about them. For it is an evolved knowledge. Since, however, it proceeds into multitude, and is allotted a composite nature, and on this account falls short of the union and impartibility of the thing, he densminates the thing itself in’ the singular number permanent and stable, cad intellectually apparent; but the discourse about it in the plural number, calling it stable words, which are without a lapse, and are irreprehensible. And since in language there is a certain: simi- litude to the paradigm, but there is also a certain dissimilitude, and this abundant, he assumes one word in common ¢he permanent, but the others different. Since also a scientific discourse is irreprehensible, as with reference to our knowledge 3 for there is not any thing ἴῃ ἂς better than science; but is confated by the thing. itself, as not being able to comprehend the nature of it, such as it really is, and. as falling off! from its impartibility,—on this account he adds, δ as much as possible” For science itself, as subsisting in souls, is indeed irreprehepsible, but is reprehended by intellect, for evolving that which is iinpartble, and apprehend- ing that which is simple ina composite manner, For the phantasy also repre- hends sense, because its knowledge is in conjunction with passion, according to a commixture, from which the phantasy is purified. But opinion reprehends the phantasy because its knowledge is attended with type and morphe, from Which opinion is. free. Science reprehends opinion, because its Knowledge Is without the explanation of cause, by which science is especially bound. And intellect. as we have said, reprehends science, because it transitively divides the object of knowledge, but intellect’ Knows at once the whole in conjunction with essence. Hence intellect is alone unconquerable, but science, and scientific
discourse, are vanquished by intellect, according to the knowledge of being.
“It is necessary however, that words respecting that which 1S assiMl- lated tothe permanent and stable, but which is the image of being should possess probability [alone).”
That the discussion of generated * natures, is a discussion about an image, and" that on this account it is to be called probable, is evident. Perhaps however, some one may inquire what words remain to be assigned to things which are not assimilated to the intelligible, but yet at the same time exist in the universe, such
* For axopevos here, 1 read axoornoapevos.
> For πρὸ των γενήτων in this place, it is obviously necessary to read πέρι τῶν YORT wr.
Book 11} τιμίεῦθ of Plato, 249
as we assert conjectural and artificial things tobe, May we not say, that words of a conjectural nature are adapted to these, which words are different from those that are assimilative? For to conjecture is one thing; since this is more obscure than sense; and to assimilate another. For assimilation pertains to the interpreters of the images of being. Artificial, therefore, and conjectural things, are unfolded through conjectural words. Unless other such like words are adapted to things which are truly conjectural; but with respect to artificial things, assimilative or probable words, are adapted to those that are the first from forms, but to those which have a secondary hypostasis, and are the third from truth, such words are adapted as pertain to things conjectural by nature. For conjectural things are the images of sensibles, in the same manner as sensibles are the images of intelligibles. Thus the painted bed is the image of that which is made by the carpenter.
Farther still, this also must be considered, that Plato is now speaking about physical images, and that on this account he gives a twofold division to words. Por things which are assimilated to the intelligible, subsist by nature or naturally ; but this is not the case with things artificial, For the artist does not make that Which he makes, according to certain ideas, though Socrates appears to say this in the Republic. There, however, what is said, is asserted for the sake of the paradigm, and is not concerning ideas themselves. For he says that God is the maker and Demiurgus of things artificial,’ but he is not the Demiurgus of ideas. But in the Protagoras, it is clealy shown by Plato that we do not contain the reasons or productive principles of the arts,* and much less of things artificial,
' See the 10th book of the Republic, where he speaks of the ideas of a bed and a table. Plato, however, did not intend to signify in what he there says, that there is an idea of each of these in the intellect of the Demiurgus of the universe; or, in short, that there are ideas of things artificial; but he calls by the name of idea, the reason or productive and forming principle which subsists in the dianoctic power of the artificer, This reason also he says, is the offspring of deity, because he conceived, that this very artificial principle itsclf, is imparted to souls from divinity, Proclus, in the Parmenides, well observes, that an argument. of the truth of this may be derived from Β΄ πο, that Piato calls a poet the third from, or with respect to, the truth, placing him analogous to a painter, who does not make a bed, but the image of it. The form of bed, therefore, in the dianoctic part of the artificer, ranks as first with respect to truth; the bed which he makes as second; and that which is printed asthe third. But if there was an idea of bed in the intellect of divinity, the painter would be the fourth, and not the third from truth.
* i.e. The soul dues not essentially contain the reasons of those arts which are solely ministrant to the purposes of the moral life.
Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 20
290 PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ 11,
and that neither are the paradigms of them established in the Gods. These therefore were not generated according to the intelligible. Plato, however, now divides words into those which pertain to the discussion of the intelligible, and those which are concerning the image of the intelligible. Hence indicating this he says, that words respecting that which ty assimilated to the permanent and stable, but which is the image of being, should possess probability [alone]. But the works of nature are assimilated to the intelligible, and not the works of art; so. that neither have particulars this assimilation detinitely, but the universals which are in then. We have, however, spoken concerning these things elsewhere.
“The latter words having the same relation to the former [as that of an image to its paradigm]. For what essence is to generation, that
truth is to faith.”
Prior to this, Timaus made two things antecedent, the intelligible and the generated, or the paradigm and the image, and assumed two things as analogous to these, science and probability, or truth and faith: so that as truth is to the intelligible paradigm, so is faith to the generated image. But now alternately he says, as truth is to faith, so is the intelligible to that which Is generated. And this perfectly well, For he makes the intelligible and truth to be antecedent, but at the same time begins from that which is generated and faith, that he may mingle that which bas a reference to us with the order which is according to nature, and that he may preserve the proper worth of the things, and may argue from what is μόν ἢ to us. Plato, therefore, clearly divides language and know- ledge conformably to the objects of knowledge 3 and Parmenides though obscure on account of his writings being poetical, yet at the same time indicating these things, he says, “that truth ts full of splendor and immutable, but that the opinions of mortals have no real credibility.” And again, “ that there are two paths, one of which has a real existence, so that itis not: possible for it ποῖ to exist. But this is the path of Persuasion, and 15 attended by Trath, The other, necessarily has no true caistence. The former of these paths, however, Clough replete with the most perfect persuasion, is unpleasant.” And again, * Neither can you have any knowledge of non-being; for it is not attainable; nor can you make it the subject of discourse." The philosopher therefore says, that there are ἔν ον
* Owing to the obscurity of the original, | have only given the substance of the verses of Parmenides
ROOK tJ TIM:ALUS OF PLATO. 204
fold knowledges, of twofold things 5 truth which he calls [full of splendor, as shining with intellectual heht; and faith, from which he takes away stable knowledge. The faith, however, which Plato now mentions appears to be diflerent from that spoken of him in the Republic, in the section of a line, For there the faith is an irrational knowledge ; whence also itis divided from eonjec- ture, but is arranged according to sense, The faith however of which he now speaks is rational, but is mingled with irrational knowledge, as it employs sense and conjecture. Hence itis filled with much of the unstable. For receiving from sense or conjecture the ors, or (hata thing is, it thus explains causes. But these kinds of knowledge, have much of the confused and unstable. Hence Sucrates in the Phado reprehends sense in many respects, because we neither hear nor see any thing accurately.
How, therefore, can the knowledge which originates from sense possess the ac- curate and the irreprehensible? | For the powers which use science alone, compre- hend the whole of the thing known with accuracy ; but those that energize with sense, are deceived, and deviate from accuracy, on account of sense, and because the object of knowledge is unstable. For with respect to that which is material, what can any one say of it, since it is always changing and flowing, and is not naturally adapted to abide fora moment, But that which is celestial, in conse- quence of being remote from us, is not casily known, nor to be apprehended by science, but we must be satistied in the theory of it, with an approximation to the truth, and with probability [instead of certainty}. For every thing which is in place, requires the being situated there, in order to a perfect knowledge of its nature. The intelligible, however, is nota thing of this kind; since it is not apprehended by us in place. For wherever any one establishes his dianoetic energy, there, truth being every where present, he comes into contact with it. But if it is possible to assert any thing firm and stable about that which is celestial, this also is possible so faras it participates of being, and so far as it can be apprehended by intelligence. For if any thing necessary ean be collected concerning it, it is alone through geometrical demonstrations which are universal. But so far as it is sensible, it is difficult to be apprehended, and difficult to. be surveyed. And thus much concerning there particulars. .
Some one, however, may doubt, how it can be any longer said to be difficult to discover the Demiurgus, and impossible when found to speak of him to all men, since we are able to employ stable, immutable, and irreprehensible language about the paradigm? Or is not that which.is said about the Demiurgus, in a much
292 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 11.
greater degree adapted to the paradigm itself? For it is much more difficult to discover the latter than the former, and when found to speak of it to all men. Neither, however, does Plato deny that scientific language may be employed about the Demiurgus, nor about any other of the natures that subsist always invariably the same. For in what does Plato differ from other physiologists, except in ex- hibiting the science pertaining to divine natures? But if he particularly reminds us of this in the Demiurgic cause, that itis difficult to find it, we ought not to wonder. For he knew, as it appears to me, that other physiologists tronsfer the effective cause to physical powers. Hence that we may not be affected in’ the same way as they were, he shows that the Demiurgic principle is difficult to be found, and difficult tobe known. And this much in answer to the doubt.