The words however, {in the form of a part,” may be easily understood, if they are considered as signifying the same as, in the order of a part. And this is the same with, fecoming a part. But the divine Tamblichas thinks fit to add the conjunction «sto the words inthe form, and to understand the whole as implying that every partial animal in intelligibles, naturally exists as in the form of a part. For since part in them is not such as it is in sensibles 3 since each is there accord- ing to its own order all such things as the whole is; on this account the philoso- pher adds, asin the form, in order that surveying the appellation of part ina manner adapted to forms, we may not understand it as a thing attended with interval, and susceptible of division, and thus relinquish the union of united and impartible essences. For these according to the philosopher himself are impart- ible and united. But with respect to the word “ naturally,” we wust not now under- stand by it according to nature, but the being cssentalized. For all essences ure Sroquently called natures, as by Socrates in the Philebus, when he says,“ hence, in the nature of Jupiter you may say, that there isa royal soul, and a royal intellect, according to the reason of cause.” But the words, “ he thought it would be adequate touts divnity,’ are said as if spoken in conjunction with the Demiurgus, and as truly apprehending the dignity of a divine cause. For he who mystically narrates the evempt and all-perfect intellectual conceptions of a divine nature, has an arrange- ment in conjunction with him. And the words, “ for that which is similar to an im- perfect thing can never be beautiful,” is indeed true, but is attended with a doubt.
358 PROCLUs ON THE [BOOK II,
For if in that whichis a whole one thing 15 more, but another less excellent, must not the whole become inferior to its more excellent part, by the addition of that which is less excellent? But the doubt may be solved by observing, that the co-arrangement of the less with the more excellent makes the whole to be one and perfect, but when they are not conzlomerated with cach otber, then the mixture of the less diminishes the power of the more excellent nature, If however, some one should make a syllogism from opposites, through what is here, and what has been before said, so as to infer that every thing which is generated according to an eternal, is not generated according to an eternal paradigm, we may solve the objection by observing that what 15 employed by the objector as the middle term, isnot so. For in one place, the words “in order that it might be beautiful,” ma- nifest that which is beautiful, whether ina certain respect, or simply ; but in another place, they manifest that which is most beautiful. For a part has indeed the beauty of a part, but simply considered, is not beautiful. But that alone is absolutely beautiful which is a whole, to which also the beauty of the parts contributes 5 this beauty pertaining to certain things, and being itself a cer- fain (and not atoiversal) thing. For every part is for the sake of another thing, 1. δὶ the whole, and the beauty which it possesses has the order of matter with reference to the beauty of the whole. Hence itis not so beautiful as to be most beautiful. From what has been said, those assertions Likewise may be confuted, which mnake the good to be a certain intelligible form and not prior to all intelligibles. For if it is a certain form, itis also a part of the whole intelligible profundity in which it subsists. But every part, as it is here said, is imperfect; so that the good likewise is imperfect. How therefore being imperfect is it the most happy of all things? In reality also that which is sinjjlar to it is not beautiful. Nor are all beings similarly with reference to it, either more good, more beautiful. “Uf therefore the good being a part, will suffer things of this 7 it will not be a part of the intelligible. Moreover, neither 15 it the whole of the intelligible. For being the whole of the intelligible, over what will it still reign? = Since neither is the sun which has an arrangement analogous to the good" the whole of that which is visible. It is necessary therefore, that the good should be beyond the intelligible, and be neither a part nor the whole of it. Neither therefore, will either animal itself, or the Demiurgus be the same with ¢he good ; since each of
these is a certain whole comprehensive of all forms.
* For τ᾽ ἀγαθὸν bere, read τ᾽ αγαῦφ.
een] TIMEUS OF PLATO. 359
“ But we should admit it to be the most similar of all things to that animal of which other animals, both according to one, and according to genera, are parts.”
Some, as Atticus, assert that this “ according to one, andaccording to genera,” gives a division to individual opposite to that of more common forms. But they call individual forms those that are proximate, and the causes of individuals; such for instance as man itself, horse itself, and each of such-like forms. And they denominate genera the more total and comprehensive paradigms of these. Others again, as Amelius, say that Plato by these words, distinguishes that which is particular from things that are more common. For some things are paradigms of parts, but others of forms, Theodorus also, following Amelius, says there are twofold intellects, one of these being divided into wholes, but the other into parts. And that these are the same with, “ according to genera, and according to one.” But others, as Nenarchus, assert, that according to genera inanifests the pre-existent intelligible causes of animals; such for instance as the celestial, aerial, aquatic and terrestrial, which are shortly after mentioned by Timeus. And that by “ according to one,” the formalizing principles in each of these many are indicated. For in celestial natures, the paradigm of the sun is different from the paradigm of the moon. In terrestrial natures, the paradigm of men is different from that of ions. And in a similar manner in the natures which have an intermediate subsistence. The divine Iamblichus however, turns into a path of interpretation contrary to all these. For they indeed make the “ accord- ing to one,” subordinate to, and more partial than, “ according to genera ;” but he, on the contrary, makes it to be more venerable, as it is fit that in intelligibles unity should precede multitude. He says therefore, that all other animals are the parts of animal itself, both according to one, and according to genera. For they are comprehended and perfected by animal itself, both according to the multitudes they contain, and according to their unities. Nor is there any one of them which does not proceed from the intelligible. For intelligible animal is com- prehensive of all the things posterior to it, not as deriving its completion from them. For itis a whole prior to,’ and does not derive its subsistence from parts. Nor is it a whole, as being predicated of parts; for it is the cause of the many. But it is
* Intelligible animal, or animal itself, isa whole prior to parts, because it comprehends parts in itself causally,
360 PROCLUS ON THE [rook 1.
a whole, as a primordial principle, and as filling all things posterior to itself with itself. Hence it comprehends what are called parts tinpartibly, many species uniformly, and exists in an all-perfeet manner prior to secondary paradigms. For this principle indeed, is the universe intelligibly ; but of the natures posterior to it, one is all things celestially, another atter a solar, another after a terrestrial manner, and another in some other way, according to the different causes of mundane natures. So that this principle comprehends all things all-perfeetly, but all things are comprehended by each of the natures posterior to it partially, as with reference to the intelligible allness. The world therefore, is also similar to these partial animals ; since itis likewise similar to the Demiurgus ; but it is most similar to animal itself, so far as it is an animal. For animal itself was primary intelligible animal. Henee, that which is most similar is so ina two- fold respect; either because it is similar to other things, or because other things are similar to it. But this is especially the case with the universe, and it is espe- Gially similar to animal itself.
* For this indeed, has all intelligible animals comprehended in itself, just as this world contains us, and such other animals as are the objects . μὲ ” of sight.
Plotinus supposes animal itself to exist ina twofold respect. For atone time he considers it to be more excellent than intellect, as in his treatise intitled Different Considerations, but at another, aa inferior to it, as in his treatise Coucern- ing Numbers, when he says that being ts first, afterwards intellect, and afterwards animal itself. But Theodorus, who says, that each of the demiurgt has a triples hyparxis, thinks fit to call the third in each, animal itself. From both, however, the truth may be assumed. From the admirable Theodorus indeed, that it has the third order in intelligibles; but from the most divine Plotinus, that it is inferior to one intellect, but beyond another. And it must be said, that unfold- ing itselfanto light at the end of intelligibles, it generates from intelligible life all the number of intellectual, supermundane, and mundane animals, supernally as αν ἀν τὸ the last of things. Tt is likewise comprehensive of all things, being ex- empt from, and uniformly and antecedently containing ta itsclf{ the causes of them, For Orpheus also indicates things of this kind about it, when theologizing
* For τρίτην here, it is necessary to read rpm Nyy.
βοοκ 1] Tim-Eus of Plato. 361
concerning Phanes. The first God therefore, with him, has the heads of many animals, viz. of aram, a bull, a serpent, and a fierce lion." He also proceeds from the primogenial egg, in which the animal exists spermatically ; and Plato knowing this calls this mighty God animal itself. For what difference is there between calling an occult cause an egg, or that which is unfolded into light from it, an animal? For what can be generated from the exg of all things, but an animal? This egg however, was the offspring of ether and chaos, the former of which is established conformably to the bound, but the latter to the infinity of intelligibles. For the former is the root of all things, but the latter has not any boundary. If therefore that which first consists of bound and infinity is that which is primarily being, the being of Plato will be the same with the Orphtc egg. And if Phanes is from this, who is arranged according to animal itself, it is necessary to investigate it as sitnated next to eternity according to Orpheus, which is a medium between animal itself, and that which is primarily being.’ And thus it will be more clearly evident, that animal itself is no other than the Phanes of the theologist. For if Phanes first proceeds from the egg, which is manifestly with Orpheus the first intelligible intellect, but that which first and alone proceeds from an egg, is necessarily nothing else than an animal, it is evi- dent that the most mighty Phanes is nothing else than the first animal; and, as Plato would say, animal ttself. This therefore is demonstrated.
Let us however, in the next place, survey what is consequent to this. Phanes, therefore, thus unfolding himself into light from the occult Gods, antecedently comprehends in himself the causes of the secondary orders, viz. of the effective, connective, perfective, and immutable orders; and also contains in himself according to one cause, all intelligible animals. For he excites himself to the most total ideas of all things. Hence also, he is said (by Orpheus] to be the first of the Gods, and to have a form. But he produces all things, and unfolds the intelligible and united’ causes of things, to the intellectual Gods. Hence too, the Demiurgus being filled from these causes, gives subsistence to this visible
* This is an Orphic line, which is not noticed cither by Gesner or Hermann in their collection of Ormhic fragments. It is however in the printed original in a defective state: for it is, cae cas Tarptovs opias, χαροπον re λέοντος. But from Eschenbach, who quotes it from ἃ manuscript, it may be amended as follows: κριὸν καὶ ravpov, opios, yaporow re eovros.
* Itis here necessary to supply the words τὸν xpwrws ovros.
Σ For ηνωμενὼν in this place, it is obviously necessary to read ἤνωμενα, in order to agree with acria.
sim, Fisk , Vo. I. 2Z