which are many in the many parts, and dillerence separates the samenesses. I know, therefore, that some l'latonists, arrange sameness in impartible, hut dillerence in partible natures, ami thus make tlie soul to consist of both, as a medium between sameness ami dillerence. Those, however, do not* attend to what Plato here savs, that the soul is a medium between the impartibility of sameness and dillerence, and the partihility of the nature which is divisible about bodies. It is likewise requisite to know that these are the genera of being, and that it is necessary these should be every when* appropriately, in impartible, and partible natures, and m the media between these, and again in intellectual es¬ sences, in souls, in natures, and in corporeal masses. I'or I should be ashamed to divide the genera as thev do, placing one here, hut another there. For if thev had said, that sameness predominates in intelligible and impartible natures, but dillerence in sensible^, and partible natures, they would have spoken rightly. But if they assert that imparliblcs are separate from difference, neither will they be able to give to tin m sameness. For the one ditiers from the same.'' And if they say that partible natures are separate from sameness, they subvert the essence of them.
Following therefore things themselves, we must admit that the genus of same¬ ness subsists with a demiurgic peculiarity, but that the species of it, is the imparti¬ ble and the partible, and the medium between both. And again that the genus ot difference is dcmiuigic, but the species of it, the impartible and the partible, and that which is intermediate. Admitting this likewise, we must assign media to tin: soul, and complicate them with the middle form of essence, mi order that we may constitute the existence of the soul. For thus I think we shall lie able to adapt the words of Plato to things. For he says, that as m essence, so likewise in the nature of same and tie nature of different, the Demmrgus mingled a third thing from both, and after the same maimer. And as there, that which was mingled from both was a species or form ot essence, so here, tin medium between same and diflcrciit, is a sjiecies or form. Foi it is possible to Ire a medium not as form, but as a whole composed of the extremes, as an animal which consists of soul ami body. In order, therefore, that you may not ignorantly conceive this to he the case, lie adds, “ and after the .same manner;" that here also, that which consists of both may be a form and not a whole.
“ And taking them as three beings, he mingled all of them into one idea."
* On i> tn*re omitted hi llie nrginal.
1 lor if uuiiditiMei I no diAmno', they will be I lit same with rack oilier, and will l>e tht one. For iu the one there is no difference. So that the one will not differ from the tame.
TIM/F.US OF PLATO.
That the throe demiurgic genera, are the causes of hypostasis to second amt third forms, Plato I think sufficiently manifests in saying, “ and taking them as three things” For where do they subsist? Evidently in the Demiiirgus. For heeontuins that which he takes. Hut he receives them from superior causes. For since sameness having in a greater degree the form of bound, consists of bound and infinity, and also difference which has more the form of infinity consists of these just as essence similarly proceeds according to both, it is evident, that we must rather place in bound [than in infinity] the sameness and difference of the impartible, but those of the media similarly in both, and those of partible natures rather in the infinite than in bound ; just as the first difference has the infinite, in a small degree only declining from bound, and the fir^t sameness has bound in a small degree declining from the infinite.’ Hence Plato says that the Demiur- gus received them as three, Ireing separated from each other. And since the forms that art* in him,’ hasten to the generation of other things, on this account also, he constitutes other things from these. If therefore we understand by hangs things prior to the generation of the media, we must say that these subsist in him according to cause. For these were in him prior to the tilings generated by him. Hut if by beings we understand the media, v\e must understand them as things constituted. For they are now lieiiigs, because they were produced bv him prior to the mixture, each apart from the other; and essence, sameness, and difference were now generated each by itself. May not hnwevi r the words lie in¬ terpreted more simply, vi/. the Pemiurgus “ taking than being three” for so many things he i fleeted from the three, the extremes Is'iug now now constituted by him, according to the preexistent causes w hich he contains ? And these genera indeed lie produced according to demiurgic lrcing ; but he added idea to all the three ac¬ cording to the union in himself, and the deity in him, which is the cause of the union of multitude. And you see, that each of the three was a form, and that which was produced from the mixture of tiie three, was one idea. Hence it is— necessary to say, that the soul is a form of forms; and, in short, to concene nothing in it as a composite and corporeal.
The triad, therefore, is adapted to the essence itself of the soul; since it was before shown that the soul is triadic. For we divided the whole of it into es¬ sence, power and energy ; essence, into hyparxis, harmony, and form; and liy- parxis, into what is properly called essence, same, and different. Nor is it proper to wonder, if we make a part of essence to Ik* essence. For the one genus of being is called essence, and that also which is generated, as it were, from all the ele-
1 In the original there is an omission hero of rov axrtpov.
* For tv rat>T|i m this place, it is necessary to read tv <wry.
PROCLUS ON Till-
merits of being, is denominated essence. If, however, we should again inquire, what it is that makes this one idea not to be any casual soul, but the mundane soul, but elsewhere a different soul; we reply, that it is the total nature of the genera that are assumed. For the mundane soul is a medium, not of casual extremes, hut of a total intellect, and total corporeal nature, according to which the world is an animal, tustas it is endued with intellect according to its impartible nature, and animated according to its middle nature. The predominance likewise of essence, cruses it to be the mundane soul; for this makes it to be divine ; just as t a* pievalence of sameness alone, produces a (heiuomacal soul, and ol diflerciice alone, a partial soul. A different habitude therefore to the extn mes, product s a diff. relic* in the media. Anti tin mixture of the media, defined according to the prevalence ol one thing, evidently « hanges the whole.
“ Co-aclapting by force the nature ot ditlcient which it was difficult to mingle, to the nature ot same.”
I It) w is the nature of dilft rent difficult to Ik* mingled * lueause it has a sepa¬ rating and dividing power, ami is the cause of progressions and multiplications. 13 ut every divine heing begins his energy from himself. Hence also th«* nature of different separates itself from other things and from itself. For it generates multitude in itself. On this account, it is said in the Sophisla, that it makes Imth other tilings and itself to he non-heings, separating them from other beings, lienee’ll is ditheult to he mingled, possessing this dilheulty, not troin .u * ideiit or any deviation, hut having an essence which is the cause ot ot lit mess, oft u* 1111- confused hypostasis of forms, and of uniningled simplicity. Possessing likewise Midi a power as this, it is a certain contrary hotli to sameness and to essence . 1 And it is contrary indeed to sameiu because sameness is the cause of union, communion and connexion ; hut dilleiviicc, of separation, of an inability to he mingled, and ofotherness, lint it is a certain contrary to essence because essence is being, but difference is non being, as is d< moiistraled in flic Sophisla. l'or the nature of different b< mg divided into minute parts, lwcomes the principal of non- lacing. That we may not, therefore, be involved in ambiguity by perceiving an at-once-cullected mixture of tin- genera, lie in the fu>t place mingles same with different* and sa\s that divinity <o-adapted the nature of difh-reiirr to that of sameness, as harmonically conjoining it with middle sameness. Afterwards, he
1 l'or r r o> tiiv uirmi litre, it i» necessary lo reait *710, ri|e iraor.
* Insle.nl of ro Mii’-( r ro Our<(ny ^171 uva 111 tins jilace, il b oliviomly reijimile to rcail ro ravToy ry Curifiy /o>* roiy.
Hook Iii ]
mingled both with essence. For Plato having said, that divinity co-adapted
tin; natim* of dillerence to that of sameness adds, “ that he mingled them with f«( nee, and made nn thing from the three." For because osence is c« nnective of the two genera same and different, but thesi; an; co-ordinate to each other, it is necessary that tliese should m the first place be mingled with each other, and in the second place, that both should be mingled with essence. And thus much con¬ cerning the order in the mixture. The farce , however, employed in the mixture, i^ not adventitious, nor such as the force which is preternatural, but indicates a transcendency and abundance of power; for such is demiurgic power. .So that it is able to unite difference, to divide sameness, and to p oduce one harmony from both.
“ But having mingled these two with essence, and made one thing from the three, he again divided this whole, into appropriate parts.”
As the equal and the unequal are conjoined with quantity;' and as all quan¬ tity is either equal or unequal, or rather is equal ami at the same time unequal, for every quantity at once participates of both ; and as the .similar and the dissimilar are conjoined with quality, and every quality is both similar and dissimilar; thus, also, same and different are co-existent with essence ; and all essence participates of sameness and difference. For these are essentially, or according to existence itself, inherent in things, and not according to quantity or quality. Hence they are essential, being the media between the divine genera, and those things which are inherent in quantities and qualities. For sameness, indeed, is suspended from bound, but difference from infinity ; just as similitude and equality, are suspended from sameness, but dissimilitude and inequality from difference. Hence, also, Plato in the Philebus, produces bound and infinity from [the highest] Hod: for the) are divine genera. But in the Sophista, he denominates same and different the genera 1 of being. And the former subsist about the one, but the latter about essence. Again, also, you see how much more venerable Plato is than all other physiologists, and even than Aristotle himself. J’or they making their principles to be contraries, introduce organic, material, and partible contrarieties. And even the most venerable of them, refer contraries to excess and defect; badly assuming the privation of measure in the principles of things. For measure is more divine than the privation of measure. But Plato refers contraries to
Tim. l*lnl.
1 l or u/errp rornv try here, read utntp ry rnny. * For you roi> hitci lu re, read yo-i; tov orr-ji.