After this opinion, however, let us direct our attention to Severus, who says that the world stmply considered is indeed perpetual, but that this which now exists, and is thus moved, was eenerated. For there are twofold circulations, as the Elean euest has shown; one of whichis that which the universe now cir- cumvolves, but the other the contrary to it. The world therefore is cenerated, and originated from ἃ eertain principle, which is) the eause of this cireulation. Bat supply considered itis net generated. This interpretation, however, we shall oppose, by observing, that itis net proper to transfer fabulous enigmas to phy- Siology. For how is it possible that the soul which moves the universe, should be weary, and change the ancient circulation? [Tow also is the universe pertect, and suflictent to itsclf fit desires mutation? Pow ean there be an alternate change of circulations, when both that whichis moved, and that which moves, preserve their proper hab? And bow does Timiens say, that the circulation of the nature which is characterized by sameness, is moved to the right hand, according to the demiurgie will, but that which is characterized by ditlerence, to the left hand ? Por ifit is neces- sary that the works of the Deminrgns should remain invariably the same, and be perpetnal, iis likewise necessary that the circulations should be always the same ; and that the period characterized by sameness should be moved to the right hand, bat that which is characterized by diderence, to the left.” For they proceeded at one and the same time from the Demiurgus, and were allotted this circulation. Barther sull, is id not necessary, that inequability must thus be mtroduced to the
' The words την de θάτερον ex’ apecrepa, are omitted ia the original, but evidently ought to be inserted
in this place,
244 PROCLUsS ON ΤῊΣ
[took 1,
motion of the universe’ For every thing which is about to cease from its former motion, and to pass on to another, hastens to the contrary, Le. to rest, and causes the precedaneous motion to waste away. For if it continued tived in the same energy, What Is the cause of the second circulation?" By no means, therefore, are these interpretations which are not physical to be admitted. Nor again, must such explanations be adopted, though they are more rational, as those which asenibe generation to the world, mm conception only, Por thus we may also infer according to conception, aud not according to truth, that there isa Demiurgus of the universe. Por from admitting that the world was generated, it is demonstrated that there is a producing and demiurgic eause of it. Orit may be said, that the universe is admitted to be generated * for the sake of perspicuity, and the doctrinal method, in order that we may Jearn what the numerous goods are, of which it participates, from the demiurgic providence. Por this is mdeed ina certain respect true, yet is not sufficient to the theory of Plato. Por the perspreaous, says Tamblichus, is venerable, when itis adapted to scienee. Por admittines also that the universe is perpetual, it is possible to point out the goods imparted to it by the Gods. And thus much tn opposition to these interpretitrons,
Again, however, let us show from the beginning, after what manner the universe is said to be generated. Por itis neither so according to ὅπ τὸ, through the before mentioned arguments, nor simply because it proceeds froma eause ; since itis not sufficient to say this, Por intellect also ts from: the first eause, and all things after (he one are froma cause, ΜΟῚ 41} things are not generated, Por where does the eternal subsist, fall: things are generated? Por the one is prior to eternity, After what manner therefore, ttmay be said, is the universe generated) As that which now is always becoming to be, and at the same tine always was becoming to be, or rising into existence. For itis not that whieh ts partial Body there. fore, (i. e. partial body) is not only generated, but there is also a time when it was generated. But the whole world alone subsists in becoming to be, and is not at the same time that which was generated. Ttis also according to Aristotle always in the end, the always being temporal, according to temporal infinity, Por as the solar-form light: proceeds from its) proper fountain, thus also the world is always venerated, and always produced, and is always becoming to be, and at the
Pap is omitted in this ploee; aod the sentence ought to be interrogative, Hence instead of τι τὴν QUTNS COTWS ε!εέργείιν, TEs HITE Τὴν δέντεμαν avususrrdews, We ust read ἐπὶ γαρ TYS αὐτὴν ἐστων
crepyeas «XN. with ἃ note of interrogation at theeud.,
* After uredero re saz here, the word σεν τον must be supplied.
rook αι] TIMZUS OF PLATO. 245
same time always was so, Asa composite likewise itis generated. For all | Composition is ceaeration. But if is always composed, it Was always becoming ᾿ to be, with which to be generated conears. And it appears τὸ me that Plate Knowing this, says ἐδ weas generated instead of it is generated, just as of [real] being, hesavs it was, instead of itis: for his words are“ whether it aleays was.” Sor as in the intelligible, the was and is are the same ; for all things are there accord. / Ing to sameness, since all things are in dhe now, which is more mpartible than the now which is according to time; thas also iis generated and it was generated proceed to the same thing inevery sensible nature. For it was generated, as that Which always was becoming to be,and as generated, itis. But that a thing generated, when it is assumed aceording to a certain time, does not indicate that which is simply a composite, is evident: from its opposite. For to. this Plato opposes perpetual being. Tf therefore, perpetual being manifests that which is simple, we must say that what is alone a composite is generated. Bat if eternal heme siguified that which is always according to time, that which is originating trom ἃ certam thing, would be said to be becoming to be. For that which is cenerated is not opposed to the eternal, so far as itis cenerated, but) so far as it participates of time; on which account also it iss generated. That perpetual being, however, [er that which alw avs is,} manifests the eternal, is evident ; since the Deminrgus also who produces time, is called perpetual being, and the para- digm likewise is thus denominated. Hence, it: sicnifies an eternal hypostasis, and not that which participates of temporal perpetuity.
Some one, however, who acnnowledges this ay nevertheless doubt, why we have before καὶ that the world is generated, from having a body? For as there are in ita body, which is alone generated, a divine soul, which always is, and a divine intellect prior to this, why do we say that it is generated on account of its body, and not denominate it unbegotten, on account of its soul, or its intellect? tis said, therefore, that the whole world is every where characterized from form, and not from the subject nature. For do we not call Socrates mortal, though he has an immortal soul, because the animal which is in him is mortal? If, however, you say that we now consider the corporeal-formed nature of the universe, not yet co-arranged with sont, you will speak richtly. Bat when vou see it animated and endued with intellect, vou may eall ita God. Por thus Plato in the Repub- lie calls it a divine generated thing, But inthis dialogue, he thinks fit to denomi- nate the world, a blessed God. In the very words also before us, he ina sreater degree celebrates the universe. For as he is about to call that which is
ri
if
246 PROCLUS ON THE (Book It.
unbegotten [viz. soul] generated, though he attributes an unbegotten subsistence to eternal natures, thus also he calls the world generated. For it is not when denominated generated, diminished by a juataposition with the eternal, He likewise conjoins the becoming to be of it, with if was generated ; in order that as all or the universe, he may evince that it is perfect and being, but as having its essence in time, that it is generated. Te likewise assigns to it the principle ofa certainand not of all generation. And according to its corporeal-formed nature, he calls it, generation, omitting the divine powers in it, through which it is happy, and ts called a God.
Moreover, the demonstration is worthy of admiration, viz. how. scientifically it proceeds from the definition. Llence also, he mverts the order. For inthe hypotheses indeed, he defined that which is generated to be the objcet of opinion butte the demonstration of that which is generated, he assures the converse, in order that he may make the definition to be the middle term, as in demonstra- tions is perfectly requisite. Por this will cause what ts said to be traly a demon- stration, For opinion through ' possessing the reasons of generated natures, introduces the order of eauses with reference to them. Elence itappears to me that Plato is not satistied with the term sensible ma order to demonstrate that the world is generated, but adds also that what is sensible is the object of opinion 5 since sense indeed knows the energy of sensibles, in consequence of suffering by them, but opinion knows also. their essences. Por itantecedently compre- hends the reasons of them. In order, therefore, that he might evince the esscnce of sensibles to be generated, he forms lis demonstration from that which ts the object ofopinton, Farther stu, lis not adding that which ts destructible to that which is venerated, shows his reverential Conceptions of the world; though it ds in a certain respect trae that the world is destructible, as we dave before said. At the sume time, this exhibits tous the caution and reverence of Plato: for having that which is consequent [τὸ the being generated], vet he does not add it; which he ought to admire who thinks that the world was generated according to Plato in time. Por this generated natare which he calls the object of opinion, isat the same time destructible ; but the world is not cestructible at) the same time that itis generated. Hence the world is both destructible and ticerraptuble, yet the philosopher does not call it both these according to the same; for this would be ridiculous ; but he calls it incorruptible, in the same manner as unbe-
gotten, according to time, For if that which ts gencrated according to time,
"Instead of ἡ yap Sofa ra τοὺς Auzous execw τῶν yeryrwy in this place, itis necessary to read y yap
toga τῷ rovs Noyors KA.
Look wd TIMAUS OF PLATO. 247
is corraptible, as atts said to be in the Republie, that which is incorruptible is unbezetten, But ie work! is destructiile, as net bein abl to connect its fo For ws that whieh ts corporeal so faras pertains τὸ itselfis alteramotive, or maved hy another, thus also so faras pertains to itself itis destructible, in consequence of hong connected by something else. Por no body is either generative or connec. live of itself; since every thing which generates, makes; but every thing which mahes is ineorporeal. For though it should be a body, yet it makes by incorporeal powers. Every thing, therefore, which generates is incorporeal ; and every. thing which connects, is efective of a certain thing, viz. it is efleetive of union, and the undissipated. Bat every thing which is effective is impartible. Every thing there- fore connective is impartible. Henee itis impossible for that which connects itself to bea body. Poritis not the province of body to connects; since so. far as itis body, tis partible, as itis said in the Sophista against those who assert that all things are bodies, Bat that which connects is inpartible, Tf however, that whieh is connected is body, but that which couneets is imeerporeal, body is not itself connective of itself Hence that whieh is connected by itse:f is neces- sarily impartble. As therefore body has in its own nature a tinite power, so likewise iis inits own nature destructible, not as being adapted to corruption, but as not naturally capable of preserving itself, nor as corruptible in’ capacity, that vou may also investigate the corruptible in energy, but as incapable of im- partiig Incorruptibility to itself.