Nor docs Plato speak after this manner, and Orpheus after another; but fit be reyuisite to give my opinion, the conceptions of the theologist become manifest through what is here said. For Ippa who is the soul of the universe, and is thus called by the theologist, perhaps because her intellectual conceptions are essentialized in the most vigorous motions, or perhaps on aceount of the most rapid lation of the universe, of which she is the cause,—placing a testaceous vessel on her head, and encircling the fig leaves that bind her temples, with a drazon, receives Dionysius (or Bacchus}. For with the most divine part of her- self, she becomes the receptacle of an intellectual essence, and receives the mun- dane intellect, which proceeds into her from the thigh of Jupiter. For there it was united with Jupiter, but proceeding from thence and becoming participable by her, it clevates her to the intelligible, and to the fountain of her nature. For she hastens to the mother of the Gods, and to mount Ida," from which all the series of souls is derived, Hence also, Ippa is said to have received Dionysius when he was brought forth from Jupiter. For as Plato before observed, it is im- possible fur intellect to accede to any thing without soul, But this is similar to what is asserted by Orpheus ; by whom also Dionysius is called the sweet offspring of Jupiter. This however, isthe mundane intellect, which proceeds into light conformably to the intellect: that abides in Jupiter. hus too, the di- vinely-delivered theology [of the Chaldeans] says, that the world derives its com- pletion from these three things (viz. from intellect, soul amd body}. Soul there- fore says [in the Chaldean Oracles,] concerning Jupiter fabricating the universe : +} soul reside after the paternal conceptions, hot, and animating all things.’ For the father of Gods and men placed our intellect in soul, but soul he deposited in sluggish body.” Plato likewise, bears testimony tu the Oracles, when he calls the Demiurgus father, and represents him yvenerating souls, and sending them into the generation of men according to the first life. And thus much concerning these particulars. Since however, us we have said, both soul and intellect give completion to one animal, Plato appears tome to use very appropriately the words to constitute and co-fabricate, through the common preposition σὺν in both,
* For Aawy in this place, 1 read Aueor. 2 je. To the region of ideas, and an intelligible nature,
3 For θερῴηχόνσα here, read θερμὴ ψυχώνσα.
soon kl TIMEUS OF PLATO. 519
exhibiting the union of the universe. For by always making diviner to be more comprelensive than less excellent natures, he causes the world to become one ; but through the forms in each he manifests in the one composition, but in the other
demiurgic art.
“Tn order that itmight become most beautiful according to nature, and the most excellent work.”
In what is here said, Timeus recurs to the principle from which all the before- mentioned particulars were deduced. For the world has arrangement on aecount of soul, soul subsists on account of intellect, but intellect: proceeds into the uni- verse on account of intelligible beauty, and the world participates of this in order that it may also participate of the one ; and this is the end to it of its composition, that it may be rendered most beautiful and the best. But it becomes most beau- tiful indeed, on account of the beautifying cause which subsists in the intelligible, but the best, or most excellent, on account of the fountain of good. For the good is the most excellent of all things. And through all these, the world becomes most similar to the Demiurgus. For he was called by Timaus most excellent. IIe however, is the best of demiurgic causes, just as the good is simply most excel- lent, existing beyond all the divine causes. But the world is the most excellent work, for itis a fabrication. Vor here also the world participates of deity ; since the goodness which is above intellect is deity ; and on this account the world ts denominated most excellent. In an admirable manner Plato likewise, does not -peak of the deity of the world in the same way as concerning intellect and soul, viz. as acceding after intellect. For the union of intellect with its proper deity is ineflable, and itellect itself being divine proceeds from the father, which also is the peculiarity of total production. For as intellect indeed, it derives its subsis- tence from the total fabrication, but as a divine intellect, from deity.’ Plato therefore, does not make a division into deity and intellect, in consequence of constituting the intellect of the world from the father. What however, is the ~ meaning here of according to nature? Perhaps this is significant of order, according to which the universe is likewise enabled to participate of divine beauty ; and there- fore will be the same with according to order. Perhaps also it manifests to us, that
* Instead of axo rns odns hicre, I read axorys Ocoryros.
Tim. Plat. Vou. 1, +e ξ ;
the Demiurgus makes by his very being, and produces both intellect and soul from his essence. And it is not improbable that it is used, because this fabrica- tion, the universe, is complicated with nature, and the most beautiful here is not of such a kind as that which 15. better than nature ; but that which is above nature, is as it were mingled with nature, and intellectual with physical entities.
‘Thus therefore, it is necessary to say, according to assimilative rea- soning, that this world was gencrated an animal, possessing in trath for reality) soul and intellect through the providence of God.”
As the world itself is mingled, being composed of images and divine essences, of physical and supernatural things, thus also Plato calls the discussion of it assi- milative, and again truth. For according to that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, it requires assimilative reasoning, but according to the intellectual essence which is init, it requires truth, and also according to the divine cause from which it proceeds. Hence Plato, when about to speak con-
cerning the world adds the word assiuilative, or probable, but the word truth,
when about to speak concerning the providence of divinity, Farther still, you may perceive both assimilation and trathin the speaker himself; not only dividing these conformably to the nature of things. For he frequently apprehends the fubrication of things in a partible manner, assuming reasonings, divisions and com-
positions, though all things subsist at once in divine production, And frequently, ᾿
he recurs to the whole intelligence of the father, asin the axioms, ‘de was good,” and “it netther was nor will be lawful for that which is most excellent to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful.” Vor in the former of these his appre- hension is assimilative [but in the latter, comes into contact with truth). For from the multiform knowledges that are in us, he indicates what pertains to divine and demiurgic intelligence. But how, say they, dues he detine the universe to be an animal animated, or possessing soul, and endued with intellect ; for it seems indeed, that ἀνέρα is a certain part, but anated agenus? In answer to this, it is necessary to recall to our memory those Platonists who say, that animal extends as far as to plants themselves, and to sce how, according to. this ductrines every thing animated is an animal, but not every animal is animated. For intelligible animal is beyond the causes of soul. For as Plato calls the ra- tional soul an aninal! but also arranges lite after the rational soul, he very pro-
* Zwov is omitted here in the original,
aaa
ee a Sea ita renner ieee
Rook 11. τιμ δ of Plato, 347
perly denominates every thing animated an animal, but not vice versa. If however, this be the case, having said that the world is an animal, since there is an intel- ligible animal, and also a sensible animal participating of a rational soul, he properly adds, that itis animated. And since of souls, one kind is endued with intellect, but another is deprived of it, in addition to the universe being animated, he likewise asserts that it possesses intellect. For it seems, that animal indeed, accedes from the first intelligible," and thus also from the intelligible father, who is prior to the intellectual Gods. But the animated accedes from the middle cause, both the triadic and the hebdomadic.’ And the possession of intellect ac- cedes from the intellectual father Jupiter]. For if you survey these as with “reference to the Demiurgus alone, according to the paradigm which is in’ him, the universe is rendered an animal; but according to his royal soul, animated ; and according to his royal intellect, endued with intellect. All these however, Plato comprehends unitedly in the words, “ through the providence of God.” For from thence the universe is rendered an animal, anda blessed God,‘ becoming perfect through the providence of divinity. You may also sce how the discourse proceeds from goodness through will, and ends in providence. For will indeed, is sus- pended from goodness, and providence from will. And the universe is gene- rated, on account of the providence, the will, and the goodness of the father ; the last of these being essence prior to essence [i. e. being superessential essence], the second, being as it were power prior to powers, and the first, energy prior to energies, Tor these pertain to the Gods so far as they are Gods. For goodness indeed is unific of essence, and is the flower of it ; but willis the measure of power ; and providence is an energy prior to intellect. For this I think, the very name itself manifests... We therefore thus distinguish animal and animated.
lamblichus however, arranges animal, with every thing that has life, but anima- fed, with the peculiar participation of souls. And perhaps he also, through the
‘i.e. Fromro er ov, or from being characterized by the one, and which is the summit of the in- telligible order.
* ice. From animal itself or Phanes, the extremity of the intelligible order.
dice. The animated accedes from the life, which is in the order called intelligible, and at the same lime intellectual, and also from the life which is in the intellectual order, which life is the middle cause ia both these orders.
* For καὶ δαιίμὼν in this place, read ευδαιμων.
S ice. ilporoa providence, is au energy πρὸ νὸν prior to intellect.
448 PROCLUS ON THE {Book 11.
possession of life indeed, comprehends intelligible animals, but through the ani- mated sensible animals alone. But it may be inferred, that the world is an ani- mal from its sympathy; that it is animated, from its perpetual motion; and that itis endued with intellect, from its excellent order. Lor if according to this, mortal’ are co-passive with celestial natures, and the latter impart an effluxion to the former, the universe is one animal connected and contained by one life. For if this life were not common there would not bea sympathy of the parts in it. Jor sympathy is effected through a participation ef the same nature. And if the world is perpetually moved, itis governed by soul. For every body which is itself moved inwardly by itself, is animated; but the body which is moved externally, is inanimate. If therefore, the universe Is always moved, what is it which moves it? For this is either immoveable, or self-motive. Butitis not lawful for the im- moveable cause of motion to approach without a medium to things which are moved by something different from themselves. Hence, it remains, that the self- motive nature is that which always moves the world. But this is soul. The world therefore is animated.