there are Gods, it is necessary that there should be truly existing being: for this is united to the Gods; but not that which is generated and which perishes, but is never ¢ruly being. Or rather prior to these things it may be said, that the exis- tence of something which always is, is deposited in our common conceptions. For whence was that which is generated produced except from perpetual being? For if this also was generated, it must have been venerated from some other being. And this must either be perpetual being, or must likewise have been itself generat- ed. So that we must either proceed to infinity, or generation 1s In acircle, or perpetual being has a subsistence. But it isnot lawful to proceed to infinity. For from one principle which is te one, all things originate. Nor is generation in a circle, lest the same things should be both better and worse, causes and eiects. Hence it remains that (true) being always is. Why then, it may be said, is not generation from the one? Because, we reply, itis absurd that multitude should be entirely produced without being. Itis necessary therefore, that there should be truly existing being, which primarily proceeds from ¢he one, in order that the first principle may not be alone the cause of the last of things, but prior to these may be the cause of being, from which also generation proceeds. After all that has been said, however, the most true solution of the doubt 15, that Plato now assuming as an hypothesis that there is perpetual being, defines it. But after the discussion about the fabrication of the world, resuming this very thing, he demonstrates that perpetual being has a subsistence. Preserving however, what pertains to phy- siology, he proceeds from this hypothesis, and demonstrates such things as are consequent to it. For science itself also is from hypothesis, and requires that hy- potheses should be assumed prior to its demonstrations. In what he says there- fore about matter, he demonstrates not only that matter is, but also that being 15. But a little after, from one of the hypotheses, i. e. from the third, demonstrating that there is a Demiurgus of the world, he obtains also from this that perpetual being subsists prior to that which is generated. And again from the fourth hypothesis he evinces, that the Demiurgus fabricated the universe, looking to an eternal paradigm. But in the place we have mentioned, be demonstrates that perpetual being is itself by itself prior to generated natures. And thus much for this par- ticular.
With respect however, to. perpetual being itself, whether does it signify the whole intelligible world, or the Demiurgus, or the paradigm of the universe? for it is diflurently assumed by different interpreters. And if indeed, it is the whole intelligible world, whence does the intelligible breadth begin, and where does it
Buok 11.} Timaus of Plato. 193
proceed? But if it is the paradigm, how comes it to pass that the Deminrgus 1. not perpetual being, if the paradigm is one thing, and the Demiurgus another? And if it is the Demiurgus, whence is it that the paradigm ts not a thing of this kind? That the paradigmatic cause, therefore, is ta be arranged in perpetual being, is clearly evident from Plato when he says, “ According to which of the paradigms did the artificer fabricate the world? Was it according to that which subsists with tnvariahle sameness, or according to that which was gencrated 2?” And he immediately decides by saying, “ Jfthe world indeed is beautiful, and the Demiurgus ws good, tt is evident that he looked to an eternal paradigm. But if the world is not beautiful, and the Demiurgus is not good, which ibis not lawfullo assert, then he looked to a generated paradigm.” If therefore itis not lawful to assert this, the paradigm of the universe is perpetual being. But that this is also true of the Demiurgus, is evi- dent from this; that Plato calls the soul, which the Demiurgus constitutes, the first of generated natures, and delivers the generation of it. The Demiurgus, how- ever, Is prior to soul, so that he belongs to eternal beings. Hence also Plato says concerning him, “ Afler this manner therefore was there truly an eternal reasoning of the God.” And how is it possible that being a divine intellect he should not rank among eternal beings? Is therefore every intelligible world perpetual being ? The divine Tamblichus, however, strenuously contends on this subject, evineing that eternal being is superior both to the genera and the species of being; and establishes itat the summit of the intelligible essence, as that which primarily part: cipates of the one, But whatis written in the Parmenides concerning the one being Cor being characterized by ¢he one}, and also in the Sophista, bears testimony to these things. For there Plato arranges the one being prior to whole, and prior to the intelligible all; though the whole and the all are intelligible. Here, however, Plato clearly ealls the paradigm’ perpetual being, and a whole, and all-perfect. For he denominates it all-pertect animal ; and a whole, when he says, ‘ of which other animals are parts according to one, and according to genera.” So that if the paradigm isa whole and all-perfect, but that which is primarily being is above whole and all, the paradizm and that being will not be the same.
Will it not, therefore, be better to say, that there is indeed such an order of being, as that divine man (lamblichus] has delivered, and such as Plato else- where surveys; but that now Plato thus denominates every cternal world? Nor is this at all wonderful. For, at one time, the intelligible is asserted of every Pr. petual and invisible nature, as when itis said that the soul also is intelligible, as by Socrates in the Phxdo. But at another time it is asserted of the natures that
Tim, Plat. Vou. I. 25
194 PROCLUS ON THE [BooKx 41,
are more excellent than every psychical essence, as the division in the Repub- lic manifests. And at another time, it is asserted of the first triads of being, as is evident from what ‘Timweus a little after says of them. After the same manner, therefore, being in the Sophista, indeed, manifests the order of the one being; but here it signifies the whole eternal world, — For it is evident that being which is primarily being, is the summit of the intelligible breadth, and the monad of all beings, Forevery where, that whieh is primarily betng in’ tts own series, has the highest order; since if it ranked as the second, it would not have the same form; for it would no longer be primarily that which itis. As therefore, virtue itself possesses the bighest phice in the series of the virtues, as the equal itself in equals, and animal itself in animals, thus also beiy itself which is primarily being, ix the summit of all beings, and frome at all beings procecd.! But every intelligible and intellectual being, ἀπ whatever ap- pears to exist, has * the appellation of being, yet being and perpetual being are not the same. For the one being is beyond eternity, Por eternity par- ticipates of being. Henee all such things as participate of eternity, have also a certain portion of being, but not all such things as participate of being, par- ticipate Likewise of eternity. The natures therefore that exist in time, participate also of being, so that what is primarily being is beyond the order of eternity. But perpetual berg is eternal, Tlenee the reasoning demonstrates: the very contrary, that every thing is rather to be assumed trom perpetual bene, than the one being. For this latter ty better than ἐπ creer, as subsisting between dhe one and eternity, and prior Co eternity being denominated one ΠΟΙ
Vf, therefore, it be requisite that I should say what appears to me to he the truth, Plato now precedancously asstanes every thing which is clernally being ; beginning, indeed, from the nature of animal itself, Pur dus ts pronwarily elcrnal ; but ending in partial intellects, But the one being, he perhaps omits, in con- sequence of its existing as the? monad of these, and as being ineffable, and conjoined to the one. Hence Plato will now speak in reality of every intelligible, that intelligible is mot assumed which is oceult, is) the highest, and does not depart from the one. He says, therefore, shortly after this, that animal itself is the inost beautiful of intelligibles, in consequence of the natures prior to this, bein:
"An the orizinal curw δηπον καὶ τὸ aurcor, © πρωτωφεἐστιον, ὁ κυρνψη Των ΟΙΤῸΝ COTE GRA) των, καὶ ἀπ᾿ dure ᾿ ΠΡ πρυεισιν, After az’ αὐτὸν therefore, the words πάντα ra ovra muot be suy pled, * eyecis Wanting here in the original. Χχ = δ
4 30} μονα here, read μονα».
nook 11.} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. | 195
through excess of union, superior to a subsistence as objects of intellect. Unless he says that animal itselfis the most beautiful ofall the objects of intellect, both animal itself and the one being existing as objects of intellect also, the latter as being causally ever, eternity as being so according to Ayparvis, and animalitself or the eternal, as existing always, according to participation. Hence, if these things are admitted, in that which always exists, eternity, animal itself, and the Demiur- gus will be comprehended, and likewise the one being itself, which possesses the ocenltcause of eternity. So that it is evident from this, that perpetual being comprehends every nature prior to souls, whether it be intelligible, or intellec- | tual; beginning indeed trom being itself, but ending in a partial intellect, and that it does not alone comprehend, as Tamblichus says it does, the summit of all beings, such as the being is which is characterized by the one, or the one being, through which all beings are said to be beings, and to which the one itself alone, and the principles of being [bound and infinity] are superior. Zhe one, therefore, is better than that which is self-subsistent. For it is necessary that it should be exempt from all multitude. Perpetual being, however, 15. self-subsistent indeed, but possesses the power of being so through the one. But that which is posterior to it, such as is our nature, ts self-subsistent, and at the same time derives its subsistence from another producing cause. And the last of things proceed ' indeed into existence from amore excellent cause, but are not. self-subsistent. It is not however yet time for these observations.
But with respect to perpetual being, it must not be supposed, that it is partly being, and partly non-being ; for if it were, it would be a composite, and consist- ing of things of this kind, it would be dissimilarly a composite. Nor is it at one time being, and at another non-being ; for itis said to be advays being. But it is simply and eternally being, and is unmingled with every thing whatever it may be, thatis of a contrary nature, For it appears to me that the addition of the words, “ but not having generation,” indicates the unmingled and undefiled purity of perpetual being, according to which it is exempt from every hypostasis which is borne along in the images of being, and is changed by time. Not as some assert, that perpetual being is said, for the sake of perspicuity, to be without generation ; nor according to others, that Plato was willing to speak of it both affirmatively and negatively ; but that it is necessary perpetual being should be intellectually perceived subsisting by itself, remote from al! temporal mutation. For soul
* For wapeco: in this place, it is requisite to read xpoecm.
198 PROCLUS ON THE [RmooK 11.