medium between dissimulation and arrogance ; for the latter is to say more, but the former less, than all others, and the medium is to say What is in no respect less. In the next place, the words no less, may not only be said of men in former times, and speculators of nature, but also of the conjectural things themselves. As if he had said, “ Jf therefore, we shall afford arguments no less probable than the things thenselces, and shall not desert the nature of the objects of knowledge, we must be satisfied.” The Gods indeed know these things in a more excellent manner, but we mist be satistied with an approximating knowledze of them. For we are men, are placed in body, and exert a partial form of life, and are filled with much! ofa conjectural nature, Hence, our discourses may be very properly said to resemble fables. For our language, which the word pugog a fable (used here by Plato] indicates, is replete with crassitude and irrationality, and it is necessary to pardon human nature,
* You speak most excellently, O Timawus, and we shall receive what you say, in every respect as you advise. Your preface indeed we won- derfully approve. Proceed therefore, and bring to a conclusion the sub- sequent melody.”
In the Republic, where Socrates disposes the discourse, Timwus was. silently present, not exhibiting bis own judgment about what was said. But) here Socrates, after a certain admirable manner, receives what Timanus says. Por in the things also, of which the persons are images, while secondary natures energize, those that are first are established in themselves, and do not depart from themselves, nor ,verge to inferior natures. But when more divine beings energize, then more subordinate natures are elevated to the participa- tion of them, through the love of all-various wonder. Hence Socrates, in’ what is here said, very properly surrounds Timeus with all possible praise. For through wonder itself, he is in a greater degree united to him. Moreover, the word most excellent” indicates indeed, the perfect, intellectual, and scientific
“nature of the doctrine of Timaus. And it also indicates his analogy to the Demi-
urgus, For as he is the best of causes in works, thes also Timieus is the best in discourses. ‘The words likewise, “ we shall receive what you say in every respect
' For πηλὸν here, it is necessary to read πολν.
* In the teat of Proclus, Aoyor is erroneously printed for sepor.
rae > or . o> pp
Zim, Plat. Vou. I. 21
298 PROCLUS ON THE [ϑοοκ 11.
us you advise,” indicate what kind of person he ought to he, who rightly receives discussions concerning divine natures. That he ought assiduously to adhere to the teacher; to perform with all his might that which is ordered by him; and to persuade himself, that it is right to be persuaded by what the teacher says.
Farther still the word “ preface” indicates: the comprehension of total concep- tions in the hypotheses, All things therefore, are in the preface itself" Por in this preface, it is shown what the form* is of the object of inquiry, on what hypotheses,’ and things previously demonstrated from them it depends, and also what the nature is of the discussion, and what are the requisite qualifications of the auditor. But the word νόμος melody, is assumed from modulations adapted to the harp. These therefore, are certain melodies, some of whieh are Minerval, out others Martial. And some indecd, are entheastic, but others are defamatory ofmanners, Prior, however, to these melodies, itis usaal to arrange the preludes, which also on this account are called precontrectations, From thence therefore, they are assumed, But the word melody contributes to: the thing proposed τὸ be considered, because all the visible partible* order of things, being harmonious, eternally remains, on account of the goodness of its producing causes. And because likewise, It proceeds from, and subsists according to intelleet, and pos- sesses total powers separated from cach other, and arranged in a manner adapted toeach. For melodies are called νομοὺς dacs, because they remain iinmutable, and hecause such things as are fit are distributed from cach,
«“ Tet us narrate then on account of what certain cause, the composing artificer constituted generation, and this universe.”
All that has been before said delivers to us preparatives for the whole of physio- logy. And of these, some through images and symbols, exhibit the theory of the world. A preface also of the whole discussion is prefixed, and of the demonstra- tion through images or symbols; one part of which unfolds the union, but another the separation of mundane natures. Of the prefatory parts also, some are hypotheses, but others are as it were lemmas demonstrated through the hypo-
* For cara re re here, it seems requisite to read κατὰ rovro. * Instead of re τὸν ecdous in this place, it is necessary to read re ro ecdos. 5 For cat ποιων υποῦεσεων read καὶ ex nowy νπυθεσεων.
* The word pepiorn is omitted in the original,
nook uJ TIMLUS OF PLATO. 299
theses. For the particulars respecting the mode of discussion, may be placed among the things demonstrated. For to the demonstration that the world is generated, the assertion that the discussion of it is eikotology [or speaking trom probability], is consequent. But again, these things having received an appro- priate end. “Timwus commencing the fabrication of the universe, begins from the good, conceiving that the discovery of the final cause will be to him the imost beautiful incitation. For as the good is the cause of all beings, so likewise it is fit that the generation of the world should proceed from this as the first prin- ciple. For all things are from ¢he good. And of such things indeed, as the demi- urgic intellect is not’ the cause, as for instance of matter, of these the good is the cause. And of such things as the paradigm is not hypostatic, these also derive their subsistence from the good. For all things are for the sake of it, and it is the cause of all beautiful things, as it is said in the Epistles. Hence Timieus refers the other causes to this one cause. For having found the form of the world through the hypotheses, and also the paradigmatic, and eflective cause, he now Wishes to assign the most principal, most venerable, and most ancient of causes, the final, which he particularly desires in the fabrication of things. For since the man who lives according to intellect performs every thing for the sake of good, will not intellect itself, and a divine intellect, in a much greater degree fabricate all things for the sake of the final cause? For though the worthy man frequently appears to perform something for the sake of the body, yet this is not the end to him of the thing, nor does he principally regard the good of the subordinate nature ; but he does this also for the sake of a similitude to divinity, and makes that to be his most intentional end. How much more therefore, must the Demi- urgus of the universe fabricate for the sake of good, and the final cause? For he does not energize without design, nor indetinitely. Hence also, as it appears to me, Plato does not investigate inthe beginning, if there is a final cause of the composition of the world, but as if this was acknowledged by all men, he inquires what the final cause is. For the Demiurgus is supposed to be intellect and a God, and not chance, as some say, But if intellect is the maker, there is certainly that for the sake of which in the fabrication of things. For as the soul when it is in an upright condition, performs all things according to intellect, so intellect in fabricating, gives subsister ce to all things conformably to divinity. But this is
the same as conformably to the good.
* For oowy μεν ἐστιν aurios here, it is necessary tu read ogwy μη ἐστιν acres,
300 PROCLUS ON THE [noox 1,
Whether therefore, it be requisite to follow the Aristotelian problems, after what the universe is, and what kind of a thing itis, 1015 necessary to investigate on what account itis. For it has been said that itis generated indeed, but is the image of being. And itis also requisite besides this to cousider, for the sake of what it was generated. Oraf it be necessary to adoptthe Platonic causes, itis fit after the demiurgic cause and the paradigin, to discover the final cause of the fabrication of the world. Por again, all other causes are suspended from this, ἀπ likewise the divinity of the paradigm, the goodness of the maker, and the perfection of that which is generated. And as far as to this is: the ascent to those who love to conteniplate truth, Tt is ustal however, to call the final cause δέον ot account of which ; the paradigmatic cause ποτ ον wth relation to which, the demiurgic cause vg ov, by which ; Whe instremental cause av ov, (rough which ; form x25 ὁ, accord: mg lo which ; and matter 22 ov, or evan, from which, ov in which, These causes also received the same appellations from Plato limsclt, Por now investigating the final cause he says, on account of what cause. Inquiring conecruing the paradig- atic Catse, he says, with relation tow hich of the paradigms. Bat concerning the demiurgic cause, he says, that which is generated, Is from necessity gene- rated by a certain cause, And as we proceed, we shall point out the rest from the words themselves of Plato; except: that at present also it must be said, that these appellations are adapted to the discriminating setenee of the philosopher,
What however is generation, and) what is the universe? Some indeed by generation understanding the sublunary phice, call the universe the whole world, Bat these entirely wander from the meaning of Plato. Por the Detturgus ts hot represented as separately fashioning materkdl natures, aud separately the whole world. And in the next place, generation itself is a part of the aniverse. Iv however, it should be said that Plato calls the heaven the universe, because it Is the greatest part of the world, for the rest is stall ee because itis the most divine and principal part, and as it were the summit of the universe; for the head also is called the whole, as,
Peucer, dear Lead ;' and Plato also says, that the world was surrounded with the remaining bulk of body for the sake of this;—yet at the same time, the philosopher is accustomed to call this likewise generation. Others again call matter generation, but that
ν iliad, viii. 281.
BOOK Ih] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 504
Which is adorned trom matter fas the subject], they denominate the universe, by Whom many things written by Plato, must necessarily be rejected. For he says. that every thing generated, and all generation, is sensible, or tancible, and visible, Farther sal, he gives a division to generation Opposite to that of matter, as when he says, there were these things subsisting separately, being, place, and generation, from which the universe was constituted,
Our preceptor however says, that the fabrication of the world is to be under- stood ina twofold respeet. For one part of it Consists in the formation of bodies, but the other, in adapting bodies to. the completion of one world, For it is one ‘thing to fashion bodies themselves, through figures, bat another to harmonize them When fashioned, to the universe. Generation therefore, must be said to be the forma: tion of bodies, being a motion [or tendency) by the wholeness and perfection of the τσοὶ, Lor that which is composed from parts has a pre-concetved production of the parts, Ilence the formation,’ which takes place between matter, the whole orderly distribution of things, and the one completion of the universe, must be called generation, τὴ order that it mity bed path to the whole inwhich the parts are comprehended. For this is the universe, being constituted perfect from perfect: parts, according to the one harmony of wholes. Since however, this whole is sensible, and not the in- telligible all, or universe: for this was the paradigm 3 nor the intellectual all; for this was demiurgie s on this account. Plato adds the particle dhis, inanifesting by it that which is sensible and partial. For every thing corporeal, though it should be a whole, is partial. But the most principal whole is that which is immaterial and withont interval, and that is traly all whether it) be intellectual or intelli- gible. And thas much concerning this particular,