nions, but pursuing one path of science. Moreover, the word ἐδοξα,' i.e. Lam of opinion, is assumed here very aptly, and appropriately to what has been before suid. For of the whole rational soul, one part ts intellect, another ts dianoia, and a third is opinion. And the first of these indeed, ts conjoined to the Gods, the second produces the sciences, and the third imparts them toothers. This man therefore, knowing these things, through prayer adapts his own intellect to the intellect of the Gods. For this is manifested by the words, “ that what we assert may especially be agreeable to their divinities, and that in the ensuing discourse we may be consistent with ourselves.” But through exhortations, he excites the dianoetic part of the souls of his auditors, For the words, what I scientifically concerve, have an indication of this kind. The doxastic part therefore remains, which receiving a scientific division from dianoia, delivers the streams of it to others. This however is not ambiguous, nur divided about sensibles, nor does the formal distinction of it consist in hypolepsis * alone ; but itis filled from intellect and dianoia, surveys the demiurgic reason, and distinguishes the nature of things. These particulars also, are sufliciently assimi- lated to the paradigm?’ of the speaker. For there, a royal intellect precedes, according to which the paradigm is united to intelligibles; a dianota, containing in itself the plenitudes of forms ; and the first and uniform cause of opimon. Hence, the paradigm contains intelligibles in intellect, but mtroduces sense to the worlds, as the Oracle says; or as Plato, “ such ideas therefore, as intellect perceived to be inherent in animal itself, so many he diancetically saw this universe ought to possess.” Moreover, the distinction between beings and things generated, Is consentaneous to what has been before said. For after the Gods and Goddesses, and the ineffable peculiarity which is in them, the separation of thesetwo genera, 1. δὲ of being and generation, takes place. Por being is allied to the more excellent order of divine natures, Which is always established in invariable sameness, and is intelligible. But veneration is alhed to the inferior order, from which, infinite progression, and all-various mutation, derive their subsistence. What then is this division, and after what manner was it produced? Was it nade as if it were the section of a certain whole inty parts, or as genus is divided into species, or as the division of one word into many significations, or as that of essence Into accidents, Or vice versa,
'-This word is not to be found in any edition of the ‘Timus of Plato; but from this comment of Proclus, it appears that it originally belonged to it.
> viz. Inu the apprehension of each of the terms of which a syllogism Consists.
+ i. εἰ To Jupiter the Demiurgus of the world.
Book 11. ἐιμξοβοος Plato. 189
that of accident into essences; for these are the species of division which some persons are accustomed to applaud. It is ridiculous therefore, to divide being and generation, cither as accident into essences, or as essence into accidents. For accident by no means pertains to perpetual being. Nor again must they be divided as a word into its significations. For what word is there which Plato assuming as common, divides into perpetual being, and that which is generated ; unless some one should say that τι, 1. e. α certain thing, is thus divided by him? This division however, is not Platonic, but is derived from the Stoic custom. Is the division therefore, as that of a whole into parts?) But what is that whole which consists of perpetual being, and that which is generated? Or how can paradigm and image give completion to one composition! How likewise can perpetual being be a part of a certain thing, since it is impartible, united, and simple? For the impartible is not a part of any thing which does not consist of all impartibles. But that which is generated is not impartible. lence there is not a common genus of perpetual being, and that which is generated. For perpetual being precedes according to cause that whichis generated ; and the former is when the latter is not. But perpetual being not existing, which it is not lawful to suppose, ceneration also would vanish. How likewise, is there one genus of the first, and the last of things? For the division of genera into species, takes place in the middle psychical reasons {i. e. productive powers}. But things prior to soul, subsist in more excellent genera; and things posterior to soul, have their essence in co-ordinate natures. How therefore, can being itself and that which is generated, be arranged under one genus? What also will this genus be? For it is not being, lest that which is generated, and which never [truly] is, should be arranged in being. Nor will being itself be the oxe. Because every genus is divided by its proper diflerences, and antecedently assumes the differences, either in capacity, or in energy. But it is not lawful that she ove should have differences either in capa- city, lest it should be more imperfect than secondary natures 3 or in energy, lest it should have multitude, But as it is in short demonstrated to be superior both to power and energy, it cannot in any way whatever have diflerences ; so that neither will there in short, be a division of the one.
What then shall we say?) Must it not be this, that Plato does not now make any division whatever, but that he proposes to detine separately what cach of these two, perpetual being, and that which is generated, is? For it appears to me that the word é:aszereov has the same signification with διακρινητεον. For since he discourses about the world, the Demiurgus, and the paradigm of the world, he
190 PROCLUS ON THE (BOOK 11,
wishes separately to define perpetual being, and separately that which is generated, in order that through the given definitions we may know where the world, where the Demiurgus, and where the paradigm are to be arranged 3 and that we may not confound the orders of things, but may separate them from each other, so far as they are severally adapted to be separated. He likewise docs the very same thing in the Philebus. For inquiring concerning intellect, pleasure and the mixed life, which is the best of these, he assumes the genera of them, viz, bound, infinity, and that which is mingled from bound and the infinite. For thus the order of each will become apparent, and he will manifest the peculiarity of them trom their genera, There however, hound and infinity beginning from the Gods, proceed throuzh all beings of whatever Kind they may be. Mor these also were in intelligibles according to the stable and generative cause of intelligibles. They were lkewise in the intellectual order according to the paternal and material principle of the intellectual Gods. And they were in the supermundane order, according to the demiurgic monad and vivifie duad, and in the last place, according to effective and prolific powers, Here however, being and that which is generated, do not bevin from the Gods; for the unities of the Gods are superior to being, and prior tu these the one itself is exempt from all beings, because the first God is one,” but the other Gods are wniticy. Nor are being and that which is generated) things which are participated by the Gods, in the same manner as the unities which are posterior to the Gods, are said tobe and are participated by being. Nor do they extend as faras to the last ofthings, For neither is it possible to say that matter is perpetual being, since we are accustomed to call it non-being ; nor that which is generated, which is not able even to sufler being, lest perishing by so doing, it should entirely vanish. This therefore, will again be asserted by us. It is how- ever, [evident]* that the division is not of one certain thing, and that the proposed theory has necessarily, prior to other things, the definition of these two-fold genera, in order that the discussion proceeding as if from geometrical hypotheses to the investigation of things consequent, may Giscover the nature of the universe, and the paternal and paradigmatic Catse ofit. For if the universe was generated, it was generated by a cause. ‘There is therefore a denuargic cause of the universe, [fthere isa Demiurgus, there is also a paradigm of the world, with reference to
which he who constituted the universe fabricated. And thus in a consequent
’ For ov here, itis obviously necessary to read er,
* φανερὸν is omitted in the original.
Book 11. Timaus of Plato. 191
order the discussion about these things is introduced, and the physical theory beautifully terminates for us in theology.
* What that is which is always being, but is without generation, and what that is which is generated indeed, [or consists in becoming to be]
but is never [real] being.”
According to some, all beings whatever, whether they subsist paradigmatically or iconically, are comprehended in this distinction ; but not all beings according to others, And the interpreters contradict each other respecting this, not a little. We however, cannot know which of these assertions it is fit to adopt, unless we examine each of them by itself, Let us then consider from the beginning, what power each of the words fof Plato] possesses in itself.
In the first place, therefore, τὸ τι, or the what is definitive. For we are accus- tomed to give rs an antecedent arrangement in definitions. But it is not a genus, as the Platonic Severus thought it was, who says that ro τί is the genus of being and that which is generated; and that the all is signified by it. For thus that which is generated, and likewise perpetual being, will be all. It was also doubted by some that preceded us, why Plato did not demonstrate ἐλ αν there is such a thing as perpetual being, prior to the inquiry what it is. For whence is the subsistence of perpetual being evident? And it is the law in demonstrative dis- cussions, to consider if a thing is previous to the investigation, what itis. In answer to this doubt it may be said, that perhaps Timeus did not think this was requisite to his purpose; as the day before, it was shown by Socrates in what he said about the soul, that the soul is unbegotten and incorruptible, and that it philosephises through its alliance to real beings, with which it comes into contact.
And likewise, as it was shown by him, that what is perfectly being, and tmily the object of science, is one thing; that what is partly being, and partly non- being, is another, and on this account is of a doxastic nature; and that what in no respect is being, and is entirely unknown, is another. This was also granted to Timwus by Socrates, when he divides a line into four parts, the intelligible, the dianoetic, the sensible, and the conjectural; where likewise speaking about the good he says, that it reigns in the intelligible place, in the same manner as the sun in the visible region." And farther still, the introduction of prayer previous to the discussion, is a demonstration of the existence of being which always is. For if
* See the latter end of the 6th book of the Republic, where all this is asserted,
192 PROCLUS ON THE [s0ox It.