sameness and difference, through which he comprehends all the contrarieties in soul, in nature, and in body ; and he places these in the Demiurgus, in order that he inav trite to them generative, cosmurgie,* immaterial, and exempt powers. Having likewise placed them there, lie constitutes the soul from them, producing from these, that w hich is as it were the subject of it, and the being of it, s,> far as being, and not so fir as ,t is a being with a certain quality, in order that it may imitate primary being. 1 'or he afterwards assigns to the soul harmony, torm, powers, and energies, thus rciid» ring the discussion ol it peilect. l’or we shall be able to sum \ its dignity, ai d its order in the world, which is of i ruling nature, if we perceive how by all the gi nera that are in it, it contains mundane essences ; how 1 1\ its ow n harmony, it co-hannom/es the whole world ; how !»y its own figure, it comprehends all mundane forms and ligun alter what manner, by the powers that are in it, it is able to perl- < t all physical, and all rational, or artificial powers; % and bow In its ow n proper • nf rgies, it excites mundane productions.
\\ by, therefore, did not Plato say, that the soul is a medium between intellect and si use ? Because lie says, t!i it inti !le« t and sense, are celt tin gnostic powers. But bis inti ntnui was to th liver the middle nature of it in c-sniees, anti not in powers. Wliv, however, did lie not say, that tin* soul is a medium between idea and things whi« li ar»* invested with form ? Because it was not now proposed by him to teat h us what the quality is of its form, but what its essence is. But it is not the same thing to speak of the i nee, as it is to speak of the form of a cer¬ tain tiling. I or form t xhibits an os nee of a ct rt tin quality. W hv then, did he not place the soul as a medium beiwivn intelligible and sensible numbers ? Be¬ cause in the following part of tin* discussion, lie assigns to it an harmony, accord¬ ing to which it ranks as a medium between separate numbers and separate lcaniiony, and si n>able numbers, and the hanuony which is inseparable from subjects. For according to the conception of Plato, tlie* soul is neither harmony itself, nor the harmony which is in things harmonized. Harmony itself, indeed, is uniform and separate, and is < vempt from all harmonized natures, ol whatevt r kuul they may be; being that alone which is called hanuony ilst.lt. But the harmony which e m things harmonized, pi rt.uiis to other things, ami is naturally adapted to be moved hv others. And the middle of both, is the harmony ot the 'Old. For this is that u huh is jirst tun niomztJ. Hein e also it imparts hanuony to other things, lor that which is able to impart stunt tiling to another thing, is t itht-r the form itself [which is participated}, or prn lanlv participates of it. I nis harmony therefore ol the soul, i' inferior to intelligible harmony, and to mtt liigihlo
* i. c. Powers efleclive of tlie worlit.
Took Iii ]
TIM XL’S or I’LVI'O
.'ll
numbers, but transcending sensible harmony, it hkevvi-e transcends sensible numbers. And if it be requisite to speak concisely about each of these, each of them is fourfold. For with respect to number, the first is divine, the second essential, the third psychical, and the last physical. And the first, indeed, has the form of unity, the second is immoveable, the third is self-motive, and the fourth is alter-motive. \\ ith respect to harmony, a!>o, the first is in the Gods, the second i> in truly -existing beings, the third is in souls, and the last is in the natures which are harmonized by other things. If, therefore, it had been now proposed by I’lato to speak concerning the psychical harmony, he would have said that it is a me¬ dium Wtween impartible and partible harmony. But since the present discussion is concerning the essence of the soul, he says that it is a medium between same and ditl'erent.
Here, likewise, it i> necessary to observe, that Plato in what is now said, makes as it were a conversion of the progressions of the psychical essence to their prin¬ ciples. Tor since the form of the mixtures i> twofold, the one .subsisting accord¬ ing to the mixture of the extri mes, which we have in the mixture of essence, same¬ ness, and difference; lnit the other, according to again collecting the media into one whole ;—the- being the rase, in the former mixture he began from essence, and ended in the latter; but vice versa in the latter. For he first co-harmonized the latter with sameness, and thus afterwards both with essence, and ended m essence, from which according to progression he began. Every where, however, that which is a whole' is subordinate to the two principles. For when he pro¬ duces the soul from impartiblcs and partibles, he places the impartible analogous to bound, but the partible to infinity. For the infinite is the cause of multitude, hut hound of union. And when he co-harmonizes difference with sameness, he assumes difference as in the genera of being, belonging to the co-ordination ot the infinite; hut sameness, as belonging to the co-ordination of bound. When like¬ wise he mingles the two with essence, he assumes essence .as having the form of unity ; but sameness and difference as dyadic, and opposed to each otiicr. And he does not cease collecting the multitude together, till he evinces the whole to be one. For the one is more excellent than essence itself, and the bitormed princi¬ ples [bound ami infinity]. The mixture, however, being as we have said, twofold, the one constituting the elements themselves, the other being that which consists of the elements, Porphyry rightly inquires whether the Demiurgus made both these in the Crater [i. c. Juno], or one of them out of, but the other in it; and lie
1 Instead of b nv, r^rrm rwr ivo ro t* ep\uv in this place, it is rfipdiitc from the vcrs.cn
cf Leonicus Tbonurus to read TtiiTo^e* b or mr^roi rmv Ivo to c\cv np^uy.
univenw*. since it is not lawful to refur the deteriorations’ of partial souls to such as are divine, Plato adds, tjiat divinity divided the soul into appropriate parts. For here that which divides, divides according to an intellectual cause, and that which is divided, is divided essentially. This mode of division, therefore, is adapted hoth to the divider, and the tiling divided ; since it is beneficent, and perfective of the essence of the soul, introducing it to intellectual variety,' and making it all-perfect, by inserting in it all the reasons of beings.
If then we assert these things rightly, it is not proper to separate the soul from union in the division of it, nor to consume the wholeness ol it, into the genera¬ tion of the parts, as the words of Tim vus seem to indicate when hesavs, that the thing mingled was consumed into these parts. Nor must we fancy that this was ns it were the division of a certain rule. J or .ill these modes are corporeal, and h\ no means adapted to immaterial essences. For every thing which is generated bv the Demiurges, must necessarily remain the same, since he always produces after the same manner, being immoveable and < ternal in bis energies. It is neces¬ sary, therefore, that the whole should always remain a whole; that the generation of the parts should be effected, the wholeness remaining; and that this should not lie consumed in the division of the parts. Hence, we must conceive, that the essence of the soul is one, and at the same time many, the whole remaining and being distributed into parts, and possessing continuity, and being, at the same time, divided. Nor must we imagine that the continuity of it is accompanied with interval; fur it is continued and without magnitude , like the continuity of tune; nor that the division of it is according to monadic numbers. For a thing ol this kind is quantity which does not accord with continuity . 1 But we must collect these into one, as it is fit with incorporeal natures, and must survey in the soul, the whole in conjunction with 4 the parts. Plato also manifests, that it is not proper to depart from union in the division, through the following words :
“ At the same time minglingcach part from same, different, and essence. But lie began to divide as follows."
If the "enera which constitute the soul, are in all the parts T of it, and the whole
* Tor ra «\arrw ficra here, read «\arru/mr«.
1 1 fumAiue is omitted in ibis place in I be original, but ought from tbc version of Thom.ru«, lobe u- kcrltd.
1 Viz. a ibuig of tins kind is discrete quantity.
* For/ice in this place, read firra
* Slffna iv is omitted in the original.
Ihiok Iii.]
TIM.KUS OF PLATO.
consists of parts similar to itself, it will in no respect be separated from continuity and union. For if in bodies similars cohere with each other without a medium, how much more in an incorporeal nature must all the things that are as it were parts, lie united, and the whole he vanquished by unity, neither tin* parts being confused, through the position of the whole, nor the wholeness taken away through the separation of the parts? Yon may also assume from these things, that the soul aerording to all the parts of itself, is both impartible and partible. For if every part of it participates of all the middle genera, nothing m it can hr assumed w hi* h lines not eonsist ol these. The ancients also, looking to these tilings, concluded every where concernin'.; it, that all of it is being, life, and mfi llect, ami that whit h< ver you may assume of the three, you may infer that it contains the rrmninmi; two ; since all things in it proceed through all, the whole is one, the one of it is all perfect, and a part in it corresponds to the whole. But if each of the parts of it In ini; many, is a certain essence, as numerous as are the parts, so multitudinous also is the essence, in a similar manner also with respect to same¬ ness and difference, each of these in intellect indeed is one, and on this account it is impartible. For in intellect one tiling is not a part different from another. l*ut in the soul both these are divided according to rsseutial nundrer, and the parts of it are adapted to each other, causing it to Ik* one tiling from many, and a whole from parts.
Moreover, this also deserves to lie considered, that according to the generation of the elements, he [vegan as we have said, from essence; hut according to the composition of the whole, from difirrrucc; co-ndnpting tiie nature o (different, which is dillicult to he mingled with same, and mingling both with essence, llut according to the division of the whole into harmonic ratios, he began from same¬ ness. For he says’ that lie divided each part mingled from same, different, and < ssrnre. 1 or a coinnii neement from essence is entirely 1 adapted to the genera¬ tion of simple natures ; since essence is more simple than other things. 1 o the composition, however, of the whole, a commcneeuient from dilfercnce is adapted. For the generation of the whole from parts begins Imm things subordinate to the whole. And a enmnu neenunt from sameness is adapted to the hypostasis of harmony. For the Deinuirgus was willing th.it tins should terminate in tin* sameness and roinmiinion of the things that were divided. And, in short, he was willing that hurmonv should Is* etlcctive ol the sameness of the things harmonized.
These particulars, however, having been discussed by us as tar as we are able,
• For court here it is obviously ncccoary |o read
* Iustcad of rarrr birr, read