That however, which is most synopucal' in the words of Plato, is this, that he says animal itselfis the most beautiful, not of all intellgibles simply, but of mtelhgible animals. Por comparing all-pertect animal with more partial animals, he says, itis the most beautiful of all intelligible animals ; so that if there is some- thing more excellent: than the nature of animal, it has nothing to do with the present assertion. Tt as necessary however, that there should) be a thing of this Kind, because bemy itself, and beauty itself are more simple than the nature of animal, on which account also they are participated by things which are not animals, Moreover, the interpreters say, that the word asysinilation is appropriately assumed by Plato. For he is frequently dubious ccncerning the mode of par- teipation, Whether itis from: forms themselves being present with sensibles, or from their communmeating with them im some other way: but he is not dubious whether or not it is stmilitude which makes the sensible world to be the image of the intelligible. Dividing however, they say, that of physical forms indeed, the sensible world participates as of impressions in wax, but that it receives the representations of psychical, and the sunilitudes of intelligible forms.* So that since Plato is speaking concerning intelligible paradigms, he very properly, as they say, assumes similitude, Parther still, the world is an animal, as the image
1 Por συνεκτικωτατον here, Tread σννοπτιλωτατων.ς
* Concerning the mod > in which forms themselves are participated by sensibles, see the Notes to my
translation of the Parmenides of Plato.
Book 11. Tim.Eus of Plato. 4207
of this intelligible animal, and of intelligible allness. But it is visible as being assimilated to the splendour of its paradigm. For what colour is there, that
the visible is here.
‘The Gods adinir'd, mv ether when they saw A light unlook’d for, bursting on the view,
Prom the immortal Phanes’ glittering skin ;"
fsays Orpheus}. And the world comprebends all kindred natures, because it is comprehensive of all sensibles. But Plato adds, “as are allied to its nature,” because intelligibles are paradigms to the world of things which are according to nature, and not as some Platonists are accustomed to say, of things preterna- tural, Torin short, mundane things being divided into such as are according to na- ture, and such as are preternatural, into universals and particulars, and into essences and accidents, we always admit that there are formal causes of the more, hut by no means of the less excellent. For that which is produced from ideas, proceeds through nature. But if this is the case with that which is according to nature, but not with that which is preternatural, that which is generated from ideas is a certain whole, and is perpetual, For if this is not admitted, one of two things must take place, either that things contingent will have no existence, or that of forms some will necessarily produce, but it will happen that others may either produce or not produce. And in the third place, every thing whieh pro- ceeds from ideas is essence... Vor since they produce by their very being, each is productive of essences. For it would be ridiculous to say that a partial nature is effective of essence, but that intelligible form gives subsistence to accident? These things however, we shall elsewhere more copiously discuss. Bat what- -eyer the world contains is allied to it, because all things in it subsist according to intelligible causes. Plato likewise appears in this place to have given a definition uf the world, viz. “one visible animal, comprehending in itself all animals.” For intelligible animal also is one, but is not visible. And the sun, and each of the monadic natures, [or those natures of which there. is only one,jis one visible animal, but does not comprehend all others. So that it is evident that the above is the detinition of the universe. Let us however proceed to the words of Plato. |
* For ro ov «πεστιλβε in this place, it is necessary to read ry μὲν αἀπεστιλιβε. Ὁ For συμιλεβήκοτος evos νποστατικον, read ovp/3e/3qxoros εἰναι νποστατικον.
368 PROCLUS ON THE [oon τι.
“ Whether therefore, shall we assert that there is one world, or is it more right to say that there are many and infinite worlds ?”
This problem follows indeed logographically what has just now ' been said. For because he had detined the world to be one visible animal, comprehending within itself all such animals as are naturally allied to it, it is necessary that he should think this to be worthy his attention and discussion, whether the world is one certain thing, or not. For of physiologists, some make the world to be one; but others assert that there are many worlds; and others contend that there are not only many, but also infinite worlds. The consideration of this likewise, has a connection with what has been before said, derived from the things themselves. For since it has been shown that the world is the image of animal itself, and is an animated animal, endued with intellect, it was requisite to add a summit to the discussion of it, by showing that itis also one, For thus he will demonstrate that it isa God, in consequence of participating a unity which is above intellect. For it was not only possible for him to say that it is an image because other things also are images, some being fashioned by nature, but others by art. Nor an animal alone, because there is a multitude of partial animals, Nor alone animated; for man likewise is an image, and an animated animal. Nor alone endued with intellect; for both a demon and an angel are amimnated animals possessing intellect. But this which especially and primarily pertains to divine natures, he before suflered to be ineffable, through the cause which we have already assigned. Now, however, he adds the one, and the alone. For every thing which ts monadic in the world is divine, as being an image, if it be. lawful so to speak of ἐμὲ one. But I denominate divine, that which is such as the anzelic, as the dwemoniacal, and as that which is in partial souls. For each of these is divine, so far as it 1s suspended from its proper deity, and cach of these ts monadic. Such monadic natures however, as have generation and corruption, and are expelled into the mortal abode, are opposed to every thing divine. Hence this problem 1s suspended from what has been before said. For since the paradigm of the universe is indeed a God, and 15 intelligible, is the suppher of lite, and is also intellect ; according to that which is divine in him, he makes the world to be one; according to the one and the intelligible, he causes it to be sensible; but according to the one, the intelligible, and life, he makes it to be
* For ra νὸν here, read ra νυν».
nook 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 369
animated and an animal; and according to all these and intellect, he causes it to be endued with intellect. For union accedes prior to other things, and posterior to other things. Animal energizes prior to, and in conjunction with other thaigs, And the gift of life generates and proceeds together with, and prior to intellect.
From what however is now siown, and from what has been before demon- strated, you may assume, that at the same time, the paradigm of the universe is unical, and the whole multitude of intelligibles. And neither is the simplicity of ewithout multitude, nor the multitude of it divided; but it has the all-various at once consubsistent with ¢he one, the monadic with the all-perfect, and the uniform with the multiform. For because it proceeds indeed from the good it is united. But because it pre-establishes in itself the order of intelligible ideas, it is ἃ}}- perfect. And as infinite, it unfolds the multitude of intelligibles ; but as contained by bound, it is only begotten. As proceeding likewise from being characterized by unity, it has the relation of a monad ; but as being the third from it, it produces in itself all the intelligible Gods, and on this account is demonstrated to be all- perfect. These things, however, we shail more fully unfold as we proceed.
But there is a controversy with the interpreters about the text. For to some of them it appears that two things are now distinguished by Plato, the one, and all multitude. And the word whether being applied by the ancients to two things, seems to testify in favor of their opinion, But to others, it appears that there is a division into three things, the one, finite multitude, and the infinite. And the patrons of this interpretation are Porphyry and Jamblichus, who speak conforma- bly both to the things themselves, and to the doctrine of Plato. For shortly after he takes away two things, but assumes one thing from division. But from three things, an ablation of two and the position of one is eflected, and not from two things alone. Nevertheless the word whether’ seems to contradict what they assert. It may be remedied however by saying that cither whether signifies the same as shall we therefore ; (zw ap ow τὸ πότερον orci ταυτον) for it is frequently thus assumed by the ancients; or that the words, or not (ἢ ov) are wanting to the sentence; and that it will be perfect by reading, whether do we rightly assert that there is one world, or not? And if not, whether there arc many, or infinite worlds ? Plato omitting to ‘say this through conciseness. Perhaps too; you may say, it is not without design that he omitted the words much and finite.
* For πρότερον here, read sorcpor,
Tim. Plat. | Vou. i, ZA
870 | PROCLUS ON THE (wooK 11.
For to say how many, or so many, is to speak in a way that gives completion to what is said. And as ifthe paradigm is not monadic, s0 as to be the cause of one thing, the things generated are intinite 5 after this manner itis probable that there are infinite worlds, if there is not only one. For the vacaum being infinite, will be the recipient of infinite worlds.
“ One [i. e. there will be but one world,] if it be admitted that it is fabricated according to the paradigm.”
Again Plato in concord with himself, announces the whole of the conclusion prior to the demonstrations, previously to beltef, dissolving the doubt. For the word one is uttered analogously to, if seas generated, and to he was wood,‘ and the demonstration on account of it, is conformable to the proper method. | For it is himself who doubts, himself who dissolves the doubts, and himself who demon- strates. Through the doubt, indeed, converting himself to intelleet; but through the concise solution of the doubt, energizing according to intellect. For to com- prehend the whole of a sentence in one word, is animage of intellectual projec- tion, And through the demonstration descending from intellect to dianoia, For every one who demonstrates, receives the principles of lis demonstration from intellect. Butitis intellect, says Aristotle, by which we know terms 3 for through this we apprehend (true) beimes by simple projections, Such therefore throughout is the form of the words.
Let us, however, if you think fit, in the first place, svilogistieally survey the trath of the words themselves. The whole sentence, therefore, is of the following kind, If the world was generated according to a paradigm, and the paradigm is one, then the world is one." Bat the antecedent is true, and) therefore the consequent also is true, That the world, however, was generated according to a paradigm, was asserted before, and was mentioned both by Plato and ous. But that the paradigm is one and monadic, Plato asserts as he proceeds, ‘The assumption therefore being true, it remains to see how that which follows from it is true. He says then that if the world imitates especially and accurately the para- dizm, it ought to imitate it ino all thines, and ought to resemble the essence
of it. For if it imitates the paradigin in some things, and not in’ others,
* Instead of ro ἀγαθὸς ἣν in this place, it is requisite to read rw az ules ny.
* The words ὁ κόσμον apa ἐν ἐστιν, are omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted.