Whence, therefore, has it the perpetual, and whenee does it receive intinite power? We reply, from its producing cause. For as it is moved from thence, so likewise it is generated from thence, and is always generated, Por every thing which is generated fren an immoveable cause, is allotted a never-failing nature, as also the damontacal Aristotle says 5 so that according to this reasoning likewise, the world will have the perpetual proceeding from the immoveable (i. e. from the intellectual) fabrication, Since, however, according to its own proper nature it is senerated, it is always generated from the father, But since the world being all anda whele, is not imperfect, in addition to being generated, or beconune to be, it always Was generaied, since, likewise, the motion of itis always in the end, as Aristotle says. Much more, therefore, is the essential gener. Gon of italways in the end, imitating the perfection of its maker. So Mat it is always generated, and always was generated ; not receiving’ at once the whole infinity of the generative
ΛῊ is pecessary here to supply μη δέχομένοι.
248 PROCLUS ON TIE [Book i.
power of its Maker, but always according to the now possessing the ability of existing from this power, and receiving something from it, according to the instantaneous participation of infinity. And it receives the same infinity, indeed, on account of that which is imparted, but on its own account is not able to receive the same at ence. After this manner, therefore, the perpetuity of the world remains, and the weneration of it takes place ; and in this respect the before mentioned men {i. ὁ. Plato and Aristotle} are not at variance. At the same tine, however, they differ, because Plato says, that the essence of the universe is co-extended with all time, but Aristotle supposes that it simply always exists, infers this to be necessary through many arguments, and ascribes to it temporal infinity, asserting at the same time that eternity is stable infinite power. He likewise demonstrates that no infinite power whatever can be present with a finite body, Hence it follows, that the world being corporeal always receives infinite power, but never tras the whole of it, because it is finite, [tis therefore alone trae to say, that from intimnite power itis generated, but ay not, infinitely, But if itis eenerated, It receives infinity on account of infinite time. ΕῸΓ fo be infinite pertains alone to that which is eternal; but a gene raced infinite belongs to that w hichis temporal; for generation is conjoined with time. Hence Aristotle himself is compelled to acknowledge that the world is in a certain respect generated,
Both likewise assert that itis the same in number, but) Plato conformably to principles, says that it is venerated. Por he established: prior to the universe a producing cause, from which he gives subsistence to the universe. But Aristotle does not admit that any eternal nature is an effective cause. And the former, indeed, generates time together with the essence of the universe, but the latter together with motion: for time according to him is that which is numbered. Aristotle, however, is accustomed to do this in his other Preatises. Lor such things as Plato asserts of the ove, Aristotle ascribes to intellect,’ viz. the non- possession of multitude, the desirable, the having no intellectual perception of secondary natures. But such things as Plato attributes to the demiurgic intellect, Aristotle ascribes to the heavens, and the celestial Gods: for according to hin, falrication and providence are from these. Such things also as Plato ascribes to the essence of the heavens, Aristotle attributes to their circular motiun; departing indeed from theological principles, but dwelling more than is fit on physical
* Aristotle in his metaphysical discussions ascends no higher than intelligible intellect, which is with
him the first cause. And perhaps this was in consequence of knowing that all beyond this intellect is
truly ineffable.
Book 11,} Timaus of Plato. 249
productive powers.’ Since, however, the demoniacal Aristotle is very copious in discussing the reciprocations of the generated with reference to the corruptible, and of the unbegotten with reference to the incorruptible, he must be reminded, that Plato much prior to him assents to these axioms; in the Republic indeed asserting that corruption follows every thing which is generated; but in the Phadrus, that the unbegotten is also incorruptible. How is it possible, therefore, since Plato gives generation to the universe, that he should not also introduce corruption to it; or that corrupting that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, he should not give generation to it prior to corruption? The generation of the universe, therefore, was devised by him after a manner different [from its apparent
meaning].
* But we say that whatever is generated, is necessarily generated bv a eS ᾽ ~ 5 -
certain cause.”
The discussion accords with the hypotheses, or rather with the order of the things from which the hypotheses are assumed. Tor as every where form is suspended from the effective cause, so likewise, the first hypotheses are in conti- nuity with the second, and afford a principle to the demonstrations which are consequent to them. For since it was demonstrated according to the first hypo- thesis, that the world was generated, through the object of opinion as a medium, afterwards that which is consequent to this is demonstrated according to the second hypothesis, viz. that it was generated by a cause. For it the world is a thing generated, or becoming to be, but every thing generated is generated by a certain cause, hence the world was necessarily generated by a certain cause. What therefore is the producing cause of the universe? That from which the being generated is present to the world, For it is necessary to investigate this immediately after the present demonstration. And we shall see as we proceed, what kind of arguments Plato uses on this subject.
Now, however, let us briefly recall to our memory, [the reasoning by which it is shown] that every thing which is generated, is necessarily generated by a cer- (ain cause. Every thing gencrated, therefore, is in its own nature imperfect. But being imperfect, it is not naturally adapted to perfect itself; since neither is any other imperfect thing. For every thing which is perfected, is perfected from that
* This is because he discussed metaphysics physically, justas Plato discussed physics metaphysically. Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 21
250 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK 1).
which is in energy. Bat that which is in energy is perfect; so that every thing which perfects another ἐμ always when it perfeetein energy! according to that form to which it gives perfection). ‘Phat however, Which ix generated, so far us it is venerated, is imperfect. Hence that which is generated, so far as it is generated is not naturally adapted to perfect another thing, But if it cannot perfect another thing, much more is it incapable of perfecting itself Phe latter, therefore, is ἃ vreater undertaking than the former, Por that which perfects itself, is also) per- fective of another thing.’ Butifitis not perfected by itself, it is evident that itis perfected by another. For how will it be generated, unless it is perfected ?
Again, therefore, it must be said, the world is generated, But every thing
which is generated being imperfeet, is either perfected: by another thing, or by itself. Hence every thing which is generated, is either perfected by another, or hy itself. But it is not perfected by itsell. It is therefore perfected by another, so that it is generated by a certain cause. Farther still, the world 15. a composite, and has its hypostasis from dissimilars. But if itis a composite, itis either com- posed by itself, or by another, For it is, necessary that composition should be from a eause, unless we intend to make it an accidental thing, and froin chance, If therefore it is composed by itself, again it will perfect itself, and give subsis- tence to itself, and we shall ignorantly transfer it to an incorporeal essence. Vor how will it compose itself? Will it be from the parts arranging themselves? But thus we shall make bodies to be self-motive. Or will it be from impelling each other? And what in this case is that which primarily moves them, And how is itholy to commit the whole world to such like impulsions and contrivances ? How likewise will there be order from things deprived of order, and ornament from things unadorned? For every where that which makes is better than its effect, and that which generates, than the thing generated. And if indeed the parts are the material causes of the composition of the world, what ' αἰ which made them? For this is what we investigate. Buatif they are the eflicient causes, how is it possible that thingsunadorned ean be eflective of things that are adorned, and disorderly natures, of such as have order and arrangement? Tf however the world is not composed by itself, it is evident that it has this composition: from another. Hence if the world is a composite,’ but that which isa COMposile is
. ν * Tustead of ἀεὶ ον ἐστι ἴῃ this place, we should doubtless read ἀεὶ εὐ ἐργεια ἐστι. τ Instead of τὸ yap εαυτίν τελειωτίκον cor, which is evidently defective, it seems requisite to read ro yap ἐαντὸ τελειοῦν, saca\Xov re λειωζίκον ἐστι».
"δ υθετον is omitted inthe original,
noox τι TIMEUS OF PLATO. 251
composed by a certain cause, the world therefore has its generation from a cause. Hence too, trom these things it is manifest, that what is generated, is generated by a certain cause.
It is not however wonderful, if Plato calls the cause of every thing generated, _ acertain cause. For the cause of all things, is stmply cause, and not ἃ certain cause ; concerning which he also says, that it is the cause of all beautiful things. For itis simply God. Butevery divinity posterior to it is @ certain God, as for instance, demiurgic or vivific. The cause therefore of generated natures is a cer- tain cause, as differing from the cause ofall. Hence, he says, that what is gene- rated, 15 generated by a certain cause. It is also well that Plato says one’ cause precedes the whole of generation, For multitude is co-arranged about one prin- ciple, and the many unities about the one. But with respect to other physiologists, some rank cause with con-causes; others recur to physical powers; others to dispersed infinite principles; others to‘ nature ; and others to soul. Plato, how ever, dismisses indeed these causes, but supposes that there is one cause which is the first of all causes. For with this cause, the psychical order indeed co-ope- rates, but nature is ministrant to it, and all con-causes are subservient to it, and are moved conformably to its will, Because, therefore, the demiurgic monad pre- cedes multitude, he denominates this monad a cause: for this is significant of unity. Because, however, it has not the first order among causes, nor is impar- ticipable,” he adds the word certain. So that the words “ by a certain cause,” have the same signification as, by one cause indced, yet not the first cause. Hence, neither is it reasonable immediately to produce that which is generated, but that which is eternal, from éhe one ; in order that from the one, which is prior to eternity, every eternal nature may proceed ; but from an eternal nature, that which is gene- rated and temporal. And that selfsubsistent natures likewise may proceed from that which is superior to beings that produce themselves; but from these, those that are generated by others, Vor the series and order of things which proceed from the one, is continued; and things nearer to the principle, give subsistence to such as are more remote from it.
“Tt is difficult, therefore, to discover the maker and father of this uni- verse, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men.” * For we here, itis requisite to read εἰς
* The demiurgic monad, (i.e. Jupiter or the Demiurgus,) is not imparticipable because it immedi- ately illuminates, or is con-subsistent with, intellectual intellect. See the 6th Book of my Translation
of Proclus on the theology of Plato.
252 PROCLUS ON THE [pook νυ".
It has been rightly observed by some prior to us, that Plato having shown that the world was generated by a cause, immediately after ascends to the God who is the Demiurgus of it, in a manner worthy of his intellectual conceptions, Vor it seems that the artificial nature of the progeny, introduces a rational and divine cause, and not accident or chance, which are neither causes, nor have an hypo- static power, nor in short, sustain the well-ordered progression of beings. [1 is requisite, however, that we should first examine the words themselves, and after- wards thus recur to the whole theory.