Moreover, in the third place, if? the universe is always arranged, and if all things are co-ordinated to well-being, and there is nothing adventitious in’ the polity of the world, intellect governs the world. For the connexion, the order, and the sacred Jaws of the natures contained in it, bring with them manifest syinbols of intellectual government. Aristotle also, in another way shows this, when he says that of animated natures, animals have the left hand and the right, but plants have the upwards and downwards, and also the meht hand and the left, so that the world is animated and an animal. But it is likewise endued with intellect. Por that which moves itis intellect. According to both plilo- sophers therefore, the world is an animal animated and endued with intellect ; except indeed, that according to Aristotle, it is animated, as having an insepa- rable lite; for he does not admit that 1 has an intellectual soul, bat that it has an intellect above soul, and which is essentially suspended from another intelli gible animal For what) Plato calls animal itself, he calls eternal animal, as an his Metaphysics, when he says, “ We say that God ts an eternal animal.” And in short, since there are in the world things that are moved, and things that are immoveable, things which are always one or the other of these, and things which
are sometimes in motion, and sometimes are tmmoveable, itis necessary that the
' Ttis necessary here, to supply ra Oynra.
* Fe is omitted here in the orginal.
‘Timeus of Plato. 349
Rook 11.}
causes of both these should preside over the world. Soul therefore is the cause of motion; on which eccount also Plato in the Laws admitting [for the sake ot arument] the universe to be immoveable, gives motion to it by the introduction of soul, Andinthe Phaedrus taking away soul, he makes all things to stand still. But itis evident that intellect belongs to immoveable natures. And beings that are always moved, are moved about those that are immoveable, and on accomnt of the permaneney of the latter, the former are perpetually moved. Hleuce it entirely follows, that there is a mundane intellect above soul. By no means therefore, must that which Chrysippus devised, be ascribed to the world. For he confounded imparticipable with participable * causes, by sup- posing them to be the same with each other, and also the divine, and the intellee- tual, the immaterial and the material. For the same God, and who according to him is the tirst God, pervades through the world, and through matter, and is both soul and nature inseparable from the subjects of his government. Plato how- ever, establishing prior to the whole world three causes, goodness, intelligible animal, and the demiurgic intellect, imparts from these to the world in the first place, a perfect intellect always fixed in energy, exempt from matter, and full of undefiled intellections. In the second place, a divine intellectual soul, evolving the essence of this one intellect, dancing round it, and convolving the universe. In the third place, a union of the total essences in the world, and one deity and eoodness, connecting all the mundane multitude, and causing itto be one. And in the fourth place, a providence extending to all things its inspective care, sub- sisting likewise from itself, and causing itself to be exempt trom all the subjects of its government.
Since however, as we have before observed, it is necessary to survey the pro- cressions and the conversions of wholes, both these are accomplished by Plato. For he delivers the progressions of them when he says that the Demiurgus placed intellect in soul, and soul in body ; but their conversions, when beginning from the world, he calls itan animal animated, and endued with intellect, and con- nects it through soul with intellect, which is the peculiar work of conversion. And in the last place, he reiers the composition of the world to the demuiurgic providence, through which conversion is imparted to all things. For goodness indeed, unites the Demiurzgus to te exe. But will supplies wholes with good. And providence converts all things to de good. For, as we have said, goodness is
* [tis necessary liere to supply καὶ peGexras.
450 PROCLUs ON THE [Βοοκ lt,
analogous to essence, will to power, and providence to energy ; because the first indeed, establishes all things; the second moves them to progression; and the third recalls them according to the retrogression of all things to that which is prior to intellect. If however, the Demiurgus adorns the universe on account of coodness, but through adorning it causes it to possess intellect, and to be animated, and doing these things, eflects them on account of providence, (for these were generated through the providence of God)—if this be the case, itis necessary that it should be the same thing to produce onaccount of goodness as on account of provi- dence. And this very properly, because providence is the energy of goodness. So that according to Plato, providence is nothing else than an energy conformable to good, For in our concerns also, we say that to provide for some one, is to be the cause of good to the object of our pros idential care. Not only, therefore, must provi- dence be detined to be that which converts all things to the first, but also to be that the energy of which extends to all things, and which adorns all things according to one union. And this is in reality providence, the communication of good to all things, the conversion of all things to and the participation of the wiver (of every good), who imparts to every thing that which it is able to receive. It is requisite likewise to remember what the Cheronean (Plutarch) says about the name of providence, as that which Plato exhorts us to conceive of as something divine. If also the Demiurgus is intellect, and providence so far as he has something which is better than intellect, he has deservedly this name, on account of an energy which is above intellect. For all things aspire after good, but all things do not aspire after intellect. For such things as are perfectly destitute of intel- lect do not desire it, lest their desire should be in vain, or they should be deprived of the end [which is their proper good}. And because he is providence indeed, he is suspended from the good itself; but because he is intellect be is suspended from the first intellect, For the first intellect (i.e, Saturn] is not that which intel- lectually sees and fabricates, but that which alone intellectually perceives; and on this account, it is a pure intellect, as we learn from the Cratylus. Hence also, according to Plato, the latter may be said to be orice," as having one energy directed to himself: bat the former Gece, dogethor with ΠΝ energy ΘΟ ΟΝ ing also w power fabricative of the universe, and not: only lovinhatively regulating: things, posterior to himself, but also abiding in his own accustomed manner, as Plato says shortly after.
* Proclus says this, alluding to the Chaldean oracles, in which Saturn is called ence beyond, and Jupiter twice beyond.
Book 11.} Timzus of Plato. 351
“This being determined, let us consider what is consequent to these things; viz. according to the similitude of what animal, the constituting artificer constituted the world.”
Plato clearly exhibits to us through what is here said the connexion of the problems, and the suspension of secondary from primary natures. For the words, “ this being determined,” and ‘ let us consider what is consequent to these things,” indicate the connexion of what has been with what will be said; and that through the truth of the former, the latter receive the principle of investigation. For since it has been shown that the universe was rendered an animal conformably to the providence of God, it is necessary that it should be assimilated to intelligi- ble animal. For where did the Demiurgus look when he made the world to be an animal, except to the intelligible? Por it was one of the things pre-demon- strated, that the world being most beautiful, was generated according to an eternal paradigm. If therefore, the Demiurgus making it to be an image of the intelligible, constituted it an animal, the paradigm itself will be an intelligible animal, For if that was not an animal, how could that which was generated an image of itt be rendered an animal? For so far as it is similar to that, it was gene- rated an animal. For it is sensible indeed, not as similar and separate [but as visible and tangible}. These however, (i. e. visibility, and tangibility,] it obtains through a corporeal nature. But it is an animal, as being similar to intelligible animal. And if itis similar, it is from thence allutted the morphe of animal. For images also, have not only their forms, but their appellations, so far as they are formalized, from their paradigms. So that if life 15 imparted to the world through the paradigm, it is also similarly called an animal and animated from it, because the cause of its whole animation pre-exists in intelligibles. For the same reason likewise, itis endued with intellect. It may however, in a greater degree be called an animal, on account of the most principal cause, because the paradigm is the cause of animation, of the supply of intellect, and as I may say, of all life. For every thing enducd with intellect, is also animated, and every thing animated ts also an anunal ; but the converse is not true. For every animal is not animated. For that
* Instead of πως τον ro exewo yeyovos εἰκων in this place, it is necessary to read πων τὸ κει ον yeyorns «ιλων.
* The words αλλ᾽ ws eparov καὶ axroy are omitted in the original, but, as it appears to me, ought to be inserted,
452 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 11.
which participates of a rational soul is animated. Nor ts every thing which is. animated endued with intellect. For the genus of men that participate of intellect,
is small ; so that animal 1s more comprehensive than all the rest. And with those
things indeed, with which the rest are present, animal also is present; but it is
not necessary that the rest showld be inherent in those things with which this is
present, That however, which iy more comprehensive, is nearer to the first prin-
ciple. But that which is nearer? to it, is of a more causal nature, since the first
principle 15 the cause of all beings. That Plato also? not only knew intelligible animal, but also the intelligible animated, ἰδ manifest from what he says in the Sophista, Por placing tite and soul in being, and wishing likewise to give to it motion, he adds, * But that which hay intellect and soul, if it ts not animated, must
remain entirely immoveable.” Wence there are, intelligible life, and intelligible animal; the cause of soul, and the animated ; the cause of intellect, and that
which is endued with intellect. And animal itself is beyond all the intelligible paradigms. Hence, Plato says, that the discussion of the similitude of the world to intelligible animal, is consequent to the problem concerning the composition of it. For because the universe being assimilated according to the form itself of similitude, was rendered an animal by the Demiurgus, ἐλ may more properly be called an animal, with reference to which the aniverse was generated an animal. For it exists as an animal on account of the intelligible, and not on account of that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner. [1 ts necessary however, that animal should be present with the universe, either from matter or from form; so that if the world is not an animal from its subject matter, itis so from form. If however from form, that which is primanly animal
is the cause to it of form.
It remains therefore, to survey in the next place after this problem, to what animal the universe is assimilated. For that it is assimilated, is evident from what has been already said, but to what it 15 assimilated, must next be con- sidered. For there is a multitude of intelligible animals, which Plato also indi- cating, inquires to what animal the Demiurgus constituted the world similar. Por beginning supernally from intelligibles, animal proceeds through all the middle
orders τ in one of these orders, subsisting intelligibly alone; in another intelligibly
" For avOpwxwe yap yevos, poayyu ἐστιν οὐ μετέχον, it is necessary to read, αὐ flpwawy yap 7Ev0s, ἤραχυ ἐστιν του vou μετέχον. Vor Plato says this in the latter part of this Dialogue.
* For αλλον here, it is obviously requisite to read ey yurepor.
nook We] TIMEUS OF PLATO, 353
indeed, but as in intelligibles and intellectuals ; and) in another intellectually
alone. And in one of these orders indeed, animal subsists intellizibly alone, but