was visible. But if not every thing, then the reasoning of Atticus is unsyllo- gistic and conclusive of nothing. Unless he should say, indeed, that the world 15 visible and tangible, but that what was moved in a confused and disorderly man- ner, is not now visible, but was so prior to the fabrication of the world; since Plato also speaks in this manner when he says, “ every such thing as was visible, and was moved in a confused and disorderly manner.” But in the words before us he says, “ for it is visible and tangible, and has a body.” He shows therefore that every thing which is visible and tangible, was generated, but not that which was visible and tangible. Though, therefore, these things should be asserted hy Atticus; for the man is skilful in defending what he advances ; it must be said in answer to him, that there is nothing of this kind in the definition of that which is generated, but it is simply said, that every thing generated is the object of opinion in conjunction with irrational sense. So thatif there is any thing which is entirely sensible, such thing will be generated. But every thing visible is sensible; and therefore that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, is generated. In addition to which we may also say ‘that Plato calls this very disorderly thing itself generated, For he says that prior to the generation of the world, there were \ three things, being, place and generation, subsisting in the vestiges of forms. Hence that disorderly nature was generated, as well as that which is visible. It is not proper therefore to say that it was unbegotten according to time, and that the universe was generated ; but either both were generated according to Plato, or both were unbegotten. For both are similarly said by him to be visible and | 4 generated. If however both were generated, the world prior to being gene- rated such as it now is was changed into the confused: for to a contrary, the generation is entirely from a contrary. And if he who made the world is good, how is it possible he should not adapt it in a beautiful manner, or that having beautifully adapted it, he should corrupt it? But if he is not good, how not being good, did he make it to be arranged and adorned? For it is the province of a good being to adorn and arrange other things. If, however, 7 being visible and generated, it is not generated according to time, it is not neces- sary immediately to make the universe to be generated in time, because it is visible and generated. And thus much against Atticus.
But let us recur to our principles, and discuss the affair as follows: Whether is the world perpetual being, in the same maaner as the eternal, or is it not
tf
* For gws here, it is necessary to read payer,
440 PROCLUS ON THE [poox i.
eternal, but consubsistent with time? And whether is it self-subsistent, or produced ἡ by another? Such then is the inquiry. But the answer is, that it is produced by another, and is consubsistent with time. A thing of this kind however, is generated. For if it has a composite form, it has a ceneration according to the composition. And if it alone subsists from another cause, it is generated, as not being itself productive of itself. If likewise it is not * eternal, it has the whole of its hypostasis according to time. For it is fabricated on account of another, and is generated as a flowing image of being. Hence, as that which is composite is to that which is simple, and as time is to eternity, so is generation to essence, Tf, therefore, a simple and uniform essence is eternal, the essence which is composite, multiform, and conjoined with time, is generation, For it is divinely said by Plato, that the world originated from a certain principle, For thet which is generated ina portion of time began from a temporal, from a producing, from a final, from a material, and from a formal cause. Lor since principle is multifariously predicated that which was once generated has a begin- ning of generation according to all these causes. The world however originated from a certain, and not from every principle, What therefore is this principle ? You must not say it is a temporal principle. Por that which originates from this is also allotted the principle of generation from all the rest, But it onyinated froin that principle, In which he afterwards instructs us, IT mean the most proper, or the final principle. For it was generated on account of the good ; and this is the principle from which its generation originated, He says therefore that this is the most proper principle, so that this may be called the principle of the genera- tion of the world. lence in the first place he shows that the world is generated from its composition; forit is visible and tangible. Phese, therefore, are the extremes of the universe. For heaven is visible, but earth is tangible, And visibility is in earth so far as it participates of light; and tangibility in heaven, so far as a terres: trial nature is antecedently comprehended in it according to cause, But the world is simply {visible and tangible], ! and has a body in order that you may also assume the middle plenitudes which it contains, And this again is asserted by Plato conformably to the oracle, which says: /é ts an tnitation of intellect, but that which is fabricated has somethings of body. So far, therefore, as the universe
* For rayoperoy here, read rapayoperoy.
* For μὲν here, itis requisite to read μη.
> The words oparoy καὶ axroy appear to me to be omitted ia this place,
Book 11. τι Eus Ov Plato. βυ
has something corporeal, it is generated ; for according to this it is visible and tanzible, But every thing visible and tangible, is sensible 5 for sense is touching and secing. That however which is sensible is the object of opinion, as being mingled from sensibles, and not able to preserve the purity of intelligible forms. But every thing of this kind ts generated, as having a composite essence. ;
Plato, therefore, does not subvert the perpetuity of the universe, as some who follow the Aristotelian hypotheses faney he does. And that this is true we may easily learn from hence. | He says that time was generated together with the heaven oY universe. If therefore time is perpetual, the universe also is perpetual.
πε if the universe had a temporal beginning, then time also had a temporal beginning, which is of all things the most impossible." They say, however, that time is twofold, the one disorderly, but the other proceeding according to number, For motion is twofold, the one kind disorderly and confused, but the other orderly and elegant. But there is a time * co-ordinate to each of these motions. That a body, however, may be moved equably or anomalously is possible 5 but it is impossible to conceive an equable and anomalous time. For thus the essence of time will be a composite. And why do 1 say this? For when the motion is anomalous, time is equable. There are now, therefore, many motions 3 and some are switter, but others slower, and one is more equable than another ; but there is one continued time -of all these, and which proceeds according to number. Ehence itis not τι τ, thus to make a twofold time. If, however, time is one and continued; ifindeed itis unbegotten, the universe also is unhegotten, Which is consubsistent with time. But if it was generated, an absurdity will follow 3 since time, in order that it may be generated, will be in want of time, and this, though it does not yet exist. For when time was gencrated, time was not yet.
Farther still, Plato conjoins the soul of the universe immediately on its being generated, with body, and does not give to it life prior to the corporeal-formed nature, but as soon as itis constituted incloses it in body. Moreover, he “says ‘ that soul ranks among beings that always exist. If, therefore, he makes body and soul to be consubsistent, but soul always exists, according to him body also is perpetual. Vor that which is at once consubsistent with the perpetual, is unbe-
' Instead of σι δε APXNY EXEL χρονικὴν, καὶ ο οὐρανὸς σρχην εξει XPorANY, in this place it seems to be necessary toread, εἰ δε ovparos ἀρχὴν EXEL χρονικὴν, Καὶ ὁ ypovos ἀρχὴν eee χρονικην. * For xpory here, it is requisite tu read ypovos.
Tim. Plat. Vou -: ae ἢ
242 PROUCLUS ON TIE {[Buok 11,
gotten. Again, Timwus here says, that the soul was generated ; but Socrates in the Phadrus says, it is unbegotten, Hence, he after another manner calls that eenerated, which is clearly unbesotten according to time, Farther still, he saye that the world is incorruptible, which is also granted by those who oppose him, But in the Republic he clearly asserts, or rather the Muses, that every thing we- nerated is necessarily corrupted, assuming in this place generation according to time. From these things, therefore, you may understand what Tsay: for the world is thus demonstrated to be unbegotten, Por if the world is incorruptible, hut nothing which is generated according to time is incerrupuble, the world ts not generated aceording to time, What occasion 15 there, however, for these syllogisms ? Por Plato in the Laws clearly says, Ghat tre ds infinite aecording to the past, and thatin this infinity there have been myriads on ΔῊΝ εἰν of barren and fertile periods of men. Por investigating the begin of a polity, from which cites change into virtue and vice, he adds se! But you wall say, frou whence 2 7 indeed think from the length and infinity of time, and the mutations whiel take place wna thing of this kind” Ov rather that we may argue from what ts tin our hands, a little prior to this, we may hear him saying, that “where there is neither catreme heat or cold, there the race of men aleays evivts more or icss numerous.” Bacit the race of men always enists, the universe also is necessarily perpetual,
Again, therefore, if the Deuiuurgus ranks among eternal betigzs, he does not at one time fabricate, and at another not. Por if he did, he would not have an in-
variable sameness of subsistence, and immutability. Βα εὐ he always fabricates,
that which is fabricated by him always exists. For why, being willinaly at rest
for an Infinite time, did he at leneth convert: himself to fabrication? Was it because he apprehended it to be better? But was he, prior to this, tznorant that itwas betteror not? Por itis absurd, betae intellect, that he should be ignorant; since there will be about him both tooraice and hoowledge. Bat ithe ον this, why did he not before begin to generate and produce the world? Numa it it was better, why did he not persevere in this enerey, iit be lawful so to speak ! For it is not holy to conceive that, being intellect and al God, he would) pursue that which os fess instead of that whieh is more beautiful Dt is necessary, how- ever, to admit these things, Wf the world is generated according to ime, and is net consubsistent with the infinity of time. Those also appear to me to sin against
V Instead of ἀλλὰ ry ἀπειρίᾳ tou κυσμον συνηλεστων ait this place, it is necessary to read «ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ απειρίᾷτου KPUdUU GUM OTWS.
nook χε] ΓΜ ΠΝ OF PLATO, 243
the Deminrgus of the world, in another way, who say that the world once was not. For if it once was not, there was a time in which the Demiurgus did not make it. For that which is made, and that which makes, subsist together. But if there was atime in which he did not make, he was then a maker in capacity. And if he was in eapacity, he was imperfect, and afterwards perfect when he made. Tf, however, there is prior and posterior about him, itis evident that he docs not belong to natures which energize eternally ; but that he passes from not making aceording to tine, to making. Moreover, he produces time. How therefore having an energy which is in want of tine, does he produce it through this energy?) For he once produced tine, of which he is indigent, in’ order that by his eflective energy he may produce time. This, therefore, cannot be otherwise.