it will not be the imare of ἃ certain whole. For the paradigm making by its very being, it makes a certain image of the whole of itself. But this being the case that which is generated with reference or according to. the whole paradigm itself, is monadic, is perpetual, and is an animal. For as he who imitates the whole of Socrates expresses the whole of his life, after the same manner, the world being fashioned in the resemblance of animal itself, imitates all things mit, so far as itis naturally adapted to such an imitation ; possessing all things sensibly which animal itself possesses intelligibly,
Some however oppose what is here said, by adducing the multitude of men and of horses, Por man itself is the cause of many men, horse itself of inany horses, and this is the ease with every other form or idea of the like hind. But if some one should say, that these beeause they are parts of other things, are on this account monadic, the oljector will not cease adducing tous the sun and the moon, and all the parts of the world which are monadic. Tence more profound solutions of the objection are requisite. The philosopher Porphyry therefore striving to solve the didiculty, says, that forms as they proceed, always descend into mulutude and division, and pass into balk, and an all-various distribution into parts. Tfenee an intelligible essence, procceding into the world, terminates ina divided, gross, and material multitade, though on high itis united, impar- tible, and monadic., To every thing, therefore, which is intelligible, nothing else imparts the whole, for the intelligible itself gives subsistence to it. Hence it constitutes it as great as it is able to become. But this universe supplies man itself with matter. And on this account the matter of one form receives many Impressions of that form. "The world, therefore, is one from one (paradigm), and a Whole froma whole. But man is numerous trom one torm, the world supply- ing the matter of it. Why, therefore, says he, are there not many suns and moons? For the matter of these is from the universe. To this he replies, that to incorruptible natures in the world, though they may be parts, the monadic is appropriate; but to corraptible natures, multitude. For if there were not many participants of the same reason (or form) but only one corraptible participant, the form would perish, this being corrupted. It is necessary, however, that all [mate- rialj forms perishing, the full perfection of the world should still remain. Such therefore is the solution of Porphyry. |
The divine Tamblichus however reprobates this solution, as dissolving no one of the doubts, For let, says he, the whole sensible world possess impartible natures partibly, indivisibles divisibly, and monadic natures multitudinously, yet
372 PROCLUS ON THE [Rook τι,
why do some things in it still remain monadic, but others not? For this is what was dubious from the beginning. He therefore adduces a certain solution of the doubt, which is indeed admirable yet is inwant of assistance. For he says that of forms some rejoice in sameness and permanency, but others in motion and dif- ference. And that some, indeed, are the causes of monadic and perpetual natures, but others of such as are mutable and multitudinous. And this indeed is very admirably asserted, but requires a certain admonition, which it is necessary to make, by considering that atter the one two principles proceed, bound and infinity, as Socrates asserts inthe Philebus. And as of numbers, some are more monadic but others are dyadic, though all numbers derive their subsistence from the monad and at the same time from the duad, thus likewise, though all forms subsist accor- ding to these two principles, yet at the same time some are the progeny of bound, but others of infinity. And what occasion is there to speak of forms; since of the Gods themselves, some belong to the co-ordination of bound, but others to that of infinity, both according to their whole orders and according to parts? According to total orders indeed, because every paternal, connective, and demiurgic series is defined according to bound; but every vivitic and effect- ive series, according to infinity. But according to. parts, because of the pater- nal and of the vivilic series, some belong to the order of bound, but others to that of infinity. If, therefore, this is the case with the Gods, why is it wonderful that of forms some are more than others allied to bound, but others to infinity? And according to this analogy some forms give subsistence to monadic things, but others to those that proceed into multitude. After this manner, therefore, it is requisite tu assist this solution.
Our preceptor, however, dissolves this doubt after another manner, multifarious. ly. Tle says, therefore, that every intelligible nature is uniform and_ eternal, but that of mundane things, some are able to be more, and others less assimilated to the essences of intelhgibles. For such things as are more 1mmaterial and pure, are capable of being assimilated ina greater, but such things as are more material and gross, in a less degree. As all paradigms therefore subsist in monadic and eternal essences, the more excellent natures in the universe especially imitating the causes of themselves, are generated in all things most similar to their para- digms, viz. according to the monadic, the essenual, and the perpetual; but the less excellent, being allotted a secondary form of similitude, are in a certain re- spect assimilated to their causes, and in ἃ certain respect not. Hence, as there are these three things in intelligible forms, viz. the monadic, the essential, and the eternal, whether do mundane natures imitate the monadic and perpetual peculi-
Book τι. Timaeus of Plato 373
arity of intelligibles, but not the essential? By no means.’ For it has been de- monstrated that it is requisite the things which proceed from them should be essences, since they produce by their very being. Will mundane natures there- fore be imitations of them according to the monadic and the essential, but not according tothe eternal?) This however is impossible. For each of them will perish ; being monadic indeed, but not perpetual. For because not perpetual, it will vanish into non-entity ; but in consequence of being monadic, there will not be that from which it may be generated. Besides, every thing which subsiste from immoveable causes, is immutable in essence. But forms are immoveable, for they are intelligible. Either therefore itis possible for all things to imitate them in all things, or in certain things. But it is impossible for all things to imitate themin all things. For the natures which are more remote from their principles are in a less degree assimilated to them. Just as with respect to Pythagoras, who possesses all sciences, he who is nearer to him, receives all his knowledge secon- darily, but he who is more remote from him, learns some of his sciences, but is unadapted to the reception of others. Ifitis impossible therefore, for all things to imitate them in every respect, it remains that this must be effected by them in certain things. And ifin certain things as there are three peculiarities which are characteristic of intelligible forms,’ either imitating the extremes, they become destitute of the middle, or receiving the two first, they will appear to have re- sinquished the third, or not partaking of the first, they will participate of the two which are posterior to it. It has however been shown, that neither the first nor second is true. T/ence it is necessary that they shoulg not express the monacic pecu- liarily of forms, but only the essential and the eternal. On this account all mundane Sorms indeed are essences, and are always invariably the same, but all of them are not monadic. For all mundane forms do not subsist commensurately to ali the powers of their paradigms. But that every intelligible form, and whole paradig- Taatic cause having a primary subsistence, is monadic, eternal, and essential, is evident. For whatever is not essence, will be an accident. Every accident, however, subsists about matter, and is conversant with things which are in matter, but not with those which are in separate causes. If likewise an intelligible form is not eternal, neither will the image of it be perpetual. It is necessary however that it should, if the world always consists of allforms. But the principle perish-
‘Instead of ro δὲ ovewées ov, ovdayws; in this place, it is necessary to read ro δε ουσιωδε: cv,
ovdapws; :
* Viz. the monadic, the essential, and the eternal.
374 PROCLUS ON THE [noox 11.
ing, that which is derived from it can by no possible contrivance be preserved. And if an intelligible form is not monadic, it will be no longer primarily a para- digm. For it is impossible for any thine to be two things primarily, as Socrates says in the Republic. Vor whence is allness derived to these mundane forms, except from one certain common form? These three things therefore are present with all first paradigms. And it seems that the monadie Is present with them from bound, the perpetual from infinity, and the essential from the first essence.
Farther still, it is also possible for us after another manner to solve the doubt. Vor of the things contained in the world, some indeed subsist from the first fabri- cation fice. the fabrication of the Demiurgus}] alone; but others from the tirst and also from the second Cor the fabrication of the junior Gods]. Those, there- fore, that subsist) from) the first fabrication, are invariably the same, and are monadie, imitating the onlyness of their producing ‘cause. Por the sapermun- dane fabrication is immoveable, one, and eternal. Bat things which proceed from the second fabrication are mutable, are borne alone In multitude, and sub- sist differently at diffrent times. — Por the second fabrication is multiform, makes that which it makes with motion, and has time but not eternity connascent with itself. Henee the things which proceed from it are very inutable, and inultiplied, and entirely moved. For things which proceed from causes that are moved, are naturally of this kind. Whence also ΤΠ think the Demiurgus, having constituted all the monadice and perpetual natures in the world, excites the junior Gods tu the fabrication of mortal natures ; ino order that these, so far as they have some- thing perpetual, may derive their subsistence from hin, but so far as they are mor- tal, fromthe junior Gods, And that so far as one thing participates of one form they might be constituted by hin, but so far as this one is multiplied, they might derive their subsistence fromthem. For the mutation and multiplication of mor- tal natures are from many canses, and such as are moved.
Aeain, therefore, this also may be said, that the only-begotten is threefold. Por it either signifies the monad of its proper series τ according to Which signification, the form of man is monadic, and the form of horse, and every form of things of this kind. Orit signifies one thing participated by one thing, according to which signification man and horse are not monadie, but the form of the sun and the form of the moon. Or it signifies that which has no other thing co-ordinate with itself, according to which ineaning the above-mentioned natures are no longer
only-begotten, since they are co-ordinate with each “other bat whole auinal [or
Por xpayparos here, it is uccessary ty read nupayorros.
wooK 1] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 375