participates of time, and the heavens are allotted a life which is evolved accod- ing to time; but the intelligible nature alone is, according to the whole of itself, eternal. Hence, some of the ancients call the intelligible breadth truly existing being; the psychical truly evisting and at the same time not truly evisting being ;* the sensible not truly existing being ; and matter, truly non-being. After what manner, however, they made this arrangement, we shall elsewhere inves- tigate. But that the addition of “ sot having veneration,’ is for the sake of indi- cating the separate essence of perpetual being, is 1 think evident from what has been said. > Inthe next place, with respect to that which is generated, whether does 1 sig- nify the whole world, or a material and perfectly mutable composition? For some of the ancients explain this in one way, and others in another. But we un- derstand by it every corporeal formed nature, and not the soul of the universe 5 so faras this nature is of itself indeed unadorned, but is always or at a certain time, arranged by another. For the soul of the universe ts, in acertain respect, perpetual being. Much less is intelleet that which is generated: for this ts im- mediately perpetaal being. But body alone is that which is generated, and is truly never real being. For body is always in) want of the world-producing cause, and is always deriving from it the representation of existence. Why then it may be said, did not Plato add, always, and that which is generated, in the same manner as dei, or at a certain time, in order that he might have whatts generated entirely opposed to perpetual being? May we not say that Plato devised this mode of expression, Jooking to the various nature of that which is) generated, and taking away from eternal being the existence ata certain time, and the perpetuity ofa generated nature? Lor the wholes of such a nature are generated always, but the parts ata certain time, Aud atter another man- ner of considermg the ΠῚ with respect to forms, seine are inseparable from matter, and are always generated from that whichis truly always ybut others are in time, and depart from matter. Lor corporicty, indecd, is aleays generated and its always about matter ; but the form of pure, or of air, enters tntoand departs from matter, becom- mg separated from it and perishing, through the domination of a contrary nature, Vout ifthe perpetuity which detams matter is always generated, it never therefore is ; and if the existence ata certain time is generated, it ts never being, νοῦν thing
* After ovrws pew ον καλευσιν τὸ γεητυν πλατοι, instead Of Cua οὐτῶν δε cy τὸ ἐυχίκον, it ts neces:
sary to read ores καὶ μὰ cvs orrws or.
SSE EA a
Rook Ii.) Timzeus of Plato. 197
however, which is generated, is either always generated, or at a certain time. Hence, every thing which is generated, is never {real} being.
These things, therefore, having been said, let us, recurring to the discussion from the beginning, show whether perpetual being in this place is asserted of all. beings, or not ofall. For if, indeed, we admit that perpetual being indicates an eternal nature alone, having the eternal according to the whole of itself, it is not asserted of all bings. For neither the being prior to eternity, nor the order of eternity, nor again, such things as have indeed an eternal essence, but produce energies according to time, ean be arranged under this being. But if we assume every thing whatever that is eternal, and which always is, either according to the whole | of itself, or partially, then soul also ranks among eternal natures, and also that / Which contains in itselfthe causes ofall things, unically, as itis said, and univer- sally. For the ease is as follows: one thing (i.e. being itself] is super-eternal ; (another thing is eternity 3") another is simply eternal, and another is in a certain respect eternal, With respect, however, to each of these perpetual beings, the first is as the power and fountain of the ever ; the second, as that which is prima- rily always being, and the ever tse/f, and not according to participation ; but the third is always, as participating of the ecer, and as primarily wholly eternal; and the fourth, is as that which in a certain respect participates of a peculiarity of this hind, For each thing subsists triply, either according to cause, or according to hyparnis, or according to participation. And the one being, indeed, is being alone according to hyparxis, but is perpetual being according to cause. Eternity is per- petual being according to hyparxis, but: δοίη, according to participation. And the eternal is perpetual beng according to participation, but according to hy- parxis isa certain other intelligible, or intelligible and intellectual, or intellectual fonly). And if the last of these, it is either total or partial; and if this, it is either supermundane or mundane, and if this, itis ether divine, or is posterior to the Gods, and is each of these either according to existence alone, or according to power and energy, and as far as to the perpetual being of things which are in a certain respect eternal,
Again therefore, with respect to that which is generated, if we assume the uni- versal, we must assume generation all-variously changed τ but ifevery thing gene- rated, in whatever way it may be, we shall find that the heavens also are gene. rated, so far as they partake of motion and mutation, and that soul is the first of generated natures, so far as it ives in time, and time is connascent with its ener-
" The words ro δε aw», are wanting in the original, but must necessaiily be supplied.
198 PROCLUS ON THE (Book τι.
gies. And thus ascending froin beneath, we shall end in soul as the first of things that are generated ; and descending from above, we shall again terminate our pro- gression in soul, as the last of eternal natures. For though a certain person’ rightly says that the heavens always exist, yet their being is always generated by something else; but soul possesses its own essence from itself. Hence also, Socrates in the Phwdrus says, that it is unbegotten, and at the same time self moved, as being indeed the principle of all generation, but generating and vivify- ing itself. If therefore we say, that itis both unbegotten aud generated, eternal and not eternal, we shall speak rightly. Hence too the Athenian guest® thinks fitto call the soul indestructible, but not eternal, because it is in a certain respect oniy eternal, and not according to the whole of itself, in the same manner as truly existing being. Por it is one thing to de always, and another to be generated always. And the heavens, indeed, are generated always ; for they do not possess being from themselves. Butsoul is always ; for it possesses being from itself. And every thing prior to soul is not venerated from a cause, butiy froma cause, Por generation Is alone in things which derive their subsistence from others. Through these things therefore it will be manifest after what manner there Is a comprehen- sion of all beings in the before-tmmentioned portions of division, and after what manner all beings are not comprehended in thei. There is not a comprehension ofall beings, because that which is eternal only, and that which is generated only, are assumed ; one of which is prior to, but the other is posterior to soul, And there is a comprehension of all beings, because the extremes being assumed, It is possible from these to find the middle, which is at one and the same time both being and that'which is generated. «
That these distinctions, however, of that which always is, and of that which is generated, ,are necessarily made prior to all other axioms, it is easy to learn; by observing that this is the first of the problems which it is requisite to consider about the universe in the beginning, i.e. whether it always was, having no bexinning of generation, or whether it was generated, For if this is the first of the things to he investigated, then what that is which is generated, and what that is which is eternal, have very properly the first order in’ the axioms, Por the other axioms follow these, just as the remaining problems follow the problem respecting the geueration of the world. And if it be requisite that resuming the discussion about the hypotheses, 1 should more fully explain what appears to me on the pulyect,
* i.e. Aristotle. > In the 10th book of the Laws.
ποοκ 11.} Timeus of Plato. 199
Plato in the same manner as georetricians, employs definitions and hypotheses prior to demonstrations, through which he frames his demonstrations, and ante- cedently assumes the principles of the whole of physiology. For as the principles of music are different from the principles of medicine, and ina similar manner there are diferent principles of arithmetic and mechanics ; thus also there are certain principles of the whole of physiology, which Plato now delivers to us; [and these are as follow :] Zrulu existing being ts that which may be comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason. That which is gencrated is to be apprehended by opinion in conjunction with irrational sense. Every thing generated, is generated by a cause. That which does not derive its subststence from a cause, is not generated. That of which the paradigm is eternal being, ts necessarily beautiful. That, of which the paradigm is generated, is not beautiful. Let the universe be called heaven or the
world. Vor from these principles he produces all that follows. And it appears
to me, that on this account he shows what perpetual being ts, and also whae that is which is generated, but does not show us that each of them is. For the geo-
ees we
metrician informs us wat a point is, and what a line is, prior to his demonstra-‘
tions, but he by no means teaches us ¢hat each of these is. For how can he bea geometrician, if he discusses his own principles? After the same manner also, the physiologist says what perpetual being is, for the sake of the demonstrations he is about to make, but he by ne means shows (fat it is; for in so doing, he would go beyond physiology. But since, as we have before observed, Timeus does not resemble other physiologists, being a Pythagorean physiologist, and Plato exhibits in this dialogne the highest science, hence he afterwards very divinely proves ¢hat truly existing being is. For his present purpose, however, it is sufficient for him to admit (hat itis, preserving the boundaries of physiology. He appears also to investigate the definition of perpetual being and of that which is generated, in order that he may discover the causes which give completion to the universe, viz. form and matter: for that which is generated is in want of these. He assumes, however, the third hypothesis, in order that he may discover the producing cause; butthe fourth, that he may be able to infer that the universe was generated according to a paradigmatic’ cause; and the fifth, which is concerning the name of the universe, in order that he may investigate the participation of the good and the ineffable by the world, as will be shown in what follows.
It appears also to me, that Aristotle in his Physics, imitating Plato, assumes one
* For παραξειγμα airioy here, read παραξειγματικον αἰτιον.