362 PROCLUS ON THE {[BooK 1,
world, and causes it to contain all sensible animals, both such as are more divine, and such as are mortal, which are properly Gzqzuara’ thremmata, or things which are nourished, as entirely participating of the nutritive soul. All bodies likewise, may properly be called Sesupara, ts being the progeny of nature, and as ulways living from, and being connected by it, even though: they should be perpetual bodies; but not as requiring externally adventitious nutriment. Unless indeed, it be requisite to call all things in the world Szeumara, us being nourished by the hing of visible natures through the communication of ight, Por Socrates in the Republic says, that the sun is the cause of nutroment and generation to all such things as he illuminates, Por every visible thing is notished bem perfected: by light, Poras we learn inthe Politious, itis possible to he nourished externally, and not only internally, Phe Demiurgus therefore, comprehends all that) the world contains, in order that this sensible world may be ἐδ πα pertect trom the parts that are in it, conformably to a sitmilitude to him, Hence, this world is a Various animal, according to a different part of itself emitting a different voice, and from all its parts one voice. For it is also one, fas well as many}. By a much greater priority however, the intelligible world is one animal and a multitude fof animals], contracting multitude in the one, just as this visible world also, exhibits the one in multitude. And the latter indeed, is a whole from parts 5 bat the former is a whole prior to parts, cxemptly, uniformly, and according to cause, comprehending intelligible antinals. Por from it the fountains of divine natures, and all the most total genera proceed. Flence also, the theologist represents it as a most tutalanimal, surrounds it with the heads of aram, a buli, a lion, and a dragon ; and ascribes to it primarily the female aud the mate, as lo the first animal.
Female and father, strong and mighty God,
ry bi ve. 4 2 Enicapxus,
says the theologist. He is likewise the first God that is represented with wings. And what occasion is there to be prolix? For if he has his progression from the primogenial egg, this fable manifests that he is the first animal, ifit is fit to pre- serve the analogy. Vor as the egg’ antecedcntly comprehends the spermatic
* The word used by Plato here for animals. * In the origival erroneously npuxe xpos.
+ For ro ev ον here, it is necessary to read ro wor.
πον τ Tim.Eus of Plato. 303
cause of the animal, thus also the occult order,‘ uniformly comprehends the whole of the intelligible. And as the animal now possesses in ἃ distributed manner, such things as were in the egg spermatically, thus likewise this God produces into a visible subsistence that which is ineffable and incomprehensible in first causes, Concerning these things however, what has now been said may suflice for the present.
If however, as this world comprehends in itself all visible natures, so its para- digm comprehends all intelligibles, and the mode of comprehension, as we have said, is different in each, yet at the same tine the visible in the former is analogous to that of the latter. For Phanes supernally illuminating intelligibles with intel- livible light, causes all of them to be visible, and exhibits all things [in the intel- ligible] generated from invisible causes ; and the world imparts visibility to bodies through the light of the stars. Farther still, this also may be considered as admirable in the doctrine of Plato, that at the same time that he preserves the union ofintelligibles unshaken, he imparts to them an unmingled purity. For if all of them were so united to each other as to be confused, and so as not to permit the peculiarity of each to remain undefiled, there would have been no occasion to enquire, according to what kind of paradizm the universe was gene- rated, Por in things confused there is no distinction of quality. And if these were so divided from each other as to be without any communion, some intel- ligibles would not comprehend, but others be comprehended. For to comprehend and be comprehended pertain to order and communion of powers, and to the -rapld conspiration of all secondary natures to become one. Moreover, for the union of them to subsist from essence, bat their separation to be rendered appa- rent from externally proceeding energies, will be the peculiarity of incorporeal and immaterial eflects. For if they are surveyed, themselves by themselves, all will be found to be in each other, on account of their being, as it were, of the same colour, and especially if the unitics of them are seen with the eye of intel- lect. But from secondary natures, and from their participants, we collect their unconfused union. Vor whence is the separation of these derived, except from the unmingled purity of their, efficient causes? For things which are confused with each other, give subsistence to other such-like natures, [i. e. to natures which ‘are similarly contused.]
* ile. The first triad of the intellicible order, which is called by Plato in the Parmenides το ¢r 11, the one being, or being characterised by, and absorbed as it were in lhc one.
404 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 1f.
“ For the divinity wishing to assimilate this universe, in the most exqui- site degree, to that which is the most beautiful, and in every respect per- fect of intelligible animals, he constituted it one visible animal, contain- ing all such things within itself, as are allied to its nature.”
Atticus, in what is here said, doubts whether the Demiurgus is comprehended by intelligible animal. For it would seem, if he were comprehended, that he is not perfect. For partial animals, he says, are imperfect, and on this account things which resemble them are not beautiful. But if he is not comprehended, animal itself will not be more comprehensive than all intelligibles. And having doubted, he easily solves the doubt, by supposing that the Demiurgus is above animal itself. On the contrary, Porphyry gives an order to the Demiurgus infe- ror to the intelligible. Bor establishing a supercelestial soul to be the inaker of the world, he places in intellect the paradigm of cenerated natures. Phe divine Iamblichus, as a medium between both these, connects and unites the paradigm to the Demiurzus, through the union of intellect with the intelligible, But Amelius makes the intelligible, which is detined according to being, to be the same with the Demiurgus."| We however say, that ammal itself is prior to, subsists in, and is posterior to the Demiurgus. For it proceeds to every intellectual order both total and partial, The Demiurgus himself likewise, sees himself, and the natures prior to himself: for it is not lawfal fur him to look to natures posterior to himself. Beholding therefore, Uhese superior natures, he produces all things, and makes the universe, so faras it is the universe, or the all, to be the image of the whole intelhi- eihle world. The Demiurzus however, is comprehended by the intelligible, accord- ine to the cause of the intellectual Gods which there subsist 5 not as beng a part, vrone species of it; but as a second order inthe order which is prior to it. Fora divine intellect is in one way said to be comprehensive of forms, and in another way to comprehend partial intellects. Foreach of the latter indeed, is all things ina self-perfect manner 5 but each of the former is united to other forms,” but is not all things. For each is itself preserving its own peculiarity, unmingled and unconfused. According to the same reasoning also, the intelligibles which are in intelliible intelleet, are comprehended by it in one way, but in another way the
intellectual orders which proceed from it. For you may say, that each of these
' Por τῷ μὲν τὸν δημιονογον in this place, itis necessary to read ry μέντοι δημιυυργῳ.
2 Por τῶν αλλων ceo here, read τοῖς ἀλλοῖς εἰδέσιν,
Slant
Dook 11.} Timus of Plato. 365
“being self-perfect, is comprehended in all-perfect animal. All such things there- fore, as are in the paradigm, are likewise in the Demiurgus ; and in making the world with reference to the paradigm, he also makes it with reference to himself. With respect to al/ness (παντοτης) however, one is intelligible, but another intellec- tual. For both the tetrad and the decad contain all things in themselves; but the former unitedly, and the latter distnbutedly. The decad likewise, though it con- tains all such things as the tetrad contains, yet because it contains them in a more divided manner, itis more imperfect than the tetrad. For the tetrad being nearer to the monad is more perfect; and in proportion as quantity is diminished, the Inagnitude of power is increased. So that the Demiurgus possessing ἈΠῸ such things as intelligible animal possesses, yet at the same time, he has an allness inferior to that which is intelligible. In short, as comprehension is twofold, the one being such as that of parts in their wholeness, but the other, as that of effects in their causes, Plato now assumes the former of these, and says, that the genera and species ofanimals, are comprehended as parts in their whole, i. ον in animal itself ; all which likewise, he denominates imperfect, as with reference to the whole. But the Demiurgus indeed, proceeds from thence as from a cause, yet he likewise possesses all things intellectually. The Demiurgus therefore, is comprehended by intelligible animal according to the reason of cause, and is not so compre- hended as a part, so as to be also imperfect. Hence likewise, Timzus in a cer- tain respect thus speaks. For the Demiurgus has all intelligible animals compre- hended in himself. For in reality, these are contained in him as parts, which remain in unproceeding union with their proper wholeness, and give completion to it, as a whole which is not prior to parts, but is from parts. And thus much in answer to the doubt.
In the next place, this also deserves to be surveyed, viz. in what an admirable manner Plato, at one time ina way known to us, passes from images to para- dizms, and at another time, from paradigms to images; at one and the same time indicating the connexion of things, and their progressions and conversions. For when he says, that as this world comprehends us, thus also animal itself comprehends intelligible animals, he recurs from sensible animals to the causes of them. But when he says, that divinity wishing to assimilate the world to the most beautiful of intelligibles, rendered it comprehensive of all things, he is willing to pass from causes to their effects, imitating the progression of secondary natures. He is led however, to such a transition as this, through analogy. For as effects are to each other, so are the paradigms of them. And the more total and the more partial,
366 PROCI.US ON THE [Βοοκ 11.
subsist in both according to the same ratio. Why however, does he call animal itself the most beautiful of intelligibles, though it is the end of intelligibles? May we not say, that though there are intelligible orders prior to it, yet the most beautiful is inferior to them?) For they do not participate of beauty ; but the producing cause of beauty, and the first beauty and elegance subsist in them. Hence also animal itself is according to Orpheus, intellectually unfolded into lightin this order. And as beauty had a prior existence in che first intelligibles, unitedly and without inter- mission, hence Phanes is called by Orpheus, “the very beautiful son of ether,” and * delicate Love.” Because therefore, this God is the first that is filled with oceult and ineffable beauty, hence also he is denominated most beautiful, being the first of participants, though all intelligibles are united to each other. For it is not proper to divide them from each other, after the same manneras the intellectual orders, but survey one and an indivisible union of them. These things therefore, are beautifally asserted (by Orpheus and Plato.