hypothesis, when he says, it is supposed by us with respect to things which have a natural subsistence, that either all or some of them are moved. For it is entirely necessary that there should be motion, if the discussion of the physical theory ts to proceed with success ; since nature is a principle of motion. But in his trea- tise On the Heavens, prior to every thing else, he assumes those hypotheses con- cerning which Plotinus says, that Aristotle will tind no ditiiculty in his discussion if his hypotheses about the fifth body are admitted, meaning these five 3 that the motion is simple of a simple body ; that a simple body has a certain simple motion accord- ing to nature ; that there are two simple motions ; that one motion is contrary to one ; and that the thing which has not a contrary, has not that which can corrupt it. From which hypotheses, he frames bis demonstrations concerning the fifth body. Aristotle, however, shows that the universe is unbegotten, from the hypotheses ς but Plato that it is generated. Whether therefore, they are discordant or not, will shortly atter be manitest to us. And this, indeed, will again be considered, Why, however, does Plato, who is accustomed to employ, when speaking of intelligibles, the terms αὐτὸ ἐπεί, and ὁπερ that which, now assume neither of these, but rather prefers the term ass aleays, as connascent with being. Vor this also is attended with a doubt, through what cause he employs the third of these terms, 1. e. always, ax better adapted to signify the nature of truly existing being. In answer to this it may be said, that the term itself manifests the simplicity of mitellisibles, a subsistence according to hyparais, and an evistence which is pronary, which is asserted conformably to the peculiarity, according to which imtellizibles are primarily that which they are, and jill secondary natures with the participation of themselves. But the term that which ws, indicates purity, the unmingled, and the not being filled with a contrary nature. And the ever manifests the eternal, the immutable, and the invariable, according to hypostasis. Thus for instance, when we say the beaatiful ‘vse/f, and the just σεν, we survey beauty which is not so by the participation of the beautiful, and justice which is not so by the par- ticipation of the just; but that which is primarily beautiful, and that which is primarily just. But when we say that which is beautiful we mean that whieh is not mingled with deformity, nor contaminated by its contrary, such as is material beauty, which is situated in deformity, and is itself replete with its subject nature, And when we use the term cver or a/ways)we indicate beauty which is not at one _tme beautiful, and at another not, but which is eternally beautiful. So that the “first of these terms manifests the simplicity of intelligibles, and the sepplyimg all other things from themselves. For such is the beantifal ἠδ by which
BOOK 11.j TIM.£2ZUs OF PLATO. 201
all beautiful things are beautiful, and the equal itse//, by which alLequal things are equal, and in asimilar manner in other things ofthis kind. But the Second of these terms, indicates onlyness and purity, the unmingled and the undefiled. For the that which is this, i, e. itis something which is not various, and which does not at- tract to itself any thing of a foreign nature. And the erer manifests immutability, for the ever is this. Yet it does not simply indicate immutability, but a perma- nency in eternity. Fora ¢emporal ever is one thing, and an efernal ever, another ; the latter being every thing collectively and at once; but the former being co-ex- tended with the whole continuity of time, and being infinite. And the latter subsisting in the now, but the former, in interval, the interval being unceasing, and always in generation, or becoming tobe. The term therefore itself, is derived to > beings from the paradigm. For that is the cause of simplicity to beings, and ot! imparting to other things that which it primarily possesses. But the term that)” which is, is derived from the one being. For that is primarily exempt from non- being, and privation ; because it is primarily being, and all things subsists in it occultly and indivisibly. And the term ever, is derived from eternity. For as the one being is the supplier of existence,‘ so eternity imparts perpetuity to intelligibles. Tleuce, if Plato had been speaking about participants and things participated, and: for this purpose had required being, he would have inquired what being thself is. And αὐ he had been discussing things unmingled, and things that are mingled, he would have used the term that which is. But since he dis- courses about) generation and the unbezotten, and for this purpose requires these definitions, he very properly inquires what that ts which is always being. For this! distinguishes the eternal from that which is temporal, in the same manner as the > unbegotten distinguishes eternity. Hence also the nature of animal itself, which. is comprehensive ofall intelligible animals, is eternal; but time was generated together with heaven, as Plato says in the course of the dialogue.
Moreover, though perpetual being is said to proceed from a cause, yet it must - \ Se
not beasserted that it is generated according toall causes, but that it is according to } them. For itis δὲ ο, that onaccount of which, and προς 0, that with relation to which, and υφ᾽ ov, that by which. For perpetual being is self-subsistent, and is not gene- rated by itself, lest not existing at a certain time, it should be geuerated. For that which is generated, when it is becoming to be is not. Nor is it gene- rated with relation to itself, lest it should be a composite. Nor on ac-
‘ Instead of ws yap πον εἰναι ro ev ov, it is necessary toread ws yap rov εἰναι κ. A.
Tim. Plat. Voi. τὺ
209 PROCLUS ON THE [ποοκ i-
count of itself, \est it should be imperfect. But that which is generated is sus- pended from another thing, and has its progression from other causes ; and such is every corporeal-formed nature. After what manner however, js that which is generated never being, concerning which Plato speaks clearly in the Sophista? Not that it is non-being,’ but that it is never ¢ru/y being. Now, however, it is said to be never at any time being, because being has a prior arrangement In an eter- nal nature; but that which is generated, is never that which always ts. Mf, therefore, existence, so far as it is being, is unreceptive of non-existence, itis evident: that what is generated, since it has the being which is init, of Whatever kind it may be, mingled with non-being, is never at any time being, soas to be genuinely being 5 and being which subsists by itself, since this pertains to real existence alone, which has notin a certain respect non-existence in conjunction with existence, at one
and the same time being and not being.
“ The former of these, indeed, is comprehended by intelligence in cone junction with reason, since it always subsists with invariable sameness, But the latter is perceived by opinion, in conjunction with irrational sense, since it is generated and corrupted, and never truly is.”
“#9? To theseit happens, that they err in tiany otherrespects, and that they coim- prehend in the definitions the things defined. Por what perpetual being is, which the first definition assumes is explained, and is said to be that which always sub- sists with Invariable sameness; and this the second definition assumes, saying it is that which is generated and corrupted, but never truly is. This, however, ix to accuse both themselves and Plato of unskilfulness in) dialectic. But others dividing the sentence, show that imeach of the colons there are definition, and the thing defined. For in’ the former colon, the words, “ ¢hat which is (0))}}- prehended by intelligence in conjunction wth reason, are ἃ deimition ; but) the words, “ since it always subsists with invartable sameness,’ are the thine defined. And in the second colon, the words ‘is perceived by opanion in conjunction with irrational sense,” are given as adetinition; but the remaiming part ofthe sentence, is the thing defined. To these men it will be found our preceptor vas well replied. For by a little transposition of the words, the whole will be immediately apparent as follows: That which aleays subsists with. invariable sanieness, is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason: but that which is generated and cor-
Me Porcuy ore τὸ μὲν ον ἐστιν, i this place, itis requisite to read οὐχ ore τὸ μὴ ov ἐστιν.
The beginning of this commentary, ts unfortunately wanting.
Book 11} TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 203
rupted, and never truly is, is perceived by opinion, in conjunction with irrational sense. For these things are consequent to what was before said, “what is that which ts always being but is without generation,” and “ what is that which is generated, but is never [real] being 3” that which always subsists with invariable SAMENCSS, signifying the same thing as, that which is without generation ; and that which is gencrated, but is never (reall, being, having the same signification as, that which never truly is, though they are more obscurely announced. And through the addition of ¢ru/y Plato indieates that so far indeed as it is generated, it is not; but that so far as it brings with it an image of being, so far it is not generated. For in the definitions, he renders the things defined more clear through the additions. Thus, one of the definitions says, “which is aleays being,” in order that by the term akeays we may not understand temporal perpetuity, but the elernal. For this is all at once, and subsists with invariable sameness. But temporal per- petuity, is co-extended with the infinity of time. Thus, too, the other definition has, “ that which is generated,” and together with it also says, “and is corrupted,” in order that we may not understand by generations simp/y progressions, which are also aseribed to the Gods who are beyond being, but progressions which are co-ordinate with destruction. The assigned definitions, therefore, are such as. follow: Perpetual being, is that which is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, That which is gencrated is perceived by opinion in conjunction with irrational sense.
Por these detinitions, however, it is usual to accuse Plato, in the first place, indeed, that he does not assume genus, as the rules of definitions require. In the next place, that he does not manifest what the nature is of the things defined, but It is necessary, however, prior to this
distinguishes them by our knowledge. But [in defence of Plato]
habitude, to consider things themselves by themselves. we shall demonstrate the very contrary, viz. that those who are accustomed thus to doubt perfectly err. For what kind of genus has a place in being, which comprehends every intelligible essence? For if essence has no genus prior to itself, nor definition, since it is most generic, what can you say respecting being which is comprehensive of every essence, and of all powers and energics? Neither, a fore, is being the genus of eternal being: for if it was, it would not be simply | being, but a certain being. Nor is non-being the genus of eternal being lest we / should ignorantly make eternal non-being. For every where genera are predicated of species. Hence, there is not a gents of being. Besides, is not a definition
derived from knowledge adapted to theory, and to the proposed definitions? For if,
204 PROCLUS ON THE. [ΒΟΟΧ 11.
as we said before, Plato wished to use these axioms and hypotheses in the demon- strations which he intended to make, it was necessary that they should be known and manifest to us. If, indeed, he had exhorted us to mvestigate the nature of things, itselfin itself, he would have ignorantly filled the whole of his doctrine de- finitions with obscurity. But as he wished to make known through definitions being and that which is gencrated, he produced the demonstri ions through things that are known, and clearly represents to us the peculiarity of them, in order that being excited and perfected, we may more manife stly survey what each of them is. Forsince every thing gnostte, is either the thing known itself, or perceives, or possesses the thing known ; for intellect, indeed, is the intelligible, but sense perceives
what is sensible, and dianoia possesses in itself the dianoetic object ; aud as we are not naturally adapted to become the intelligible, but know itthrough the power im us which is conjoined with it; this being the case, we require this power, and through this the nature of being ts macs ntous. After this manner, therefore, we answer the doubts. ᾿