in consequence of not being co-ordinate with any other animal, As the only-begotten, therefore, has a threefold subsistence, if you assume that which is truly: only-begotten, it is the third, as the cause of all animals, having the relation of a monad to all of them, being participated by one thing, and not being co-ordinate with any animal, but being truly monadic. This, however, being assumed, that which is conjoined with it now necessarily follows. For if the paradigm is only-begotten, that also which is generated according to itis only-begotten, imitating the only-begotten nature of the para- digin, and nothing else besides the world is a thing of this kind. For no other thing besides animal itself, is according to this signification, only-begotten, Farther stll, it is requisite to solve the doubt after another manner, by consider- ing as follows: Every form is gencrative of onc thing, and of a multitude. Of one thing, indeed, because it constitutes a monad similar to itself, prior to the multitude which 1 produces. But it produces a multitude, because every monad has a number co-ordinate with itself. Animal itself, therefore, as a monad, constitutes the whole world. But according to each order, it gencrates a number! analogous to the whole, and Which is able to preserve the similitude to the universe contorinably to that series, Hence the solar paradigm, generates Indeed the visible sun itself, but it likewise zenerates a number of solar animals possessing the same form, according to a similitude to their proper form, And of animals of this kind, some are celestial, but others sublunary, so that such a number as this extends as far as to the earth. Man itself, therefore, does not gmncdiately produce this infinite multi- tude of men; for progression is no where without a medium; but through numbers proximate to the monad and appropriate. lence, since an intelligible form is one, itis necessary thatit should not immediately produce the infinite, but ins the first place a monad, afterwards an appropriate number, aud so on in suceession. For between the intellizible form which is one, end the sensible wich is multiplied, the medium is the form which is sensthle indeed, but monadte 3 through proceeding becom= ing sensible; but through preserving the similitude of its paradizm, having a monadic subsistence. For it may be said to be {ταν absurd, that divine, intelligible, and immoveable causes, should not be primarily the causes of things essentially immu- table, but of things matenal and mutable. For how is it possible that things which are in the profundity of the universe, cau be conjoined with those super-
ἡ Ap Opoy is omitted in the original.
* In the original δία τῶν ενυλων, καὶ μεταβλητων; but δία ought evidently to be expunged.
376 Proclus on the [βοοκ 11
mundane natures ; things deprived of intelligence, with intellectuals ; perfectly sautable, with eternal natures; very composite things, with such as are simple; and things which in their own nature are dissipated, with united essences? It is necessary, therefore, that man itself, and each of such-like forms, should generate stable monads prior to a dispersed multitude; from which the progression of each to its appropriate number is derived. It is likewise necessary that these monads should exist in the second fabrication. Hence they remain invariably the same, as being alone produced by an immoveable cause. You must not wonder, therefore, #f some one should call man immortal, a brute rational, and a plant intellectual. For each of these is primarily a thing of this kind. But pro- gression producing a diminution of the all-various imitation of the paradigm, exhibits some things sensibles, others irrational, and others intellectual im capacity. For as the water, which primarily proceeds from its wuntain, is most similar to the fontal water, and preserves its proper purity undefiled; thus also the natures Which are first unfolded into hight from intellyible forms, genuinely preserve the similitudes of their paradigms ; batas they proceed, dissolve the perfect sumilitude, and are filled from their subjects with composition and inelegance.
In another way, likewise, the solution of the things investigated may be attempted. For of fabrication the first is total, one, and impartible; the second is partial and multiplied, and proceeds according to a distribution into parts; and the third is not only partible like that which precedes it, but comes into contact with generated natures, and with the forms they contain, Vou have also these three fabrications in Plato, viz. the Jovian, the Dionysiacal, and the Adonaical (or pertaining to Adonis), conformably to which he divides his three polities, as we have elsewhere shown. The third fabrication, therefore, ts the cause of wholes’ and parts, and of things which are not monadtc. The second is the cause of things which are monaaic indeed, but are not wholes. And the first 1s the cause of the whole and the monadic. For such is the universe, which is not a part of any thing, as the sun and moon are, and each of the peculiar parts of the world. If therefore Plato had now spoken concerning cyery fabrication, it would have been requisite to annex the extensions of forms into multitude, and their divisions. But since the present discourse is alone concerning the whole fabrication, or the fabrication which has a total subsistence, what occasion is there to disturb ourselves, in con- sequence of not remaining in the first fabrications, which are eflected by an
* For edwy here, it is necessary to read odwy,
Bouk 11.) Tim.Eus of Plato. 377
mmoveable and total cause? For the whole Demiurgus is a fabricator totally and monadically ; since also producing many Gods, he produces them monadically. Por each of the Gods belonging to the inerratic sphere, is constituted according to one form; since the form of earth is different from that of water, and the form vs water from that of fire; the parts of which have a temporal generation and corruption. Much more, therefore, do such perpetual natures as the stars, and also partial souls, differ in form from each other, For every individual and at the same time partial nature, is material. If also partial souls produce different peculiar lives, from exerting the reasons they contain, it is evident that they pos- sess the reasons of all things universally, and subsisting in forms alone, so that the progressions of each of them are according to different forms. This number too of forms must be placed in the fountain of souls unically (or having a subsis- tence characterized by unity), but distributedly in the principle* of souls. For how is it possible it should not be necessary, souls being finite, that the number of them should pre-exist in the causes from whence they are derived ? Since even nature comprehends the numbers of the things which she produces according to numbers. If, however, the Gods are monadic, and souls, the genera between these, are like- wise monadic ; so that each thing which the Demiurgus constitutes, is entirely monadic. "This likewise appears to be the cause of the perpetuity of the things which he produces, that each receives the whole form of the paradigimatic cause, Ilence every thing which proceeds from the whole Demiurgus has a nature of this hind,
It, therefore, he gives subsistence to the world, the world is one; both on account of the demiurgic monad, and the onlyness of the paradigm; which Plato, as it appears to me, knowing, says, “if it be admitted that itis fabricated according to the paradigm.” For by not saying if it was generated, but Wit was fabricated, accord- ing to the paradigm, he indicates the onlyness both of the paradigmatic and the demiurgic cause. For the Demiurgus is a monad, and the paradigm also is a monad; and therefore this universe being generated by a monad, with reference to amonad, is monadic. Why, therefore, you may say, is he satisfied in what follows, with the demonstration from the paradigm? We reply, because the
“i.e. In Rhea, or the vivitic Goddess, considered according to her first subsistence in the intellec- tual order of Gods. :
>i. δ. In Proserpine, who subsists in the vivific triad of the super-mundane order of Gods, which order consists of the Gods who are called apyac or Principles. See the 5th and 6th Books of my Transla- tion of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, for an account of the deities called fountains and principles.
Tim. Plat, Vou. I. 3B
478 PROCLUS ON TIE [8οοκ τι.
paradigm is more united than the Demiurgus. For the Demiurgus himself is a monad, through his similitude and analogy to the paradigm. This however is evident. For among the kings, he is analogous to it ; and both the Demiurgus and the paradigm are analogous to the intelligible monad.' Hence, since the monadic nature is from thence derived to the Demiurgus himself, what ought we to think concerning the universe? Js it not, that it primarily possesses its only- ness from the paradigm? The paradigm, therefore, is a more principal thing, for the purpose of demonstrating the onlyness of the world. And again, you may see, that these are three monads, viz. animal itself, the demiurgic cause, and the universe. But the first, is an intelligible monad, the second, an intellectual
monad, and the third, a sensible monad.
“ For that which comprehends all such animals as are intelligible, can never be the second, [or co-arranged] with* any other thing.”
The necessity of these demonstrations is admirable, showing that all-perfect animal is one and monadic,' similar to those methods through which in the Sophista, he demonstrates that the multitude of beings is to be referred to one truly existing being. For if there are two principles of beings, either each of them is primarily being, or only one of them. But if only one ofthem, the other will proceed from this. And if each, itis necessary there should be another being, from which both of these are beings. For cach of these is a certain being, and not simply being. After the same manner likewise, he now shows, that all- perfect animal is one. So that according to all the orders of things, that which is said to exist primarily, will be only-begotten. For being itself is primarily being, Just as anima! itself is here demonstrated to be primarily animal, or only-begotten. For how is it possible this should not be only-begotten? For if there is another animal co-arranged with it, either each has all things, or one of them has all things, but the other not, or neither of them has all things. For besides these, there are no other consequences. If, therefore, it should be said that neither of them is all things, each of them is imperfect. We however are speaking of that which is all- perfect, and we investigate whence it possesses all things. For it must not be
ice. To the summit of the intelligible order, or being itself. > In the text of Proclus μεθ᾽ erepoy erroneously instead of μεθ᾽ ἐτέρον.
> Τὰ the original ἐν ov καὶ pevoy. But for μενον Tread μοναδικον.
nook 11.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 379