Plato however in many places admits the truth of beings, conformably to theologists. For aniform truth (or truth characterized by unity] is of one kind, and is the light proceeding from the good, which, as he says in the Philebus, imparts purity, and as he says in che Republic, union to intelligibles. The truth proceeding from intelligibles, is of another kind, and illuminates the intellectual orders, which the essence that is without figure, without colour, and without contact primarily receives, where, also, as itis written in the Phadrus, the plan of truth is situated. Another kind of truth is that whichis connarcent with souls, which comes into contact with being through intelligence, and is) conjoined through science with the objects of science. For the psychical hight, may be said to be as in the extension of breadth the third from = the intelligible; the intellectual breadth being filled from the intelligible, but the psychical from the intellectual. This truth, therefore, which is in souls, is that, which must now be assumed, since we likewise assume this faith, and not that which is irrational, and separated from all rational animadversion, The one also must be conjoined to intelligibles, but the other to sensibles.
“ You must not wonder, therefore, O Socrates, if asserting many things about many concerning the Gods, and the generation of the universe, I should not be able to employ language in every respect accurate and consistent with itself.”
Timeus first exhibits the hypotheses of the whole of physiology, and collects
the lemmas pertaining to the theory of it; the latter being three, but the former five. In the second place, he defines the mode of the discussion. And in the
ποοκ 41.} Tim.Eus of Plato. 293 -
third place, he prepares the auditor to receive in a proper manner the discourse
which he is about to make. For it is necessary that he should not expect to
hear perfectly accurate arguments in’ physical discussions, nor sach as are truly scientific, but such as are assimilated to them. 11 is besides this requisite he should know, that as the world is mingled from physical powers and an intel- lectual and divine essence; for “ physical works, as the Oracle says, co-subsist with the intellectual light of the father = thus also the disenssion of it, makes a commixture of faith and trath, Por things which are assumed) from sense par- ticipate largely of conjectural discussion; but things which commence from intel- ligibles possess that which ds irreprehensible, avd cannot be confuted. For when we say of the Demiurgus himself, that he consults, that he energizes diano- etically, and that he makes these things prior to those, we relingtish the trath ofthings. So thatif when speaking of eternal beings, and showing how they provide for the universe, we are compelled to divide that which is impartible, and to inake that which is eternal temporal, much more will the assertions res specting sensibles themselves be deficient in accuracy [and truth]. What then, someone may say, do we not speak accurately concerning the heavens when we say, thatthe circles inthe bisect each other? Butdo we notfall off from accuracy, when we are satisfied, not with the accurate, but with an approximation to it, in con- sequence of our tmbecility, and not on account of the nature of the thing? Or, also, when we receive indeed, principles from sense, yet is it not from universal reasons? ‘The assertions therefore, respecting the heavens, as in intelligibles, ex- hibit the irreprehensible; bat as in objects of belief, they also are reprehended through immaterial forms. Consider then this very thing which is now asserted, that the greatest circles in the Heavens bisect each other. [sy it not necessary that the section should be according to points? But a point isimpartible. What, therefore, is there of this kind ina partible nature? What is there without inter yal in a nature distended with interval?) For every thing which subsists in a phy- sical body, is co-divided with its subject. What, then, is there not likewise a physical point? This however relinquishes that which is truly impartible, and is a point indeed, in physical substances, but is not simply a point. So that what is said of a point, is not accurately adapted to a thing of this kind. In short, as the assertions concerning intelligibles, are not adapted to dianoetic objects, so neither is what is said of scientific objects adapted to sensibles. For intelligibles are the paradigms of dianoetic natures, and dianoetic natures of sensibles. For
204 PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ “τ.
it is soul which adorns the mighty heaven, and adorns it in conjunction with the father. So that when we speak of circles in the heavens, of contacts, bisections, and equalities, we speak accurately, as not speaking about sensibles. Since therefore things of this kind may be asserted of all material natures, the objection is trifling.
If, however, some one should.ask us, is not that which is truly equal impartible, and that which is truly a circle, without interval? Por each is a universal; but universal is an impartible reason and form. But the natures in’ the heavens are partible, and not indivisible, and are inasubject, Here again, we do not say that either circles, or equalities, or any thing else of this kind are in sensibles ; and thus we are consistent with ourselves. We summarily, say, therefore, that Plato at one time defines science, by an explanation of causes alone ; at another time, by the subjects of tt, possessing anessence perfectly stable, tovether with an caplanation of cause ; and at another, by the principles not being hypotheses. And according to this last form, indeed, he asserts that there is one science (i.e. dialectic] which ascends as far as to the principle of being. Por this science pre-establishes the principle which is truly principle, to be unhypothetical, Ttalse has for its subject truly exisiting being, and produces its reasonings from cause, But according tothe second form, he also calls dianoetic knowledge science. And according to the first alone, he allows the appellation of science to be given to phystology. Now therefore looking to the first’ form he thinks fit to call it conjectural know- ledye. And thus much in answer to the doubt, the whole of what is here said being attended with difficulty on account of the construction of the words, which may thus be corrected with a small addition. “JA O Socrates, asserting many things about many,” afterwards showing what these many things are, he adds, “ concerning the Gods, and the gencration of the universe. And these are the many he alludes τον. Uf therefore, he says, many things being asscrted about many, concerning the generation of the universe, and the Gods tt contains, cach of these being many, we should not be able to employ accurate language, you must not ΟΝ He says this, however, because itis not w onderful, to be oceupicd in things of a necessary nature, But it is necessary that a discussion should not be accurate in a twofold respect, viz. on account of the thing known, not being stable and clear,
and on aecount of our nature being human. So great therefore is the caution
' Itis evidently necessary instead of Seurepor ertus iv this plece, to read πρωτὸν etSos. Vor diunve-
tc hnowledge is by nu means conjectural.
ΠΟΟΚ 11. TIMTUs OF PLATO. 295
which Plato employs in what he says. This however is not the case with others. But Heraclitus, by asserting of himself that he knew all things, makes all other mento be destitute of science. And Empedocles announces that he imparts truth herself, and that, in what he writes.
‘To Wisdom’s summit rapidly he leaps.
For these assertions are not conformable to philosophic caution. But the Stoics say that there is the same virtue of Gods and men, being very far from emulating the piety of Plato, and the modesty of Socrates.
“ Tf therefore we shall afford arguments no less probable than others, it is proper to be satisfied, calling to mind that I who speak, and that: you who are my judges, have the human nature [in common]. 80. that if you reccive a probable narration concerning these things, it is fit to seek for nothing farther than this.”
Timeus reminds us ina twofold respect of the privation of stability and aceu- racy in physical discussions ; first, from the essence of the things. For from im- material natures becoming material, from impartble partible, from separate hatures, such as are situated in a foreign seat, and from universal, becoming indi- vidual and partial natures, they do not receive the definition of things scientific and irreprehensible, which is adapted to: immaterial and imparuble forms. But in the second respect, from the imbecility of that by which physical objects are surveyed. For if it be requisite to know any thing concerning them, it is also requisite to embrace a knowledge co-ordinate to them. But this is sense. And if indeed we were in the heavens, we should perhaps be less deceived ; but here dwelling in the last part of the universe, and being most remote from them, we employ sense in a gross and erroncous manner. For we are allotted the human nature. But the human nature brings with ita life which is material and dark- ened by the body, and which is partible, and in want of irrational knowledge. The Gods, however, know' that which is generated, in a way perfectly remote from generation, that which is temporal, eternally, and that which is contingent, necessarily. For by intellectually perceiving they generate all things, so that they
* The word yeywosover is wanting in the original.
906 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK It,
intellectually perceive them after the above- mentioned manner. For we must not fancy that knowledge is characterized by the natures of the things known, or that what is not stable is also not stable with the Gods, as the pInlosopher Porphyry says; for this is asserted by lim which it would have been better not to have said ; but we must admit that the mode of knowledge varies with the diversities of gnos- tic natures. For the same thing is known by divinity indeed unitedly, by intel- lect totally, by reason universally, by the phantasy morphotically," and by sense passively. Nor does it follow, that because the thing known is one, the knowledge also is one. Farther still, if knowledges are essential in the Gods, and their intel- lizence is not adventitious, such as they are, such also is their Knowledge. But they are immaterial, eternal, united, and undefiled; and, therefore, they know immaterially, eternally, unitedly, and with uncontaminated purity, Hence they antecedently comprehend that w hich ismaterial, immeatertally 5 dispersed multitude, uniformly ; that which is changed according to time, stably and eternally 5 and every thing preternatural, dark and impure, ina manner ftranscendently lumi- nous and] pure, Would it not therefore be superfluous to add any further contir- mation of this truth?
Again however this? may be assumed from what has been said, that the want of accuracy in the theory of the images of being, arises from our imbecility Por to the knowledge of them we require phantasy, sense, and many other organs. But the Gods contractedly comprehend these in their unity, and divine intellection, For in sublunary natures, we are satisfied in apprehending that which for the most part takes place, on account of the instability of their subject matter, But again, in celestial natures, we are filled with much of the conjectoral, through employing sense, and material instruments, On this account, we must he satisticd wath proximity in the apprehension of them, since we dwell remotely, at the bottom, as itis said, of the universe. This also is evident from those that are conversant with them, who collect the same things respecting them from diferent hypotheses 5 some things, indeed, through eccentrics, others through epicyeles, and others through evolvents, (in all these} preserving the phenomena, What then, some one may say, are we to be satisfied with Plato im physiologizing, and in affording us arguments no less probable than others? May we not reply, that it especially becomes prudent men thus to speak about things of this kind, and to pursue the
' The word morphe, as we have elsewhere observed, pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of superficies. Hence, the phantasy perceives morphotically, because its sight 1s a figured perception. ? Yor roec here, it secins necessary to read rovro.