participate of intellect prior to the universe." For the universe is always arranged, and through the sameness of its subsistence, is nearer to an intellectual essence. But much of the disorderly and confused is inherent in partial animals. Much more therefore, must it be said, that soul is in the universe.” Hence Plato very di- vinely admits that there is a twofold intellect, the one being imparticipable and de- miurgic, but the other participable, and inseparable ? [from its subject]. For from things which are in themselves, those which are in others, and are co-arranged with inferior natures, are derived. He also gives to the universe a twofold life, the one connascent, but the other separate; in order that the world may be an animal through the life which is in it, animated through an intellectual soul, and endued with intellect through much-honored intellect jisclf, But Aristotle only admits the half (of this doctrine of Plato}, since he takes away * imparticipable intellect from his philosophy.’ For the first: intellect with Jum, 15 the intellect of the inerratic sphere; but he cuts off the intellectual soul, which is the medium between intellect and the animated body of the universe 5 and immediately con- joins intellect with the living body. In addition to these things also he appears to me toerr in another particular, Por having placed intellect over the spheres, he does not establish the whole world in any intellect; but this is the most absurd ofall things; for how is the world one, unless one intellect hasdominion init?) What co-arrangement likewise is there of intellectual mulutade, unless it 1s suspended from a proper monad? Aud how are all things co-ordinated to an excellent condition of being, unless there isa certain common intellect of all mundane natures? For the intellect) of the inerratic sphere is the intelleet of that sphere
falone}; and this is also the case with the intellect of the solar, and of the lunar sphere, and in a similar manner of the Other spheres. Against Aristotle however, we have written a peculiar treatise about these particulars.
With respect to Plato however, Is not his method admirable? For receiving the world, dividing it into parts, and surveying by itself that which js moved in
" Tu the original ἢ ec ἐστι re wow τοιουτῶν, ατόπον. ἀλλ᾽ ore πρὸ τὸν παντὸς vou μέτεχειν. But it ts necessary to eapuage ad\, and by altering the punctuation, to read as follows: ἢ ecegrert ἔωον rowvror, arroy ore πρὸ τὸν παντος, KX.
* The words ev τῷ marre εὐλ αι, are omitted inthe original,
§ Vor aywpnrus here, it 1» necessary to read aywperrer.
4 Forvoede here, read ἀφεῖλε.
§ Por an explanation of the intellect: to which Aristotle asceuded, also why he says nothing about that which is beyvnd intellect, and why he appears to dissent in many things from Plato, but does not
in reality, see my Diasertation On the Philosophy of Aristotle.
nook 11} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 311
a confused and disorderly manner, he stops it in his discussion, Just as in the Laws, wishing to show that the self-motive nature is the cause of all motion, he stops the whole heaven, and having stopped it, introduces soul into the universe, in order that by pouring forth an abundance of life, she may animate the world. He likewise introduces intellect to soul, which governs the world, being con- verted to itself; through which the universe is moved in a circle, the whole is arranged, and the whole world is immovable. Since however, all these parti- culars give completion to one animal, and one nature, it is requisite that a collective and uniting cause of them should have a prior existence, and that this should be intellectual. For to comprehend wholes collectively and at once, and to bring them together, to the completion of one thing, is the work of an intellectual cause. Hence, Plato establishing imparticipable prior to participable intellect, and placing the causes of all things in it, he produces from thence, intellects, souls and bodies, from which he gives completion to the sensible world. ‘That it is necessary therefore, that the universe should participate of an intellectual soul, if it participates of intellect, is evident from what has been said. For this soul is the bond of the extremes which are contrary to each other.
But it must also be demonstrated that the converse is true; viz. that an intellectual soul existing in the universe, it is necessary that there should be an intellect of the universe. For since it is said that this soul is intellectual, it is likewise necessary that it should participate of intellect. Whether therefore, does it alone participate of the whole of intellect, or does it participate of it through a certain thing in itself derived fromit? But if indeed, that which is corporeal immediately participates of the fountain of souls, and not through that which is in itself, it will be also requisite to admit, that the same thing takes place in the whole soul (of the universe]. If however, there is in the Demiurgus the fountain of souls, and there is also the fountain of the soul of the universe, and the universe participates through the latter of the former, it is likewise necessary that the soul itself of the universe, should be entirely suspended from imparticipable intellect through participable intellects. dor as the body of the universe is to its soul, so is the soul or it to intellect. And if indeed, so far as it is soul it becomes intel- lectual,' it would be necessary that every soul should be the same [i. e. should be
* Instead of και et μεν abe voepa, ψνχη ywera, in this place, it is necessary to read, και εἰ μεν cabo ψνχη, voepa γινεται.
342 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox 1.
intellectual]. But if it becomes intellectual through the participation of intellect, it is necessary that it should participate of an intellect commensurate to it. A thing of this kind however, is not intellect itself, but that which is a medium between intellect itself and soul, which has intellectual perception adscititious. This intellect also is a certain intellect, and is essentially intellect, and not becoming to be so, like soul; for it is better than soul. But by being! a certain intelleet, itis co-ordinate with soul. For intellect itself is intellect by eristing, and not by becoming to be, and intellect which is simply so by its very being, is superior to a co-ordination with soul. Ifalso you consider, that every monad constitutes a multitude similar to itself, a divine monad, a divine multitude, a psychical monad, a psychical multitude, just as an intellectual monad produces an intellectual multitude, and that secondary orders always participate of the natures prior to themsclyves, it is necessary these things being admitted, that there should be a certain intellect of the whole world. For it is necessary that an intellectual soul should participate of intellect. But if some one should say, it’ participates of the intellect which ranks as a whole, it is absurd. For this intellect will not be the Demiurgus of all things And if it) par- Ucipates of a certain other intellect, this is the intelleet of the universe, and that which is properly participated, as giving completion to the universe in conjunction with soul. But the intellect which ranks as a whole, is so participated by, as illuminating the soul of the universe. Mf therefore intellect presides over Wholes, the universe is animated ; but if the universe is animated, it is also
endued with intellect.
“Through this reasoning process therefore, placing intellect in soul, but soul in body, he fabricated the universe.”
In the first place, it is requisite to sce what this intellect is, and whether it is essential, established above soul, or a certain intellectual habit of soul. From analogy however, it may be inferred that it is essential. For as intellect is to soul, so is soul to body, But soul does not so subsist with reference to body, as tobe ahabit ofits and therefore neither is intellect a habit of κοι], This like-
' For ro δε ris είναι, read τῳ δε res εἰναι. , * viz. The intellect participated by soul, will not be the Demiurgus of all things. For the demiurgic is an imparticipable intellect, or in other words, is not consubsistent with soul,
Book "1. Tim.Eus of Plato. 343
wise, may be inferred from the final cause. For Plato says that soul was constituted on account of intellect.". But the converse is not true. If however. soul is for the sake of intellect, but intellect is that for the sake of which soul subsists, intellect is not a habit; for no where*® does essence subsist on account of habit. And inthe third place, the Demiurgus constitutes this intellect; but the soul as Plato says, gives subsistence to the intellect which is according to habit, throneh the motion of the circle of sameness about the intelligible. For fas he adds] through this motion, imtelleet and scicnce are necessarily produced, Liow therefore does the Demiurgus constitute prior to soul, that to which soul herself gives subsistence? To which we may add, that it is right to assume, that in the Demiurgus there is a royal soul, and a royal intellect, as Socrates says in the Philebus, subsisting according to the reason of cause [or causally]; and that according to these fountains of these two-fold genera, the Demiurgus now places intellect in soul, and soul in body, not because better are in less excellent natures, nor that intellect is in want of a certain seat, or that the soul of the universe is in a certain thing, For these things are unworthy of wholes and divine essences; through which the world is called by Plato, a blessed God. Because however, we conceive of the nature of things in a two-fold respect, either according to their progression, or according to their conversion; hence, when we survey their progression, we begin from first natures, and say that causes are in their effects. But we assert the converse of this, when we survey their conversion. For then we say that the things caused ’ exist in their causes. This second mode therefore, Plato delivers to us shortly after, when he places body in soul, and analogously soul in body. Now, however, treating of tie mode of progression, he places intellect in soul, because the whole of it has the form of intellect, and nothing pertaining to it can be assumed, which is not under the dominion of an intellectual nature. But soul in body, because this according to the whole of itself participates of soul, and no part of it can be assumed which is inanimate; but even that which is deprived of its proper life, so faras it isa part of the universe, is animated, For as we say that providence proceeds every where, and is every where because itis present with all things, and leaves nothing destitute of itself; after the same manner likewise, we say that intellect is in
' For δια νὸν here, it is necessary to read δια your,
* After ovsapou in this place, it requisite to supply yap.
7 For ra aria here, it is necessary to read ra acriara.
344 PROCLUS ON THE {Book 11.
soul, as circularly illuminating the whole of it, and soul in body, because it is present with the whole of it.