as in intellectuals; but in another vitally. And thus in each of the intellects
there is intelligible animal, subsisting appropriately in each. For every intellect
has a conjoined intelligible. Very properly therefore, does Plato investigate
what kind of animal is the paradigm of the universe, whether it is super-mundane,
or intellectual only, or intelligible, and at the same time intellectual, or intelligible
only. For the nature of animal’ proceeds according to all the orders of intellect.
But Plato admits that the differences always subsist in the first animal itself: according to union, and gives a progression to them according to appropriate
numbers. For as the first animalis tetradic, thus a different animal is defined
according to a diflerent number. And in those things in which there is the same
number, in these there is a variety of subsistence according to the peculiarities of animals, Lor itis necessary that in animal also, there should be the monadic
prior to the multiplied ; because this * is more allied to (he onc. And universally,
every divine multitude begins from a monad. As therefore, the Demiurgus is the
monad of all eflective causes, though the effective peculiarity is in many Gods,
thus also animal itself is the monad of all animals; in which Tihewise the most
total paradigms of mundane natures, and the one cause of the whole world pre-
eNist.
Whi. however, some one may say, does Plato call the intelligible paradigm animal? Because itis the supplier of life, as T have before observed 5 and because it generates the causes of the whole vivilie series, and the fountains themselves of lite. Because likewise, itis replete with the first and intelligible life. For the one being, or being characterized by the one, is beyond life. But the middle order of intellizibles is the first life, and is one and infinite. Animal itself) how- ever, being full of intelligible life, is very properly called animal. For as it is eternal, on account of being filled from eternity, thus also it is aw animal, on account of its reception of life. For it ts intelligible, as being arranged [immedi- ately} after intelligible lite. Tt is therefore called an animal, not as sensitive, nor as having impulse, but as being vital. For every thing which lives, is according to Plato, an animal.‘ For because it has life, says Timeus, it may be justly called ananimal.” Hence also, Plato calls plants and seeds animals, characterizing the
' For ἢ τὸν vow gums here, it is necessary to read ἡ τὸν ὥνου peas. * For roury here, read τοῦτον
Zim. Plat. Vor. J. Ye ὦ
554 PROCLUS ON THE acne,
animal by vitality. If therefore, the intelligible paradigm lives, as being eternal ; for eternity, as Plotinus says, is the life of all things, so that the eternal lives κα and if every thing that lives is an animal, hence the intelligible paradigm is an animal. And you may from hence assume that this paradigm is in the third trad of intelligibles. For it ig not in the first triad; for this is prior to life. Nor is it in the second ; for this is life. Hence it isin the third. For it does not exist out of intelligibles; since Plato on this' account alone calls the paradigm intelli- gible, though he knew the super-mundane demiurgic intellect. But neither does he call the latter intellizible, nor the former intellectual. Before therefore, he assumed every thing which perpetually exists as the paradigm of all generation ; among which eternally existing beings, animal itself and the Demiurgus are included ; for each of these always is. Eternity likewise, which is the first thing that always is, and the one being itself, which is eternal being according to cause, are in the number of eternally existing beings. Now, however, he calls animal itself the paradigin of the world considered as living. Fur perpetual being was the paradigm of disorderly generation ; since from thence, forms without distinction, were present with the disorderly nature, prior to the generation of the universe. But though we should assume animal itself, which has the forms of the elements, this also is te paradigm of the vestizes of the elements. So far, however, as it 1s animal, it is the paradigm of this universe now possessing life. So that simply considered, animal itself, and the intelligible paradigm are not the same. For eternity like- wise, which always exists, is the paradigm of time, but is not an intelligible animal 5 since not every paradigin is an animal belonging to the intelligible order. But if animal itself is eternal, eternity is prior to it, whichis not an animal, For prior to animal itself, there is no other animal ; since neither prior to any other of those things to which we apply the term itself, is there a certain -form prior to it. As there- fore, eternity is prior to animal itself, not being yet an animal, so hkewise, being itself is prior to eternity. Hence also eternity is that which is being, and is a certain being, Animal itself therefore, is the third intelligible triad, concerning which the (Chaldean] Oracles say, “ It is the operator, and the giver of life- bearing fire. It fills the vivific bosom of Hecate,? and pours on the Synoches the fertile strength (in fireendned with mighty power.” For all these assertions in no respect differ frorn saying that all-perfect intelligible animal is the fountain of all intellectual
’ For δια re here, it is necessary to read δια rovro.
? For exaorns here, read Exarns.
nook 11. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 335
lite, and the cause of every paradigmatic hyparxis, And thus much concerning
this particular.
With respect to the words of the text, “fo constitute in the similitude,” manitests that the universe is in the highest degree assimilated to its paradigm. For not every image is constituted in similitude, but that alone which is perfectly similar ; since this is not the case, where dissimilitude predominates. Vor then similitude is not the end. But the words, “the constituting artificer constituted,” clearly de- monstrate to us, that the Demiurgus of the universe makes by his very being, and. possesses energy essentially, For Plato does not call him in one way, and the effective energy proceeding from him in another, but he calls both by one name. Farther still, the words likewise appear to signify, that the Demiurgus always produces, and that he always produces perfectly. Tor the word constitu- ting, Manifests an ever-present making; but the word constituted, an all-perfect making, and which is suspended from its cause. But by the conjunction of both these expressions, itis very manifest that the maker of the universe generates eternally all things, his productive energy neither commencing, nor ending at
a certain time,
“ We must not therefore assert, that he thought it would be adequate to its dignity, to assimilate it to any one of the animals which naturally exist in the form of apart. For that which is similar to an impertect thing, can never at any time become beautiful.”
As there are many intelligible animals, some of which are more total, but others more partial,’ some of which are united, but others disided, and some are detined according to bound, but others according to infinity; Plato inquiring what the all-perfect paradigm of the universe is, and from what intelligible animal the world is suspended, thinks that no partial animal ought to be placed in this order. For each of these is imperfect as with reference to the whole. For it is possible for the imperfect to be so called in a twofold respect, either with refer- ence to its own nature, or with reference to that which is better and more causal, And the former indeed, it is not even lawful to conceive of divine natures. For each has the measure of itself eternally, and its own proper good always exerted. For, as Socrates says in the Republic, each of them is most excellent in its own
‘It is obviously necessary in this place, to supply the words, των δὲ μερικωτερων.
356 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.
order. But the latter ranks, as it is said, among the things that are usual. For as in the Banquet, Plato calls that which is not primarily beautiful, but participates of beauty, indigent of beauty, thus also he calls that an imperfect animal which is not the first animal, nor animal itself, but is such by participation, and subsists according to a progression from that which is first. If therefore, every partial animal is imperfect, but the paradigm of the world is all-perfect, the paradizm of the world will not be a partial amimal. Por whether does the Demiurgus intellee- tually perceive this all-perfect and first animal, or not? It is impossible indeed, that he should not intellectually perceive those things which we perceive when our soul energizes intellectually. But if he thus sees it, and all intellectual perception
of the Demiurgus is production or making, it is necessary that he should make:
δ; by intellectual perception itself. What therefore can he make more divine than the universe? For he will not make any thing of a less excellent nature, when looking to that which is more excellent. Very properly therefore, does Plato when investizating the paradigmatic principle of the world, recur to all-perfect animal,
What then, some one may say, are not the sun and moon and each of the stars beautiful? But how is this possible? For each of these is assimilated to a partial animal. To this we reply, that each of these is beautiful, when surveyed in con- junction with the whole, and co-arranged with the whole: just as the eye and the chin are beautiful, in conjunction with the whole face, and while in the whole ; but surveyed by themselves apart from the face, do not extibit the beauty which is adapted to them. For in subsisting as a part and not as a whole, cach when essentially divulsed fromthe whole, sutters a diminution of its own proper beauty. The pertect therefore, and the beautiful are present with these which are parts, on account of the whole. ‘The cause, however, of this, says Porphyry 15, that in intelligible forms the part isa whole.t | For all such things are in each partially, as are in the whole all-perfectly, on account of the union of intelligible forms. And the asseruon is indeed true, that each of the parts in them is in a certain respect a whole, each receiving the form of whole, and becoming essentially united on account of its Communicating with all, and being all things according to participation. Nevertheless the wholeness of it subsists partially, and not like that wholeness which is simply a whole. For itis one thing to be alter a solar manner a whole, or to be so after a lunar manner, in consequence of cach.
* Instead of ro cNoy μέρὺς ἐστιν, it is necessary to read ro pepos ὑλὺν Core.
Book I] Timmus of Plato. 357
intellect possessing all things ina way adapted to itself, one form having dominion, which makes the intellect to be such an intellect, and a certain intellect; and ano- ther thing to be all things, without a partial peculiarity, being all things so far asin- tellect, and not so far asa particular kind of intellect. What) then, are not these also generated according to intelligible paradigms, viz. the san and moon and each of the stars? How therefore, are these beautitul? To this we reply, that these are beautiful, but not most beautiful. Butthe world is that which is truly most beautifal. As therefore each of these is perfect, but not all-perfect, so likewise each is beautifal, but not ke the universe most beautiful. For that each of these is perfect, Plato manifests farther on, when he says, “ that the world was generated perfect from things perfect, anda whole framwholes.” Uence the perfection of the whole is one thing, and ofthe part another. And the wholeness of the all-perfect is different from the wholeness of that which is only perfect. The beauty likewise which is in the most beautiful is one thing, but that which receives a more partial partict- pation of beauty, is another. And thus much in answer to this doubt.