Itis requisite, however, to observe how Plato proposing to himself the problems, renders each of them manifest, both affirmatively and negatively. But viving an answer to each, in perpetual being, indeed, he assumes the affirmative alone, but in that which is generated, the negative, adding to italso, * ad which is destroyed.” He, also, explains the words, * but which is never being,” through the assumption of, “ never truly is.” For since being is characterized by existence alone, but that which is generated by non-existence, he assumes the one, alone defining it, and says, subsisting invariably the same; but he assumes the other together with hegation, yet not with negation alone, because definitions respect affirmations, and signify that which in each thing is inherent. Itis not, however, wonderful, if he not only says * which is generated,” ut also, “ and corrupted.” Vor as he adds to beimg, the words, “ subsisting with meariable sameness,” and not only says, if is akeays ; 50. likewise to that which ty venerated he adds, “ and corrupt- ed.” For this so faras it is generated, is different from perpetual bemg; but so far as it is corrupted, it differs from that which is invariably the same, Por that which is generated, so far as it is generated and corrupted, is incapable of con- necting itself; since if it were, it would also be able to produce itself. Assuming therefore each by itself, i.e. being and that which is generated, he assumes the former as that which is above generation, but the latter, ἀπ. that which is not indestructible. So that when the representation of being accedes to that which is generated, it is able after a certain manner to abide in a condition of always becoming to be.
voox tt] TIMAUS OF PLATO. 205
Let us however, consider each of the words by itself, through which he ccm- poses the propositions ; and in the first place, let us see in how many ways intelli- gence subsists, and collect by a reasoning process the other progressions of it. The first intelligence therefore, is the intelligible, which passes into the same with the intelligible, and is not any thing different from it. This also is essential intelligence, and essence itself, because every thing in the intelligible subsists after this manner, viz. essentially and intelligibly. The second intelligence is that which®onjoins intellect with the intelligible, possessing a peculiarity which is con- nective and collective of the extremes, and existing as life and power, filling indeed intellect from the intelligible, but establishing it in the intelligible. The third is the®eonjoined intelligence in a divine intellect" itself, being the energy of intellect, through which it comprehends the intelligible it contains, and accord- ing to which it intellectually perceives, and is what itis. Por this intelligence is energy, and intelligence itself, but is not intelligible intelligence. Nor does it exist as power, but (as we have said), as energy, and intellectual intelligence. The Yntellige ‘nce of partial intellects has the fourth order. For each of these
possesses this *
and entirely contains in itself a certain conjoined intelligible and intelligence. Or rather each has all these partially, viz. intellect, intelligence, and the intelhetble, through which also it is conjoined to total intellects, intellec- tually perceives each of these, and likewise the whole intellizible world. The fitth : intelligence is that of the rational soul. For as the rational soul is called intellect, thus also the knowledge of it is intelligence, and transitive intelligence, and has time connascent with ᾿ self. But the sixth intelligence, if you are willing also to con- numerate this, isphantastic knowledze, or the knowledge of the imagination, which by some is denominated intelligence; and the phantasy is called by them passive intellect, δ because it knows such things as it does know, inwardly, and accompa- med with resemblances and figures. For itis common to all intelligence lo have the chjects of tts knowledge inward. For in this also intelligence diflers from. sense. In one order however, intelligence is the thing known itself. In another it ranks asx the second, but sees that which is first totally. In another it is partially the thing Known, but sees wholes also through that which is partial. In another it sces indeed wholes, but at the same time partially and not at once, And in
* Ta the original, τρίτη δε ἢ ev avty Geup συξυγος vonoes, But it is necessary alter θείῳ to supply oy. * For τοῦτον here, it is requisite to read ravrny. ὁ The phantasy is thus called by Aristotle.
206 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 1}.
another, the vision is accompanied with passion. So many therefore, are the differences of intelligence.
Now, however, phantastic intelligence must not be assumed ; since this is not naturally adapted to know truly existing being. For it is indefinite, because it knows the object of its perception accompanied with figure and morphe. But perpetual being is unfigured. And in short, no irrational knowledge is able to survey being itself, since neither is adapted to perceive that which is universal. Nor must the intelligence in the rational soul be assumed. For it does not possess the at-once-collected, and that which is co-ordinate with eternal natares ; but it proceeds according to time. Nor must we assume total intellections ; for these are exempt from our Knowledge. But Timwus co-arranges intelligence with reason. The intelligence, therefore, of a partial intellect, must now be assumed. Por it is in conjunction with this, that we some tine or other perceive real being. Por as sense is in the second duad betow the rationel soul, so intelli- gence is inthe duad above i. Por @ partial inteliect ts proximate’y established above our essence, elevaling and perfecting it, townich we are converted when purifed through philosophy, and when we conjoin our own mitellectual power with the intellt- gence of this intellect. But what this partial tntellees ts, and that it ty not as one to one rational soul, but is participated through souls which akeays energize according to tt, through which also partial sows sometimes partuctpate of intelectual light, we have elsewhere aistinctly and coptousyy discussed. Now, however, Uius nuch must be assumed, thatit is participated indeed by ad other proammate damontacal souls, but tllumimates ours, when we convert ourselves tott, and render the reason whichis inus intellectual, And as tn the Phadrus Plato calls thts the governor of the soul, and says that tt alone intel. lectually perceives real being, but that the soul percetves tt together with thas mtellect, when she is nourished by intellect and science ; thus also it must be satd that this mtel- ligence 1s prior to soul, and is truly that intelligence (mentioned by Plato) but that itis participated by soul when reason energizes intellectually, Hence Plato says in the following part of this dialogue, that intellect ts indeed in the Gods, but that a certain small genus [ο΄ πιο] participates of tt. And it seems that in what he says unfolding the Anowledge of perpetual being, he first calls it intelligence ; but that we may not apprehend it to be that alone, he adds to intelligence reason, distinguishing by a transitive energy the latter from the former, So that when reason intellectually perceives perpetual beans, as reason tndeed, tt energizes transitively, but as perceiving intellectually, with simplicity ; undcrstand- ing cach thing as simple at once, yet not all things at once, but passing from some to
nUOK 11 TIMAELS OF PLATO. | 207
others. It transitively however perceives intellectually cvery thing which it perceives ay one thing, and avy simple.
After the definition of intelligence however, let us see what reason is, and how itis connascent with intelligence, In the Theatetus therefore, rsyos, reason, 18 said to havea three-fold subsistence ; for itis either enuneiative, ora discursive procession through the elements (of speech]; or that which exhibits the differences of each thing with respect to ethers. All these signitications however, are conver- sant with compositions and divisions, and are unadapted to the comprehension of eternal being. For the similar is naturally adapted to be apprehended by the sinilar, But eternal being is simple and indivisible, and is exempt from every thing which is contrary to these. Again, after another manner, one kind of reason is said to be doxastic, another scientific, and another intellectual, For since there are in us opinion, dianoia, and intellect; but 4 call intellect here, the summit of dianoia ; and since the whole of our essence is reason, in each of these reason must be diflvrently surveyed. Opinion however, is not naturally adapted to be united to the intelligence of intellect in energy + for on the contrary it is conjoined to irrational kKnowledze. Noris dianoia, so far as it proceeds into multitude and division, able to recur to intellect; but on the contrary through the Variciy of its discursive energies, it is separated from intellectual impartbility. It remains, therefore, that the summit of the soul, and that in it which has most the form of ¢he one, is established in the intelligence of a partial intellect, being threweh alliance united to it. Hence this is the reason which intellectually per- ceives the intelligibles co-ordinate to our nature, and the energy of which’ Soera- tes in the Republic says is intelligence 3 just as dianoia ts the knowledge of Uungs which subsist between intellizibles and the objects of opinion. It, however, intelh-~ gence is the energy of this reason, it will be a certain intellect. Plato in the fol- lowing Mart of this dialogue says, that ¢his reason in the same manner as science, ts mgencrated in the soul, when it is moved about the intelligible. But that science has amore various energy, apprehending some things through others, and intellect a more simple energy, intuitively surveying beings themselves. This highest there- fore, and most impartthle portion of our nature, Piato now deneminales reason, as unfolding to us intelicct, and an intelligthb’e nature. For when the soul abandons phantasy and opinion, and various and indefinite knowledge, but recurs to its own impartibility, according to whieh it is rooted ina partial intellect, and having run back to this, conjoins the energy of itself with the intelligence of that intellect, then
* Instead of καὶ ov ὁ εν coreg Σωκράτης, γοησιν εἰπε τὴν ἐνέργειαν iv this place, itis uecessary to
ἃ ᾿ ecad καὶ οὗ o ἐν πολιτείᾳ Lwaparns vonow εἰχε τὴν Evepyetay,
208 PROCLUS ON THE | [Book τ".
it intellectually perceives eternal being together with it, its energy being both one, and twofold, and both sameness and separation being inherent in its intellections, For then the intelligence of the soul becomes more collected, and nearer to eternal things, in order that it may apprehend the intelligible together with intellect, and that the reason which is in us may like a less light, energize in conjunction with one that is greater. For our reason in conjunction with intelligence, sees the intelligible ; but the intelhgence of intellect always sees it, and always is; and \conjoins reason to if, When reason acquires the form of intellect.
After what manner however, 15 truly existing being comprehended by a partial intellect, or by reason? For this is still more admirable. May we not say, that though the intelligible itself cannot be comprehended by intellect and reason, because itis superior to all comprehension, and comprehends all things exemptly, yet intellect possessing its own intelligible, 15 also on this aceourt said to compre-
“hend the whole fof an intelligible nature}. But reason through the intellect which is co-ordinate to itself, receiving the conceptions of real beings, is thus through these said to comprehend being. Perhaps also it signifies, that reason running round the intelligible, and energizing and being moved as about a centre, thus surveys it; intelligence indeed knowing it intransitively and impartibly, but
vreason dancing as it were round the essence of it in a circle, and evolving the united hypostasis init of all things,
In the next place, letus direct our attention to opinion, and consider what it is. That itis therefore the boundary of the whole rational life, and that it is conjoined to the summit of the irrational life, is frequently acknowledged. But we shall now unfold such things as are the peculiarities of the Platonic doctrine; and which are as follow: That the doxastic part comprehends the reasons ' [or pro- ductive principles] of sensibles; thatit this is also which knows the essences of them; and that it knows the ors, or that a thing is, but is ignorant of the cause of it. For since dianoia knows at one and the same time both the essences and the causes of sensibles, but sense knows neither of these; for itis clearly shown in the Thewtetus that sense does not know the essence of a thing, and that it is perfectly ignorant of the cause of the objects of its knowledge 5 it is necessary
that opinion being arranged between sense and diangia, should know the essences fon) > ’