disturbed. For prior to a distinct evolution, he follows the accustomed mode of speaking. Hence also, when celebrating the Demurgus he says, “he was good,” though the Demiurgus ranks among eternal natures. And speaking of the paradigm, he collects both these together at once: for he says, “Zhe nature of animal itself therefore was being eternal ;” together with αἰώνιος, ovra being eternal, assuming τὸ eruyyave was. And in addition to all that has been said, because the power of every finite body is not infinite, as Aristotle has demonstrated, but eter- nity is an infinite power, hence every finite body is incapable of receiving eternity. It is necessary therefore that it should not always Je, but should always be gene- rated, or becoming to be, receiving as much as possible a flowing existence.
Being, therefore, as 1 have said, and perpetual being, manifest the eternal. But “ that which was generated,” signifies the being allotted an hypostasis, mea- sured by time, such as is a sensible nature, which also 1s apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense. It has however been already said by us, that the intel- ligible is sclf-subsistent and eternal; but that the sensible nature is produced by something different from itself, and is con-subsistent with time. For the eternal in number is one thing, and the temporal another. And the former is in number,
Book 11. Tim.Tus of Plato. 935
but the latter iy generated in number. For to the former eternity is conjoined, but to the latter time. That which is generated likewise, thouch it is said to be per- petual, has an hypostasis co-extended with ali time, and which is always gene- rated, and always adorned by its producing cause. If therefore, perpetual being manifests the eternal, but that which has a principle of generation signifies that which is produced by another cause ; for such is that which is always generated ; but Plato always inquires, whether the world always was, or has the principle of acertain generation ;—this being the case, an inquiry of this kind will be the same asx an investigation. whether the world belongs to eternal natures, or to things which are generated according to the whole of time; and whether it belongs to self-subsistent natures, or to things which are adorned by another cause,
Farther still, that which is generated belongs to things which are multifariously predicated, For this very thing which has a temporal beginning, and is so much spoken of, is called generated, whether it arrives at being through generation, or without generation, as Aristotle says. Every thing likewise which proceeds from _ a cause, is called generated, that also which is essentially a composite, and that which has a generable nature (or which is naturally capable of being generated] though itshould not have been generated 3 such asis that which has a visible nature, thoughit should not be seen. That which is generated therefore, being predicated multifariously, that which is generated according to time, has all the generations. For it proceeds from a cause, is a composite, and has a generable nature. Tt does not, however, entircly follow that what is generated after another manner, has all the generations. [If therefore Plato had inquired whether the universe has all the gencrations,} or not all," we should say that he investigated whether itis generated according to time, or has not a temporal principle of generation. Since, however, this is not the case, but he asks whether it has no principle whatever of generation, or has a certain principle of it, he renders it manifest to those who have the smal- lest degree of intelligence, that he does not doubt about its temporal beginning, but whether the universe, since there are many generations, has a certain princi- ple of generation. For if it has no principle whatever of generation, it belongs to eternal and self-subsistent natures, in which there is not generation, because neither is there time. For though we sometimes speak of the generations of the
+ It seems that the following words are wanting in this place in the original: εἰ τοινυν ecnre 9
πλατων ποήέρον Τὸ παν πασαξέχει PAS γενεσειξ.
236 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.
Gods, yet we say this indicating their ineffable progression, and the difference of secondary natures with reference to the causes of them. Theologists, however, previously subverting all such doubts, in order that the generations of the Gods may be rationally devised by them, call the first principle of things Time, because it is ft that where there is generation, time should precede, according to which and on account of which generation subsists. With these, therefore, cause and time are the same; since also with them progression is the same as generation. That however which is truly generated, is that which does not generate itself, but is generated by another, becomes the image of another thing, 15 composed of many dissimilar things, and always receives a renovated hypostasis; with which also time is conjoined. It Vkewise has a never-failing generation, co-extended with the infinity of time, and is always becoming to be one and the same in num- ber, but is not one according to an eternal subsistence. But that which is. thus generated you may say proceeds from non-being. For that which is self-subsis- tent, being generated by itself, does not proceed from non-being. For though youmay divide it by conception into cause and effect, yet it proceeds from being. For the maker and that which is made are one, so that it proceeds from the being of itself, Hence also it: is eternal, never at any time deserting itself, But that which is alone from another thing, subsists from non-being, because it no longer is when separated from its cause; and the cause 15 different from the effect. Thus, therefore, the physical axiom δ may be adapted according to analoy to this generated nature : and that which is always generated and illuminated by being, to that which is always in time, But this is evident; forif you take away the maker, the universe is immediately imperfect ; which is likewise the case with every thing that is 51}}} generated. At one and the same time, however, the universe is generated and perfect, and is always venerated. H{ence also its pey- -petuity and its perfection, are according to the whole of time. For time was generated together with the heaven (or the universe], not a part of time, but all time: so that the heaven is generated in an infinite time, and is never-failing both with respect to beginning and end, in the same manner as time. Thus, there- fore, it is also said to have a principle of generation, and to originate from a cer- tain other principle. And in the first place, indeed, it originates as he says from the most proper principle, the final. For from this, the generating cause com- mences the generation of the world. In the next place, the generation of the
i.e. That the cause is different from the effect.
Book 11.] Timeus of Plato. 237
world subsists with reference to the final principle, and as the world is always becoming to be, it is beginning to be generated, and possesses the end of it, through generation in the whole of time. For with respect to the world, if was generated, is not one thing, and iis generated another; as neither is the begin- ning of it one thing, and the end another. That, therefore, which is generated in a part of time, begins at one time, and is perfected at another; but that which ts gencrated in the whole of time is always beginning, and is always perfect: And it has indeed, a certain principle of generation, which is perfected by some- thing different from itself, but it has not a certain principle, as not having the be- ginning ofa certain partial time. For since generation is multifarious, the prin- ciple also of it is multifarious. So that the generation which subsists through the whole of time ἢ is a certain generation, and this principle is the principle of a certain, and not of all generation. What therefore is this generation? That which has both the beginning * and the end contracted together [so as to be si- multaneous]. Because therefore the world is a body, it is generated, and has a principle or beginning of generation. But because intellect is the maker of it, it was generated, and has an end of generation. Through both, however, it is rising into existence, and is perfect according to generation, was generated, is always becoming to be, and is gencrated. For these do not” subsist at one and the same time, in things which are generated in a part of time. Thus for instance the motion of the heavens, not being generated in a part of time, is always, as Aristotle says, in the end ; but this is not the case with motions on the earth.
“It was generated. Tor it is visibie and tangible, and has ἃ body. But all such things are sensible. And sensibles are apprehended by Opinion in conjunction with sense, and appear to be things which are becoming to be, and are generated.”
As the Demiurgus of wholes looking to himself, and always abiding in his own accustomed manner, produces the whole world, totally and at once collectively, and with eternally invariable sameness ; for he does not make at one time, and
at another not, lest he should depart from eternity ; after the same manner also
* xpovoy is omitted in the original. * apxn also is omitted in this place in the original. ? It is necessary to supply ovy here.
248 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ τι.
Timeus, being converted to himself, delivers the whole theory, recurring to in- tellect from dianoia, and proceeding into a reasoning process from intellect; doubting, therefore, and interrogating himself, he energizes according to the self- motive nature of soul; but in answering he imitates the projecting energy of in- tellect.. For he first comprehends the dogma in one word γέγονε, it was generated, and proclaims the conclusion prior to the demonstration, directly after the manner of those who energize enthusiastically. For these see the whole collec- tively, and contract in intellect the end prior to the egress, perceiving all things at once. But syllogizing, he descends from intellect to logical progressions, and the investigation through demonstration of the nature of the world. Hence, in a manner perfectly divine, he shows from the hypotheses the whole form of the universe. For if the world is visible and tangible, and has a body, but that which is visible and tangible, and has a body, ts sensible, and that which is sen- sible is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense, and is generated, the world therefore is generated. fence he shows this demonstratively from the de- finition, according to a conversion’ of the definition ; since geometricians also use demonstrations of this kind.* And thus much concerning the form of the words. ΐ Since, however, as we have said, he asks whether the universe is eternal, or has a certain principle of generation, he answers, if was generated From this, therefore, itis evident that he gives a certain generation to the world: for this was the other part of the before-mentioned opposition, — If, however, this be the case, he establishes the universe remote from temporal generation ; for if the world has a certain, and not every principle of generation, but that which is generated in time has the principle of every generation, the world was not generated in tume. Farther still, let us also consider the wonderful hypotheses of Atticus, who says that what was moved in ἃ confused and disorderly manner is unbegotten, but that the world was generated in’ time, and let us speak concerning this assertion, “7 was generated.” | Since, therefore, Atticus admits that there is a cause of generation, let us see what the nature of this cause is according to him; for the world is visible and tangible. Whether, therefore, was every thing sensible generated in time, or not every thing? If indeed every thing, then that which was moved in a confused and disorderly manner will be generated in time: for he says that this alsg
* For exirpoxny here, it is necessary to read exwrpogny.
> See this explained farther on.
1 Γέγονε is omitted here in the original,