We indeed have already observed, that Timieus discourses about one and the same Demiurgus, and shall now remind the reader that this must be admitted. Por if there isa multitude in the demiurgi, (i.e. if there are many demiurgi,] it is necessary to arrange aimonad prior to the multitude. Moreorer, we think it fit that the divine Lambiichus should consider, whether the one and whole Demiur- gus, being an intellectual world, is not multipotent, and does not by different powers fabricate diferent things, in addition to his being the father of all things ? Por let the same Demiurgus, so far as he is good, and so far as he is a God, be the producing cause of all things; yet since he comprehends in himself the cause of all fabrications, and produces in one way the whole, but in another the parts ; the former indeed collectively and totally, but the latter in’ a distributed manner, ceiving subsistence to each thing, according to its proper cause; hence by one intellectual perception, he adorns the whole, and generates it, collectively 5 accord- inz to which also, the world is one animal. But by a reasoning process, he pro- duces the parts in the world, and these as wholes; because he is the Demiurgus of total naturcs, fabricating total intellect, and total soul, and all the bulk of body. Hence, as composing parts, he is said to make them by a reasoning process. For λογισμὸς isa distributed or divided evolution of parts, and a distinctive cause of things. For it does not pertain to one who doubts; since neither does art, nor science doubt; but artists and scientific men then doubt when they are indigent of the habits by which the former become artists, and the latter men of science. If however these do not doubt, ng reason can be assigned why intellect should
' For ovvecrecverac in this place, it is necessary to read ovvrecraiveras,
336 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox 11.
doubt. Hence this λογισμὸς is not through the want of that which is fit taking place. But the Demiurgus produces the whole world by intelligence. For intelligence is collective of multitude into one; just as λογισμὸς is distributive of the one into multitude. Such therefore is the meaning of “ by a reasoning process.”
With respect however to the things which are naturally visible, to say that they are sensibles is perfectly absurd. For these are not yet arranged in the discourse of Timeus, and it is among the number of things impossible, that the Demiurgus should be converted to them. For how can he verge to that which 15 less excellent, or what kind of representation can he receive of material things, to which it is not fortunate even for a partial soul to incline? Itis better therefore, as the divine Tamblichus interprets the words, to think that things of this kind are intelligibles. For that these are visible is evident from the things which ‘Timwus shortly after says the Demiurgus perceives. For his words are, “ As many therefore, and such tdeas, as intellect perceived to be inherent in that which ts animal, &c.” That they are also naturally visible, will be evident if we consider, that some things are visible with relation to us, but others according to nature. And the things indeed which are visible with relation to us, are in their own nature dark and immanifest; but those which are naturally visible are truly known, and are resplendent with divine light. But intelligibles are things of this kind. Perhaps too, as he had ealled that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner visible, and which subsists preternaturally as with reference to fabrication, he now calls the intelligible paradigms of the Demiurgus, naturally visible. Hence, in the introduction he inquires, whether an eternal or a generated paradigm of the universe must be admitted; these two things existing prior to the generation of the universe, being and generation. And where else can the Demiurgus find the causes of generated natures, than in intelligibles? Por in- vention with him is not a fortuitous thing, nor a syllogistic process 3 since this pertains to partial souls; but a union with the intelligible causes of the parts of the universe, and a survey and plenitude from thence derived. For all things exist paradigmatically in the natures prior to him, both such as are the objects of intellection, and suchas are deprived of intelligence ;' since truly existing being comprehends uniformly the cause of intellectual natures, and of those that do not participate of intellect. And the intellectual beings which are there, are
Yor vonrwy here, it is necessary to read asonruy.
Book 11.] Tim.Eus of Plato. 337
of a superior’ but the rest, ofan inferior order. For though all things there are objects of intellectual perception, and intellects, yet in some of them, the cause posecsses the intellectual nature of the things caused, but in others, the privation of intellect and the irrational; the causes themselves being intellectual, but the things which proceed from them, deprived of intellect. Hence the Demiurgus looking thither, very properly admits that what possesses intellect is more venera- ble than that which is without it, the genus of the one, than the genus of the other, and the individuals of the one, than the individuals of the other. For manis better than horse, and a certain man than all horses, according to the possession itself of intellect. If however, you assume a certain part of man and a certain part of horse, it does not entirely follow that the one is better than the other. Norif youassume man fashioned by nature, and the man made by the art of the statuary, is the former in every respect more venerable according to figure than the latter. For art is in many respects more accurate [in this instance than nature]. One whole therefore, is every where better than another, when the one possesses intellect, but the other is deprived of it. For through what other thing can body be able to participate of intelligible beauty [than intellect]! Let no one therefore fancy that Plato makes the division of forms to be into those that possess and those that are deprived of intellect. For all things there (i. e. in the intelligible world] are, as we have said, intellects, where also Plato calls all things in every respect Gods. But extending himself to the natures which are there, he likewise perceived the separation which is here between the beings which possess, and those that are deprived of intellect. Hence he thus says, that nothing destitute of intellect, will be better than that which possesses it, the difference of these existing as in works, but there pre-existing according to cause.
Again however, let us survey how Plato says, that secondary energize on account of more principal causes, the latter being more perfect than the former, bul the former being suspended from the latter. Because indeed, the Dewmiurgus is good, on this account, he made the world to be most beautiful. For goodness is the cause of beauty. But because he made the universe to be most beautifal, he rendered it endued with intellect. And beauty fills the first intellect with its own power. Because also he made the universe to be endued with intellect, he imparted to it soul. For soul proceeds from intellect. Because likewise he rendered the world animated, he inserted life in that which was before moved in
' For uxeprepoy read νπερτεέρων.
Tim. Plat. | Vou. I. 2U
338 Proclus on the [βοοκ 11-
a confused and disorderly manner. For this being well arranged, is able to participate of soul, soul of intellect, and intellect of beauty. The whole world however, becomes most beautiful trom the good, and after this manner may be said to be a blessed God. The Demiurgus likewise, seems, in what is here said, to behold all the paradigms, which Plato calls naturally visible, not those only Which are in animal itself, but also such as are more partial than the four ideas which are there. Or how does he see some things which are the paradigms of intellective, but others which are the paradigms of unintellective natures, which are hot separated in animal itself? But he mentions the forms of this animal itself, When be causes the universe to be an animal. For so far as it is an animal, iis the image of anunal itself, and so far also as it consists of four parts [i. e. of the four elements}. So far however, as it is now divided into intellectual, and non-intellectual beings, so far it entuely derives its subsistence from other paradigms more partial than those which exist according to the four ideas in animal itself, So that animal itself indeed, is a paradigm,\but every " paradigm
isnot *animalitself, Taving discussed these particulars however, let us proceed
to what follows.
* It as impossible however, for intellect to accede without soul.”
The intellectual essence indeed, is impartible, uniform and eternal, but the essence of bodies is partible and multiplied, and is consubsistent with temporal representation, These therefore, exist contrarily with reference to each other, and are in Want of a medium which may be able to collect them together; a medium, which is at one and the same time partible and impartible, composite and simple, eternal and generated. But according to Plato, the psychical order isa thing of this kind, intelligible, and atthe same time the first of generated natures, eternal and temporal, impartible and partible. If therefore, it is neces- sary that the universe should be endued with intellect, it is also necessary that itshould have a soul. For soul is the receptacle of intellect, and through it mitelicet: exhibits itself to the masses of the universe. Not that intellect is in wantol soul: for thus it would be less honorable? than soul; but that bodies
* Tustead of τὸ δὲ παράδειγμα in this place, it seems necessary to read ray δὲ παραδειγμα, > Por os τὸ avrezwow here, it isnecessary to read vv τὸ avrozwor.
* Por cyryswreoos here, it ts necessary to read ariyuwrevos.
pooK 11} TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 339
require soul, in order to their participation of intellect. For the last, and not the first of things, are in want of secondary ' natures, For the first of things are every Where present without a medium.’ Hence it is necessary to understand, thatthe soul which connects intellect witha sensible nature, ought to be intellee- tual, and not deprived of intellect. For how can that which is destitute οὔ intellect be suspended from intellect?) But to these another medium will be requisite. The medium however, being a thing of this kind, will wisely and orderly govern every corporeal-formed nature. But it will imitate intellect, dancing as it were round it. If therefore, wholes are better than parts, things eternal, than such as subsist in time, and efficients than effects, it is necessary that the whole universe should be more divine than all the parts it contains. If therefore, certain animals in the world, which are partial, material and mortal, are naturally adapted to participate of intellect, what ought we to say of the whole world? Is it not, that the whole of it exhibits through the whole, the presence of intellect? For its figure, its order, and the measure of its powers, may be said to afford clear indications of intellectual inspection. If however, intel- lect presides over wholes, and governs the universe, it is necessary that there should be an intellectual soul in the middle of it, adorning and ruling over bodies, and at the same time separate from the subjects of its government, and filling all things with life, in order that the world may through it, be firmly established in intellect, and that intellect may illuminate the world. .
If you are willing, we will also recall to your recollection ’ what is written in the Philebus, where Socrates shows that the world possesses intellect and is ani- mated, because that which is terrestrial in us is from the universe, and the fire which is in us is from the mundane fire, and in a similar manner the air and the water which we contain; and that it would be absurd that things less excellent in us should pre-exist in the whole, but that things more divine should not analo- gously pre-subsist in it, and that total intellect and total soul should not be contained in the universe. For either it must be said that no animal possesses intellect, or ifthere is a certain animal of this kind, it is absurd that it should
* Instead of σωμάτων in this place, it is requisite to read δεντέρων. * viz. They are notin want of a medium inorder to be present every where: but the last of things require secondary natures as media, by which alone they can receive the illuminations of the first
of things. 3 For ἀναμισθωμεν here, it is necessary to read avaprnobwyer.
340 PROCLUS ON THE [Book τι.