We ought not however, to wonder if Plato calls the world an image. For though itis most beautiful, vet itis the image of intelligible beauty. Through this similitude also, aoexhibits such things as adorn! and beautify. generation, and receives as a whole the form of the paradigm. ‘Thus the philosopher calls the world the image of the intelligible, as being assimilated to its paradigm. The addition likewise of vecessity, shows that the similitade of the former to the latter is admirable and metlable. Afterwards also, le testifies this by a demonstration indubitable and firm. For it proceeds trom the hypotheses themselves,
But in every thing, to begin from a principle according to nature, is
the greatest of undertakings.”
Some read what is here said by stopping at the word ravros, every thing, ac- cording to whom the words indicate, that it is the greatest of all things, to make that bezinning. of the discussion which is according to nature. But others, stop- ping at the word μέγιστον, ereaiest, conjoin the word rayrog with what follows; so that with them the colon signifies that it is the greatest undertaking, to begin
* For exirpowevorra here, I rcad eximpexovra,
504 PROCLUS ON THE [nook τι.
the discussion of tho universe, from a principle which is according to nature, Others again say that these words are introduced for the sake of the things pre- viously assumed, these being rightly concluded through) the hypotheses which were necessary. But according to others, they are introduced for the sake of what is directly after asserted, it being requisite, if we intend to make a proper beginning, to define previously what hind of discourses ought to be adopted concerning sensibles, And others say, they are introduced for the sake of what will afterwards be delivered concerning the tinal cause, Por this is the greatest principle, and according to nature, which it is requisite especially to survey, and from which commencing it is fit to discuss what follows. But that previous to the disquisition of this, he informs us what the mode will be gf physical dis- cussions.
To me however, this axiom appears to be rightly asserted of all things. Vor it is universal, and is adapted to what has been before said, to what immediately follows, and to what will be again said. Or rather, it is not adapted to these alone, but to all fabrication. Por beginning from a principle according to nature as from a root, Plato delivers afterwards explanations of cause homologous to this principle. And science itself, from) proper hypotheses, collects appropriate conclusions. Science therefore follows the order of things ; but doctrinal dis- quisition follows science. And this is the greatest undertaking. Ino the first place, because it imitates wholes, and the progression of beings. In the next place, because if the smallest particular Is overlooked in’ the principle, it becomes multiplied as we proceed. And in the third place, the principle or beginning, Is said to be the half of the whole. If however, this be the case, it possesses the createst power, ΠῚ, too, as some say, the principle is something more than’ the whole, it is in an admirable manner said to be the greatest thing. The truth ag this is also. testified by poets who say, ‘that every thine which reecives a good beginning usually ends well.” And moreover, on this account the Athenian euest calls the principle a God, if it obtains that which is fit. For he says, * Principle being established in men as a God, produces all things rightly of it obtains acongruous portion{or the part which ts adapted to "1
But what is the meaning of the words “ according to nature? Is it the re- ceiving every thing which ought to be received, or is it that which first proceeds from things which subsist essentially? Por that which ts last is a principle as with reference to us, but not with reference to nature. The principle therefore
Book "1 Tim.Eus of Plato. 285
according to nature, of the universe indeed, is the final cause, but of demonstra- tions the hypotheses, and of discussions the definition respecting the form of the doctrine, whether itis to be received as firm, immutable and accurate, or as that which is merely probable, and is not indeed truth, but credible, and assimi- Jated to truth.
“After this manner therefore, we must decide about the image, and
the paradigm of it.”
These three particulars are connascently consequent to each other, the things, the conceptions, and the words, According to the things and the conceptions therefore, Plato assumes the first hypothesis; but according to the words he makes this definition, Por when he separates that which is generated from being, he adheres to the theory of the things. But when he defines our knowledge according to the objects of it, he adheres to the theory of the conceptions.” And now distributing the words according to the diversity in the knowledge of them, he demonstrates to us their definite nature. Tlence, these are consentaneous to each other; viz. twofold things, being and that which is generated ; twofold knowledges, intelligence and opinion; and twofold words, the stable and the probable, For whence are knowledges derived, except from the objects of know- ledge? And whence ts the difference of words derived, except from knowledges ? Some therefore say, that it is the logographic art to define previously what. the mode is of the diction, and what kind of person the auditor of it ought to be; and that Aristotle emulated this, and also many others more recent.
L however should say that the disenssion imitates the fabrication itself of things, [ν᾽ αὐ thatunfolds into lightthe invisible lives of the world, but gives subsistence to that which is apparent, and imparts a boundary to it prior to the whole world, thus also Timwus adheres indeed to the theory of the things ; bat also makes the form of the words to be adapted to the things; and antecedently assumes, and previously defines the mode of the whole theory ofthe discussion, in order that he may dispose the whole ofthe doctrine conformably to this definition, Why therefore does he do this now and not before? Because, after the demonstra-
' In the original, ore ες ras nperepas γνώσεις διοριθει, exe ros πραγμασιν τοιε τῶν νοημάτων, Which is evi- dently defective, but may be restored to its genuine meaning by reading, ore δε ras ἡμετέρας γνωσεις
Sopi2et ene rows πράγμασιν, rns ἀντείχετο Ocwpias των νοηματων.
28. Proclus on the ἐν ἐς
tion, that it is requisite the world should be generated, he necessarily detines what the nature of the discussion about: sensible things ought tg be, but not prior to this, the nature of the universe being unknown, But when he calls the world an image, an image of sucha kind is not ἡ to be assumed, as we conceive that of inanimate * natures to) be, as neither is the paradigm unprolitic and ineflicact- ous, but an assimilation must be given to this world to the intelligible. Inthe first place indeed, according to the prolific power ot the paradizin 5 for by its very being it produces the image trom itself. In the second place, according to the demiurgic cause, Which renders the universe most similar to the intelligible, by the energies extended to it. And in the third place, according to. the con- version of the world itself to the forming power and participation of intelligibles. Por “itassimilates itself, as the Oracle says, hastening to be invested with the im-
pression of the images which the intelligible Gods extend to it.”
“ As words therefore are allied to the things themsclves of whica they
are the interpreters.’
As the progression of beings is from the one which is prior’ to the many, and
mundane natures proceed from a monad to their proper number, thus also. the.
discourse of Timieus, beme assimilated, as he says, to beings, commences from one axiom, and the universal, and thus afterwards introduces division to his words. What therefore is the one common axiom, in the words before us?) That itis necessary language should be allied to the things, of which itis the interpreter. And it seems that the Platonists Albinus and Gaius, and their followers, took occasion from hence to define in how many ways Plato dogmatizes ; and that he does this in a twofold respect, either scientifically, ov from probability, and not according to one mode, nor as if all discussions had one accuracy, whether they are concerning beings, or things which subsist through generation ; but such as is the nature of things, such also is that of the words which are divided) in con- Janction with things. Hence they subsist in such a way with respect to accuracy and clearness about the things which are their subjects, that some words assert
the accuracy of the dogmas, but others their probability. For it is necessary that
1 Ou is omitted in the original, >For ῴνχὼν here, itis necessary to read αψυχων,
2 ΤΙρο is omitted in the original.
DIR Te ee
τιν of Plato. 237
Book 11.}
language should be similar to things ; since it could not otherwise interpret their nature, than by being allied to them, Por it is requisite that what the thing is contractedly, that language should be evolvedly ; in order that it may unfold the thing into Jight, and may be subordinate to the nature of it. Hence, the divine causes of language unfold after this manner the essences of the natures prior to them, and are connascent with them. J the Gods therefore, the angel or messenger of Jupiter (i.e. Hermes), who has the relation of logos to the intellect of his father, announces the will of Jupiter to secondary natures. But in essences, soul which is the logos of intelligibles, unfolds the united cause of wholes which ts in them, she receiving from them her hypostasis."| And in the genera superior to us, the angelic order has the relation of logos to the Gods. Very properly therefore, is it here said, that language is allied to the things of which it is the interpreter. This therefore, must be said to be the one* common axiom, prior to the divided particulars. And Timwus in what follows, distributes different modes of words in conjunction with
the quality of the things.
- “ TIence, respecting that which is permanent and stable, and intellec- tually apparent, it is requisite that the words should be as much as possible permanent, without lapse, irreprehensible and immutable. But
in this [stability] the paradigm is in no respect deficient.”
Prior to this, Timeus called the paradigm perpetual being, subsisting invariably the same, and apprehended by intelligence ; but now he calls it permanent and stable; the former indeed, instead of perpetual being, and which is apparent in conjunction with intellect, but the latter, instead of that which is apprehended by intelligence. Tle also denominates: the words respecting it permanent, indeed, in order that through the sameness of the name, he may indicate the similitude of them to things; but wethout lapse, in order that they might adumbrate the firm- ness of the thing. And irreprehensible, in order that they may imitate that which is comprehended by intelligence, and may scientifically accede. For it 15 necessary that words, in order that they may be adapted to intelligibles, should have accuracy and firmness, as being employed about things of this kind. For as the knowledge of eternal natures is without lapse, so likewise is the discourse
* For τὴν υποθεσιν here, it is necessary to read τὴν νποστασιν-. > Ἐν is omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted.
288 PROCLUS ON THE {Book 11.